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Abstract
Despite decades of inquiry an adequate theory of ‘quantum gravity’ has remained elusive,
in part due to the absence of data that would guide the search and in part due to technical
difficulties, prominently among them the ‘problem of time’. The problem is a result of
the attempt to quantise a classical theory with temporal reparameterisation and refoliation
invariance such as general relativity.
One way forward is therefore the breaking of this invariance via the identification of a
preferred foliation of spacetime into parameterised spatial slices. In this thesis we argue
that a foliation into slices of constant extrinsic curvature, parameterised by ‘York time’,
is a viable contender. We argue that the role of York time in the initial-value problem of
general relativity as well as a number of the parameter’s other properties make it the most
promising candidate for a physically preferred notion of time.
A Hamiltonian theory describing gravity in the York-time picture may be derived
from general relativity by ‘Hamiltonian reduction’, a procedure that eliminates certain
degrees of freedom — specifically the local scale and its rate of change — in favour of
an explicit time parameter and a functional expression for the associated Hamiltonian. In
full generality this procedure is impossible to carry out since the equation that determines
the Hamiltonian cannot be solved using known methods.
However, it is possible to derive explicit Hamiltonian functions for cosmological sce-
narios (where matter and geometry is treated as spatially homogeneous). Using a per-
turbative expansion of the unsolvable equation enables us to derive a quantisable Hamil-
tonian for cosmological perturbations on such a homogeneous background. We analyse
the (classical) theories derived in this manner and look at the York-time description of a
number of cosmological processes.
We then proceed to apply the canonical quantisation procedure to these systems and
analyse the resulting quantum theories. We discuss a number of conceptual and technical
points, such as the notion of volume eigenfunctions and the absence of a momentum rep-
resentation as a result of the non-canonical commutator structure. While not problematic
in a technical sense, the conceptual problems with canonical quantisation are particularly
apparent when the procedure is applied in cosmological contexts.
In the final part of this thesis we develop a new quantisation method based on configu-
ration-space trajectories and a dynamical configuration-space Weyl geometry. There is no
wavefunction in this type of quantum theory and so many of the conceptual issues do not
arise. We outline the application of this quantisation procedure to gravity and discuss
ii
some technical points. The actual technical developments are however left for future
work.
We conclude by reviewing how the York-time Hamiltonian-reduced theory deals with
the problem of time. We place it in the wider context of a search for a theory of quantum
gravity and briefly discuss the future of physics if and when such a theory is found.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Quantum theory and gravity
Cosmology, the study of the history of universe, has a unique role in the investigation of
physical reality. Unlike, for example, particle physics or condensed-matter theory it can-
not be tested experimentally in the laboratory. All evidence must come from observation
of the one and only universe to which we have access. To make matters worse, all our
observations are made roughly from a single point in space and time.
Yet despite these limitations, cosmology — in particular the study of the very early
moments in the history of the universe — is not only fascinating in itself but also excep-
tionally useful in that it allows us to explore physics at extremely high energies and on
very small scales, where both gravitational and quantum effects are expected to play a
crucial role. That is, through observations of remnants of this very early period in the
history of the cosmos, we can hope to probe physics that is irreproducible in the lab to
any degree of practicality, if not in principle.1
The observational investigation of the early universe is uniquely challenging, but also
uniquely rewarding.
Aside from technical difficulties (to which we come shortly) it is this lack of ex-
perimental access that has led to the elusiveness of a complete and testable theory of
quantum gravity, a theory that is to describe physics under the conditions that existed
in the immediate aftermaths of the big bang,2 and that is to reduce to the testable limits
of classical general relativity and quantum field theory in the appropriate regimes. The
elusive theory of quantum gravity therefore has a unique historical status: Advances in
electromagnetism during the nineteenth century were propelled forwards by observing
phenomena such as static electricity and the action of magnetic forces, thermodynamics
1Since it is impossible to have the entire universe inside a piece of apparatus that is itself part of the
universe.
2Throughout this thesis I will use the term ‘big bang’ to refer to the initial singularity with which the
universe is thought to have started (unless quantum gravity were to tell us otherwise). A particle physicist
on the other hand would probably place the ‘big bang’ at a point when the universe had a size of roughly
the Planck scale (where classical general relativity is sure to break down), while some cosmologists would
use the term to describe a point in time as far forward as the end of inflation (since everything before that is
highly speculative).
1
by observing the behaviour of gases and other fluids. During the early twentieth century
the mystery of spectral lines and other atomic phenomena led, ultimately, to quantum
mechanics. Even general relativity, undoubtedly one of the most elegant theoretical de-
velopments in the history of physics, was not primarily a quest for mathematical beauty
but one to explain the advancing perihelion of mercury, for example.3 And while quantum
field theory was developed with the idea in mind of making quantum mechanics compat-
ible with the Lorentz-invariance of special relativity, experimental progress kept up with
theoretical predictions.4 On the other hand, the search for quantum gravity is driven not
by experimental facts in need of explanation but by a desire for a unified description of
phenomena, each of which is already well described by an appropriate theory such as
general relativity or quantum field theory.
The fact that the quest for quantum gravity is driven by theory rather than experiment
is exactly the reason why experimentally corroborating any particular quantum-gravity
contender is difficult; if appropriate experiments were available in the lab we would likely
already have performed them, observed new phenomena and would have had empirical
evidence to guide our search.
That no accepted theory of quantum gravity exists is not due to a lack of contenders.
Proposals are numerous, albeit few are sufficiently developed theoretically to justifiably
claim the status of a self-consistent theory with concrete predictions. The proposed the-
ories differ radically even in the answers they give to most fundamental questions: Is
spacetime fundamental or is there a true differentiation between space and time? Are
space and time infinitely divisible? Is there a physically fundamental measure of time? Is
time even physical at all, and if so, what does that mean? Is everything dynamical or is
there a fixed ‘background’ structure that serves as the arena of the universe’s dynamics?
The reason for this plethora of theoretical frameworks is the failure of the ‘standard’
procedure when applied to gravity: the canonical quantisation of the classical gravita-
tional field of general relativity. In the present work we will spend some time gaining an
understanding of why this method fails. Suffice to say at this stage, both the success of
canonical quantisation with anything but the gravitational field, as well as the procedure’s
failure with it are in their own way remarkable.
A priori the idea of canonical quantisation appears ludicrous: Begin with a ‘classical’
theory describing entities such point particles, or fields, or rigid objects, where the chosen
classical theory is experimentally adequate on sufficiently large scales and sufficiently
low energies. Now perform a series of ad-hoc mathematical steps to arrive at a new
theory whose ontology (that is, the physical entities that purport to make up the world) is
radically different from that of the classical theory (if at all well-defined). Finally establish
a link with what is measurable by introducing highly questionable postulates concerning
the outcomes of ‘experiments’.
3In fact, later in life Einstein revised his own history, stating that mathematical beauty had been the
driving force behind his development of general relativity. The documentation of the period 1910-1916
tells, however, a different story [123]. Einstein’s motivation was almost entirely experimental.
4Perhaps a notable exception is the Higgs boson, which was only observed some forty years after having
been predicted theoretically.
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This new ‘quantum’ theory is now supposed to be understood as being more funda-
mental than the classical theory from which it originated, the latter being considered a
limit of the former under appropriate conditions. It appears that the reasoning is back-
ward, with the fundamental being derived from the approximation. Yet the phenomenal
experimental success of this ‘recipe’ in all areas of physics except gravity is truly remark-
able. When applied to the most fundamental classical theory known, the fields comprising
the standard model of particle physics, the resultant quantum theory has been corroborated
experimentally to an extremely high degree of accuracy.
However, when the same procedure is applied to the metric field gµν , a (0, 2)-tensor
classically used to represent the gravitational field (or, more accurately, to the spatial
metric gab on a suitably chosen space-like ‘slice’ taken from a foliation of the spacetime),
it fails spectacularly. In particular, the resultant theory implies that the universe is frozen,
that no dynamical processes are possible at all. This is one facet of what has been dubbed
the ‘problem(s) of time’, which we will be discussing in some detail in chapter 2.
At the heart of the problem lies the general covariance of the classical theory, that
is, the fact that the dynamical equations of general relativity are covariant under arbitrary
coordinate transformations on spacetime. General covariance is not a physically meaning-
ful property of a theory. Any (classical) theory can be expressed in a generally covariant
form, a criticism going back almost a century [69]. However, applying the quantisation
recipe to distinct forms of the same classical theory does not necessarily yield physically
equivalent quantum theories. This fact is central to the line of inquiry pursued in this
thesis and will be discussed further in future chapters.
In general relativity one can consider four independent generators of coordinate trans-
formations at each point in spacetime, three in space and one in time. These are the
gauge freedoms of the theory at any one point in spacetime. Each of these gauge free-
doms leads to a constraint equation, totalling three so-called ‘momentum constraints’ and
one ‘Hamiltonian constraint’5 stemming from the three spatial and one temporal gauge
freedom respectively. The problem of time is associated with the latter.
Understanding how the ‘frozen’ dynamics follow from the temporal gauge freedom is
possible without reference to the full theory of general relativity. In fact, a simple particle
model suffices, provided its laws (that is, its action) is given in a time-reparameterisation
invariant form. This time-reparameterisation invariance serves as a toy model for the
temporal gauge freedom of general relativity. It is however important to emphasise that
in general relativity there are other facets to the problem of time which do not appear in
the case of a particle model, primarily due to the fact that while in the toy model there
is a single gauge degree of freedom determining the temporal parameterisation, there is
one such degree per spacetime point in general relativity. As a consequence in general
relativity it is not only that the sequence of spatial slices constituting the history of the
5Gauge constraints usually generate (non-physical) gauge transformations (‘generate’ referring to mo-
tion in the configuration space determined by the Poisson bracket of the constraint and the configuration
variable). However, it has been argued that the Hamiltonian constraint described real physical change [11].
We briefly survey the argument at the end of section 2.2.
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universe may be freely relabelled, but it is not even clear how the slicing should be done
in the first place.
Short of more radical proposals, two ‘fixes’ come to mind. First, one may consider
partially gauge-fixing general relativity. Here one specifies the temporal gauge, thereby
choosing a unique slicing and a unique labelling of those slices. This eliminates the
Hamiltonian constraint and hence the frozen dynamics. A second approach is to con-
struct an entirely new theory which does not possess the slicing ambiguity in the first place
and has a fixed temporal parameterisation, provided the phenomenology of general rela-
tivity can be recovered sufficiently closely in order not to contradict past observations.6
One such contender is Shape Dynamics, a theory whose dynamical variables are those
describing a conformal three-geometry (rather than the non-conformal four-geometry of
general relativity). Shape dynamics matches the phenomenology of general relativity for
spacetimes that can be foliated into globally hyperbolic slices (for example, a spatially
flat Friedmann universe) but differs in its prediction for what to expect on the other side
of a black-hole event horizon, for example. It turns out that in the presence of such a
hyperbolic slicing Shape Dynamics and general relativity have a gauge overlap. That is,
there is an appropriate gauge fixing (a choice of coordinate description) for each such that
the resultant two gauge-fixed theories are identical.
From the perspective of general relativity this gauge fixing consists of splitting space-
time into slices of constant mean extrinsic curvature (CMC), a concept we will introduce
in some detail later. The slices are labelled by ‘York time’, named after James York
in whose work on the initial-value problem of general relativity in the early 1970s this
parameter had special significance [143, 28]. In a cosmological setting York time is pro-
portional to the negative of the Hubble parameter. This choice has a number of convenient
properties which we will describe in chapter 4. The choice corresponds to the gauge over-
lap between Shape Dynamics and general relativity.
In the light of the problem of time, performing such a gauge fixing is an obvious
strategy. However, it is nonetheless radical in that it constitutes an explicit abandonment
of general spacetime covariance in favour of a more limited spatial covariance. Physically
speaking, it assumes the existence of a fundamental slicing of spacetime into space and
time, at least if this gauge choice is meant to be more than a convenient coordinate choice
for general relativity. Since we intend to construct a quantum theory from this choice,
and since different gauge fixings of the same theory may well lead to phenomenologically
distinct quantum theories after application of the quantisation recipe (see chapter 3), the
choice is indeed more than one of coordinates.
Abandoning spacetime in favour of space and time might appear to run in the face
of the last one hundred years of developments in physics, not least quantum field theory
whose development was in part motivated by the desire to construct a Lorentz-covariant
theory of particles. However, at closer inspection it is not, in fact, as far-fetched as it
6It is not strictly necessary that all predictions of general relativity are recovered by such a theory, but
only those that have actually been tested. Discrepancies would allow for the ability to distinguish between
the two theories in future experiments.
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might appear. One reason is that in quantum theory the notion of ‘time’ takes on a fun-
damentally different role. Consider the quantisation of field theories. The quantisation
must be performed with a specific choice of temporal parameter. It is only after the quan-
tisation is complete that one can show that the chosen splitting of space and time (here
in a Lorentzian setting with flat spacetime rather than the curved spacetime of general
relativity) is, in fact, undetectable and that no superluminal ‘signalling’ is possible. That
is, spacetime covariance is recovered at the phenomenological rather than fundamental
level. Further, covariant quantisation of the electro-magnetic field (or equally fields of
the strong and electro-weak sector of the standard model) leads to ‘ghosts’, unphysical
modes in the field which are nonetheless essential to the mathematical structure of such
a formulation. Once again these do not appear at the level of the phenomenology, but
their status is somewhat of an open question on the ontological level if the quantum field
theory is treated with any degree of physical realism (which it rarely is in practice). A
fundamental choice of space and time would alleviate this concern.
A very different reason to suspect the existence of a fundamental distinction between
space and time is found in cosmology. It is well established that the observable universe is
highly homogeneous and isotropic at sufficiently large scales. Over distances of hundreds
of megaparsecs matter and radiation are very evenly distributed throughout the universe.
However, this homogeneity is not generally invariant but only holds in one particular
foliation of spacetime (up to small perturbations with scales smaller than the scale on
which the homogeneity holds).
Quantum theory demands an unambiguous notion of simultaneity. This is because
time is treated very differently from any other variable in standard quantum theory.
The departure from a fundamentally ‘relativistic’ physics is radical, but not unreason-
able. In fact, even at the classical level one can very naturally arrive at a field theory in
which the universal light-cone, that is, the constancy of the speed of light and the fact
that this ‘speed limit’ appears to apply to all fields of matter equally, is a result rather
than a postulate of the theory. Starting from the desire to implement a truly ‘relational’
viewpoint of dynamics this has been achieved as part of the Shape Dynamics program.
However, for the emergence of the classical light cone a slightly simpler theory suffices,
dubbed ‘Relativity without relativity’ by its creators [12].
In order to arrive at a theory describing the evolution of CMC slices we will perform
a procedure called Hamiltonian reduction. It provides a method to arrive at a physical
(that is, non-vanishing) Hamiltonian for the foliation-fixed theory starting from the gauge-
general Hamiltonian of general relativity in its Arnowitt-Deser-Misner (ADM) formula-
tion [4]. The ADM Hamiltonian vanishes in virtue of being the sum of four constraints.
In general, the Hamiltonian reduction cannot be completed analytically since it involves
solving a highly non-trivial (and non-linear) differential equation [28]. However, at suf-
ficiently large scales on which the universe is spatially homogeneous the procedure is
relatively straightforward. For example, for a cosmological model with a set of scalar
fields the equation reduces to a cubic, which can be readily solved (see chapter 5). At the
level of perturbations it is more intricate and a perturbative solution to the problem and
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the discussion of the resulting perturbation theory will constitute chapters 7 and 8.
The reduced-Hamiltonian theory, unlike the original constraint system of general rel-
ativity, can be quantised without (too much) difficulty, although we will encounter some
subtleties in the process. How then is the quantisation to be carried out?
It is important to remember that no quantisation method is intrinsically superior to
another. Ultimately empirical data corroborates the contenders for the correct quantum-
gravitational theory and eliminates incorrect ones. If two theories, constructed from the
same classical theory using different methods of quantisation, are identical in their predic-
tion, one may be preferable for its conceptual clarity. However, realists must proceed with
care. The inference of facts about the world’s underlying ontology necessarily involves a
certain degree of ‘philosophy’ and one must be careful when choosing between two em-
pirically equivalent but ontologically distinct theories. This is not to say that such reason-
ing is irrational, although many physicists throughout the twentieth century and beyond
have taken this attitude.7 In fact, here we wish to argue that any fundamental physical
theory must make statements about what the basic ontological entities are with which the
theory is concerned. Lacking such information a theory is more akin to a prescription for
predicting experimental outcomes, without or with only very little explanatory value.
Yet it is no hyperbole to say that the last century has been dominated by confusion with
regards to the correct ‘interpretation’ of quantum mechanics, even in the context of, say,
quantised non-relativistic particle models.8 We chose to use quotation marks around the
term since it is rather inaccurate. What is generally counted among such interpretations
includes theories with potential experimental discrepancies (such as dynamical-collapse
theories and non-equilibrium pilot-wave theory), as well as ‘interpretations’ that are in
fact no such thing but an explicit lack thereof (so-called operational pictures).
Given the extent to which the quantum field theory of the standard model of parti-
cle physics has been tested it is highly doubtful that discrepancies in the predictions of
laboratory measurement outcomes by different formulations will be detected in applica-
tions relating to conventional (that is, non-gravitational) quantum field theory. On the
other hand, given the fundamental incompatibility of the standard quantum formalism
with general relativity, one or both of them must be revised. This might plausibly lead
to diverging phenomenologies in appropriate regimes, in particular in cosmological ob-
7More accurately, there are two distinct points here. First, there are schools of thought that claim or at
least imply that any form of reasoning about the underlying reality of a theory is meaningless. Historically
the best known such group were the logical positivists, most prominently represented by the famous Vienna
Circle. In a similar vein, arguably, falls the rising popularity of attempting to formulate quantum mechanics
in terms of partial knowledge and information with an ‘epistemic’ wavefunction (concerning knowledge
rather than physical facts), an approach appearing attractive to some at least in part due to the progress
in quantum computing and quantum information theory. The other point we are referring to here is the
unfortunate tendency of many physicists to look down on any form of philosophical reasoning, in some
cases using the word in an almost (and sometimes outright) derogatory manner.
8It would be an apt if slightly too general observation to criticise much of the work that has been
done in the foundations of quantum mechanics for being too focussed on non-relativistic models. While
mathematically and conceptually easier to handle, it is by no means clear that any insight gained in this
realm generalises. On the contrary, as we will argue, insight into the correct ‘interpretation’ might be
gained from insights in quantum gravity.
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servations. One is therefore justified in the hope that cosmological observation may help
narrow down the set of viable proposals for theories of quantum gravity, which in turn
may contain indications for the correct formulation, or interpretation, of quantum theory.
We already touched on how our theory of gravity may be modified in agreement with
astronomical observations, for example in the form of Shape Dynamics instead of general
relativity or by considering the existence of a physically fundamental notion of time. We
shortly turn towards a discussion of appropriate formulations of quantum theory.
Before doing so however we must emphasise that there is no guarantee that any choice
of classical theory and quantisation method will succeed. Given the ludicrousness of the
quantisation method, it is entirely plausible to expect that the correct theory of quantum
gravity can only be attained ‘from scratch’, that is, by direct construction from fundamen-
tal principles and not via quantisation at all. One example of such an approach is that
of causal sets ([124]and references therein; for the original proposal, see [19]) where the
spacetime four-manifold is only considered a smooth approximation to a discrete set of
spacetime elements that are related via a partial ordering.9 However, given the success of
quantisation in other areas, the attempt to obtain an adequate theory of quantum gravity
in the ‘conventional’ manner is at least plausible.
It is not entirely clear what the ‘standard’ method of quantisation (that is, canonical
quantisation) is beyond the relationship between mathematical quantities, even leaving
aside the option of path-integral quantisation completely. Formally, canonical quantisa-
tion is the construction of an operator algebra from a Poisson algebra of classical functions
by ‘promoting’ variables and functions of variables to operators [128]. This operator al-
gebra may then be represented as operators acting on complex functions on a Hilbert
space. Quantum mechanics is then itself about relationships between ‘observables’,10 a
misleading term used to refer to the set of those operators that are self-adjoint on the
chosen Hilbert space. It is difficult to see how this formalism alone leads to the physical
reality of everyday objects or even that of particles or fields. At best, it describes some
structural properties thereof.
In slightly less mathematics-focussed approaches ‘canonical quantisation’ is assumed
to also include the existence of a ‘quantum state’ or ‘wavefunction’, although the latter
term is often reserved to refer specifically to the quantum state when represented in the
position basis of the Hilbert space. This wavefunction is then considered to represent the
physical state of the universe or at least the system under consideration and the action
of operators on this wavefunction is used to extract information about the likelihood of
measurement outcomes (hence the name ‘observables’), albeit without being clear what
exactly constitutes a ‘measurement’. The time evolution of the wavefunction is deter-
mined by the action of a particular operator, the quantum Hamiltonian. If ‘measurement’
9Depending on the particulars of the approach, matter fields are either defined on those spacetime
elements or the elements are all there is and matter fields are emergent via a Kaluza-Klein formalism
[66, 67, 91]. One should also add that even the causal-set approach does not completely abandon the notion
of quantisation. It employs a ‘sum-over-histories’ method in its construction.
10Some authors [108, section 3.2.4] suggest that in a relativistic setting even classical mechanics is about
the relationship of observables.
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is understood as referring to a physical process (as it must or its meaning is entirely ob-
scure), then it is unclear why this process is supposed to have a special status and is not
itself encoded in the wavefunction and its evolution. This is particularly problematic in
the context of cosmology where the entirety of the universe, including anything capable
of performing a measurement, is supposed to be described by the ‘universal wavefunc-
tion’. But even in non-cosmological application the concept is problematic and a large
literature has been dedicated to various facets of the ‘problem of measurement’ (see [139]
for a relatively recent review with many references).
In the minimalist sense canonical quantisation is a purely mathematical procedure and
does not constitute the construction of a physical theory. If the term is used in a broader
sense it is an incomplete if not inconsistent recipe to construct one. Either way, by itself
it is insufficient to arrive at an ontologically meaningful theory, although it may describe
certain mathematical structures underlying such a theory. In order to arrive at a more
satisfactory picture canonical quantisation must therefore be supplemented with a set of
physical principles that relate the operator algebra to physical reality. The abstract notion
of measurement does not suffice.
One can separate proposals to overcome the overcome the measurement problem into
two groups, those that are purely interpretative of the quantum formalism and those that
add or change ontological and dynamical elements of the theory. Among the former
one counts the Everett ‘many-worlds’ interpretation ([42], though see [139, sec. 4] for
a review and discussion), and Quantum Bayesianism [48] and other ‘psi-epistemic’ (the
quantum state describes a state of information or knowledge) approaches. Among the
latter are dynamical collapse model such as those of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber [49] and
de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory [34, 18, 59]. The list is by no means exhaustive and
this is not the place for detailed critiques of these ideas, which by themselves would easily
fill several doctoral theses.
To us, de Broglie-Bohm theory will be of particular interest. The reason is not that it is
a picture that is conceptually or otherwise more appealing than its contenders (although it
arguably is, as I have argued elsewhere [101]), but that it provides mathematical tools that
are unavailable in other formulations. These tools are configuration-space trajectories just
like they exist in classical physics, although they are governed by non-classical dynamics.
Specifically, the trajectories may be used to provide a new way to deal with quantum
cosmological perturbations.11
Does the unique availability of mathematical methods imply that de Broglie-Bohm
theory deserves greater credence? In the process of constructing the quantum cosmo-
logical perturbation theory via the quantisation of a reduced-Hamiltonian system we will
see hints towards the plausibility of de Broglie-Bohm. Yet in the absence of a full, non-
perturbative theory of quantum gravity that explicitly relies on quantum trajectories any
definite conclusion of the sort would be rash.
However, it is possible to develop a quantum theory from a classical starting point
11There is no reason to think that the method we use here does not generalise to other applications,
although this will be the subject of future work.
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based entirely on the notion of such configuration-space trajectories and without reference
to a wavefunction. The exploration of such a framework and its tentative application
to cosmology will form the final part of this thesis. A wavefunction-free formulation
of quantisation may be particularly suited to gravity and to the quantum theory of the
universe as a whole. Whatever its conceptual benefits, whether or not such an approach
can really lead to a fully satisfactory theory of quantum gravity remains to be seen. In
part IV we sketch the way forward.
1.2 Outline of this thesis
This thesis is divided into three parts. Part I introduces the relevant background and mo-
tivates the line of inquiry pursued in this thesis. In part II we develop the classical theory
of York-time cosmology and in part III the corresponding quantum theory. Chapters 2
and 4 for the most part review material (though hopefully introduce some new perspec-
tives), while chapters 3 (at least section 3.3), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 contain primarily
original work.
Most of the quantitative work has been published. The contents of chapters 5 and
9 (with the exception of section 5.4) has been published in ref. [106], that of chapter
6 in ref. [104], sections 7.2 and 10.1 in ref. [105], while sections 5.4, 4.4,7.3 and 7.4
correspond to the content of ref. [107]. The work on perturbation theory proper (chapter
8 and section 10.2) is contained in ref. [103], while that on trajectory-based quantisation
methods (chapter 11) is presented in ref. [102].
We begin by setting the scene. Chapter 2 begins by considering the classical laws
governing a system of particles with the aim to express them in a time-parameterisation
invariant manner. That is, we wish to describe the dynamics in a way that is invariant
under the transformation t → T (t), the transformation from Newtonian time t to an
arbitrary (smooth monotonic) function T (t) thereof. Classically this turns out to be not
difficult. However, we find that it is a necessary condition of time-reparameterisation
invariance that the value of the Hamiltonian function vanishes, H = 0. This ‘Hamiltonian
constraint’ leads to difficulties after quantisation however, where it seems to imply that the
quantum dynamics is frozen. This is a facet of the ‘problem of time’. We leave the particle
system behind and review relevant concepts in general relativity, in particular the ‘3 +
1’ formalism of Arnowitt, Deser and Misner. The formalism has properties resembling
those of the parameterised particle model and once again leads to frozen dynamics after
quantisation. However, there are other facets of the problem of time, related to the spatio-
temporal symmetries of general relativity.
In chapter 3 we review the idea of Hamiltonian reduction, a method to ‘pick’ a par-
ticular time parameter as physically fundamental and derive an associated non-vanishing
Hamiltonian, eliminating the problem of time. We argue that while in the classical theory
the choice of time is purely aesthetic, without consequences for observation, quantisation
with distinct choices of time may lead to diverging phenomenologies, implying that if
indeed there is a physical time, the list of contenders can be narrowed down empirically.
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We illustrate this using a particle model.
Finally we introduce York time in chapter 4, a particular choice of time parameter in
general relativity which is a plausible candidate for an underlying physically fundamental
time. We discuss its role in the initial-value problem of general relativity, perhaps the
strongest motivation for taking York time seriously, before looking at some of its formal
and physical properties, specifically the Poisson structure of the reduced variables, the
behaviour of the York-time foliation around singularities and how various aspects of the
problem of time are resolved.
Hamiltonian reduction cannot be performed explicitly in the case of full general rel-
ativity without additional symmetry assumptions since in this case the Hamiltonian con-
straint cannot be solved explicitly. In part II we perform the procedure for various physi-
cally relevant scenarios in which solving the Hamiltonian constraint is possible due to the
presence of symmetries or at least approximate symmetries.
In chapter 5 we consider the simplest possible cosmological scenario, a homogeneous
and isotropic (‘Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre’) universe. This simplification leaves only one geo-
metric degree of freedom: scale. This one degree of freedom is ‘absorbed’ into the notion
of time through the Hamiltonian reduction, so that only matter degrees of freedom remain,
for which we consider one or more scalar fields. The model, though simple, is nonetheless
of relevance. First, it serves to illustrate some of the features of the reduced-Hamiltonian
method in practice. Second, the model will describe the dynamics of the homogeneous
background on which cosmological perturbation theory is defined. Furthermore, aside
from the simplified matter content used here, the Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre universe does, in
fact, provide a good approximation to our actual universe. We conclude the chapter with
a discussion of cosmological inflation in terms of the York-time description.
In chapter 6 we discuss an important, if unexpected implication of considering York
time the physically fundamental time parameter: the history of the universe should (de-
pending on the global geometry of space, that is, whether the universe is closed, flat or
open) be extended beyond what is normally regarded as temporal infinity t = ∞. This
point corresponds to a finite value of T and a priori there is no reason for T to ‘end’
here. However, there are also concrete physical reasons why the quantum theory based on
York time requires this extension for consistency. We consider the conditions on various
scalar-field potentials, with particular emphasis on potentials favoured as candidates for
inflation, for a smooth transition from ‘our’ side of cosmological history to the extension.
Chapter 7 begins the development of the theory of cosmological perturbations in York
time. First we consider a simple model (a homogeneous but anisotropic model classically
equivalent to the ‘Kasner’ models) that explores the unconventional Poisson structure,
that is, the fact that the geometric reduced variables are only ‘almost’ canonical. We then
examine phenomena that are well understood in conventional perturbation theory, such as
the freezing of modes as their physical wavelengths grow to scales larger than the Hubble
radius, in the context of York time cosmology.
Finally, drawing on the preliminary insights gained in the last chapter, in chapter 8 we
develop the formalism for cosmological perturbation theory based on York-time Hamilto-
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nian reduction, discuss a variety of related conceptual points and aim to obtain a physical
understanding of the theory.
Chapter 9 begins part III the development of York-time quantum cosmology. We
consider the quantum theory of the cosmological ‘background’ by canonical quantisation
of the theory developed in chapter 5, explore the dynamics and draw some conclusions
for different scalar-field potentials. We also discuss some of the more subtle technical
points of the quantisation procedure.
In the next chapter, chapter 10, we undertake the project of canonically quantising cos-
mological perturbation theory as developed in chapter 7. First, we consider the quantised
anisotropic minisuperspace model explored earlier. This quantum theory can be solved
exactly, that is, we are able to find the Hamiltonian eigenvalues and eigenfunctions, for
example. Following quantisation the non-canonicity of the Poisson brackets has some
curious consequences relating to the nature of momenta. In particular, (1) the theory does
not have a momentum representation and (2) the momenta are not observables (are not
Hermitian). We discuss the implication thereof. We then move on to the quantisation of
perturbation theory proper and discuss a number of its features. Because of its complex-
ity, no explicit solutions can be found and explicit connection with observation will likely
require numerical work.
Chapter 11 considers an alternative to canonical quantisation. After all, the problem
of time is the result of the application of the canonical quantisation recipe to general
relativity. In the rest of the thesis we only modified general relativity by selecting a
physically preferred choice of foliation. In this chapter on the other hand we consider a
modification of the quantisation recipe by ‘quantising’ via the mutual interaction of an
infinite set of configuration-space trajectories. The particular approach proposed here,
we argue, is preferable over similar quantisation methods developed in recent years for
certain technical reasons that we explain in detail.
The approach of chapter 11 is understood for simple finite-dimensional particle mod-
els. Its application to gravity remains an open question. In chapter 12 we discuss the
application of the quantisation scheme developed in the last chapter to gravitational field
theories and consider some cosmological examples. The mathematical development here
remains mostly schematic. Given that this line of inquiry is still in its infancy, these
last two chapters are to be understood as a speculative guide and the beginning of a new
direction of research rather than a presentation of established results.
Finally, in chapter 13 we summarise what has been accomplished in this work and
discuss its implications and open questions, as well as future directions of research.
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Part I
Setting the scene
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Chapter 2
The problem of time
In this chapter we explore the problems that arise when attempting to quantise a time-
reparameterisation and refoliation invariant theory such as general relativity. These
‘problems of time’ are perhaps the most pressing difficulty when formulating a theory
of quantum gravity.
2.1 Time-reparameterisation invariance
Much of modern physics describes the physical world through the use of variables. These
are mathematical quantities — often real or complex numbers, or entities representable
as ordered sets thereof (such as vectors, matrices and so on), or occasionally more com-
plicated objects with different mathematical behaviours (such Grassmann numbers) —
which are understood to have some physical interpretation, are subject to certain laws
expressible in the form of equations limiting the values the variables can take and es-
tablishing relations between values at different (often infinitesimally separated) points in
time. We leave a more careful characterisation of the relationship between the mathemat-
ical entities and physical reality to philosophical discourse.
The variables and equations that provide the best known description of our actual
world, the quantum state vector on the space of field variables of the standard model of
particle physics and, somewhat speculatively, of some appropriate theory of gravity along
the lines of general relativity, are so complicated that explicit calculations are only possi-
ble for highly symmetric situations (such as Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre cosmology) or through
perturbative approaches (such as particle scattering theory or cosmological perturbation
theory). It is therefore often beneficial to look at non-realistic, simple, finite-dimensional
models in order to understand individual physical features of the more complicated re-
alistic theory. The implications of time-reparameterisation invariance, that is, roughly,
the irrelevance of the choice of temporal parameter to the form of the equations, is no
exception.
While the notion of a ‘variable’ is fairly clear, at least from a practical perspective, the
notion of ‘time’ is not. Greater questions aside, one can ask: Should time t itself be a vari-
able? Suppose we have a classical system of n particles of identical mass m, moving in
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three-dimensional space, whose instantaneous configuration may therefore be described
by a 3n-dimensional vector in configuration space. The set of all points that describe the
particle configuration at some time forms a trajectory in this configuration space. This
trajectory may well cross itself any (finite or infinite) number of times. Suppose instead
we consider the extended configuration space, that is, the 3n-dimensional configuration
space together with an extra dimension, time. Time t is treated as a further variable. The
trajectory in this 3n+1-dimensional space never crosses itself (since every instant of time
only occurs once). Furthermore, with time t explicitly included in the information given
by the vector in the extended configuration space, the trajectory may be parameterised by
any choice of parameter τ , not necessarily the value of t.
The natural question raised by this picture is whether or not the physical laws (equa-
tions) that govern which trajectories are dynamically allowed (that is, are solutions to the
equations of motion) can be expressed in terms of the arbitrarily chosen parameter τ . For
simplicity, suppose the system is conservative (or scleronomic in Boltzmann’s language),
that is, its dynamics has no explicit time dependence. Consider the form of the action
when parameterised by τ rather than t:1
Action =
∫ t2
t1
dt L
(
q1, . . . , q3n; q˙1, . . . , q˙3n
)
=
∫ τ2
τ1
dτ t′ L
(
q1, . . . , q3n;
q′1
t′
, . . . ,
q′3n
t′
)
, (2.1)
where q˙i = dqi/dt, q′ = dqi/dτ and t′ = dt/dτ . We limit our considerations to La-
grangians without second or higher-order time-derivatives. This still encompasses the
majority of physically relevant Lagrangians and indeed all those relevant for the present
work. Note that the variable t appears only in the form t′. It is kinosthenic, or cyclic in
Helmholtz’s terminology. It is then a basic theorem of classical mechanics that its conju-
gate momentum, pt is a constant of motion. Bearing in mind that the Lagrangian in the
action in τ -form is t′L rather than merely L, this momentum is
pt =
∂(t′L)
∂t′
= L−
(
3n∑
i=1
∂L
∂q˙i
q′i
t′2
)
t′ = L−
3n∑
i=1
piq˙i
= −
(
3n∑
i=1
piq˙i − L
)
. (2.2)
The momentum pt conjugate to time is just the negative of the Hamiltonian of the system.
This insight will form the basis of the ‘reduced Hamiltonian formalism’ we will employ
below. At present, we note that the fact that pt is a constant of motion therefore implies
that the total energy of the system is, too. This constitutes a proof that the energy in
conservative systems is conserved, although this was not our primary objective here.
1In this and the next few paragraphs we follow roughly the presentation in Lanczos beautiful book [72]
on the variational principles of classical mechanics, chapter V, section 6.
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Another consequence of pt being a constant of motion is that t may be eliminated
entirely from the variational problem defined by this Lagrangian. This effectively consti-
tutes a partial integration (hence a partial solution) of the Lagrangian equations of motion.
In our case this eliminates any reference to the original notion of Newton’s absolute time
t. The general procedure to eliminate kinosthenic variables can be found in most text-
books on classical mechanics (or e.g. ref. [72, ch. 5, sec. 4]). In brief, the procedure is as
follows.
Suppose variable qk only appears as ‘q˙k’ in the Lagrangian. In this case the Euler-
Lagrange equation for qk is simply the statement that the conjugate momentum pk ≡
∂L/∂q˙k is constant, pk = ck. One introduces a modified Lagrangian,
L¯ ≡ L− ckq˙k. (2.3)
Now solve the original Euler-Lagrange equation of qk, ∂L/∂q˙k = ck for q˙k and substitute
the result into L¯ to arrive at a variational problem leading to dynamics equivalent to the
original but without dependence on the kinosthenic variable.
Let us apply this procedure to the variable t in order to eliminate any reference to it.
The momentum conjugate to t is a constant,
pt = −E. (2.4)
The modified action is
A¯ =
∫
L¯ =
∫ τ2
τ1
dτ
(
Lt′ − ptt′
)
=
∫ τ2
τ1
dτ (L− pt)t′ =
∫ τ2
τ1
dτ
3n∑
i=1
piq˙it
′, (2.5)
in which we must eliminate t′ via equation 2.4. Assuming that the Lagrangian has the
usual form L = K.E.− V , note that the integrand on the right-hand side of eq. 2.5 is just
twice the kinetic energy,
K.E. = 1
2
3n∑
i=1
piq˙it
′ = 1
2
3n∑
i=1
mq˙2i t
′ = 1
2
3n∑
i=1
m
(
q′i
t′
)2
t′ =
1
2t′
3n∑
i=1
mq′2i . (2.6)
Having chosen to focus on Lagrangians of the usual form, eq. 2.2 combined with eq. 2.4
now gives the familiar relation
E = K.E.+ V (~q), (2.7)
where the argument (~q) is shorthand for (q1, . . . , q3n), so that eq. 2.6 implies
t′ =
√∑3n
i=1 mq
′2
i
2(E − V ) (2.8)
and the resulting action is (after another use of eq. 2.7),
A¯ =
∫ τ2
τ1
dτ
√√√√(E − V ) · 3n∑
i=1
1
2
mq′2i . (2.9)
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This action is of geodesic form: it may be written as
A¯ =
∫ √√√√ 3n,3n∑
i=1,j=1
Gij(~q)dqidqj, Gij(~q) =
1
2
(
E − V (~q))δij, (2.10)
where δij is the Kronecker delta function. That is, the configuration space may be consid-
ered to be equipped with a metricGij(~q) and the variational problem is one of minimising
the path length in configuration space with respect to that metric. We will meet actions of
this form throughout this thesis.
The action principle 2.9 has been used by Barbour [9, 10] as a starting point for time-
reparameterisation invariant mechanics. He justifies this by arguing that the ‘kinetic met-
ric’Gij is the natural choice of metric on the configuration space. We chose an alternative
route for its derivation by promoting Newtonian time t to a variable and parameterising
the configuration-space trajectory by an arbitrary monotonic parameter, identifying t as
kinosthenic and hence being able to eliminate it, resulting in the geodesic action 2.9. The
Euler-Lagrange equations for this action are
d
dτ
(√
E − V (~q)∑
k
1
2
m
(
dqk
dτ
)2 mdqidτ
)
= −
√∑
k
1
2
m
(
dqk
dτ
)2
E − V (~q)
∂V
∂qi
. (2.11)
These equations are dramatically simplified if we choose τ such that
∑
k
1
2
m(dqk
dτ
)2 =
E − V (~q). This is, of course, the case when τ = t, where one recovers the familiar
Newtonian equations of motion. The Newtonian time parameter is special: when the
dynamical laws are expressed with respect to t they take their simplest form. However,
we are not forced to make that choice or ascribe any fundamental meaning to t. But given
that t has this simplifying property it is no surprise that Newton and his followers believed
in the existence of an ‘absolute’ time.2
2.2 Vanishing Hamiltonians and frozen dynamics
It is an obvious next step to try to understand time-reparameterisation invariance in the
Hamiltonian picture. However, promoting Newtonian time t to a variable and parame-
terising the configuration-space trajectory instead via an arbitrary parameter τ leads to a
difficulty: The Hamiltonian vanishes. The Hamiltonian3 is defined as
Hτ = ptt
′ +
3n∑
i=1
∂(Lt′)
∂q′i
q′i − Lt′ (2.12)
2Newton’s reasoning was, of course, considerably more subtle and relied on philosophical and theo-
logical considerations as well [89, 73]. Furthermore, the Lagrangian formalism had not yet been invented,
although it is interesting to speculate what he might have thought of the above line of argument.
3We use a subscript τ to identify the Hamiltonian as the one defined with respect to the arbitrary pa-
rameter and not, say, the Hamiltonian Ht defined with respect to Newtonian time t, which is given by
Ht = −pt.
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since the Lagrangian is Lt′ and the set of configuration variables is (t, qi, . . . , q3n). But
from eq. 2.2 and q˙i = q′i/t
′ it follows immediately that the right-hand side vanishes,
Hτ = 0. (2.13)
This result may be understood heuristically, although as with all heuristic explanations
care must be taken not to take this for being more rigorous than it is.4 The heuristic
picture is as follows. A Hamiltonian function generates (via the Poisson brackets) motion
of the system in phase space that corresponds to the physical evolution of the system
in time. But Hτ is to generate motion for all possible choices of τ . For example, if
Hτ generates the motion for one choice τ = τ1, exactly the same Hamiltonian Hτ is to
generate the motion for another choice, τ = τ2 given by τ2 = 2τ1, that is, a choice where
the parameter-time ‘passes’ twice as fast. But this is inconsistent unless the Hamiltonian
vanishes.
Eq. 2.2 followed from the parameterised form of the action 2.1. The vanishing of
the Hamiltonian is a direct result of the definition of the momenta (specifically pt) for an
action of this form and hence is a primary constraint in the language of Dirac [36]. It is the
so-called Hamiltonian constraint. As an aside, note that the other momenta p1, . . . , p3n
conjugate to the original variables q1, . . . , q3n are independent of the choice of time since
p
(t)
i ≡
∂L
∂q˙i
=
∂L
∂q′i
t′ =
∂(Lt′)
∂q′i
≡ p(τ)i . (2.14)
The result that the Hamiltonian vanishes remains unchanged if one eliminates the
cyclic variable t first. Starting with the the Lagrangian given by expression 2.9 (the La-
grangian of Barbour and Bertotti [10]) instead, the momenta are
pBBi =
∂
∂q′i
√√√√(E − V ) 3n∑
k=1
1
2
mq′2k =
1
2
√
E − V∑3n
k=1
1
2
mq′2k
·mq′i, (2.15)
in virtue of which the associated Hamiltonian vanishes,
HBBτ =
3n∑
i=1
pBBi q
′
i −
√√√√(E − V ) 3n∑
i=1
1
2
mq′2i = 0. (2.16)
The Hamiltonian constraint does not pose any problem for the dynamics, at least
classically. For example in a conventional particle system with L = K.E. − V and
Ht = E = K.E. + V = −pt it merely says that the total energy E is zero. Since the
dynamics does not depend on the value of V but only its gradient (is invariant under a
4It is not an uncommon occurrence for heuristic explanations to become the canon that is repeated
and propagated without question. A prime example is undoubtedly Hawking radiation, whose supposed
heuristic explanation by spontaneous pair production near a black-hole horizon has very little to do with
the rigorous derivation via the inequivalence of inertial frames at the horizon and at infinity. The heuristic
version goes back to a paragraph in Hawking’s original paper [58], though it is doubtful that the author
intended this idea to be popularised in the way it did.
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shift in the potential V → V+const.), whether or not E = 0 is not detectable and the
choice of potential and resulting dynamics is effectively unrestricted.
The Hamiltonian constraint does however pose a problem for quantisation. During
canonical quantisation the canonical variables are ‘promoted’ to operators, which act on
‘states’, that is, complex functions ψ over the configuration space of the system. The con-
straint equations become equations of operators, which may either be identically satisfied
at the operator level or, if not, select a subspace of states that are considered ‘physical’
in virtue of satisfying this quantum constraint equation, rather than mere mathematical
artifacts. We will encounter both cases in this thesis. This is not the place to review the
systematic treatment of constraints in the classical and quantum theory, which is due to
Dirac [36]. A comprehensive discussion of constraint systems can be found in ref. [126].
Accordingly, physical states in time-reparameterisation invariant systems, that is, sys-
tems with a Hamiltonian constraint Hτ = 0, must satisfy
Hˆτ ψphys = 0, (2.17)
where Hˆτ is the Hamiltonian operator obtained in the usual manner by replacing qi and pi
by operators qˆi and pˆi respectively in the functional expression for Hτ . In the context of
general relativity the analogue equation is known as the Wheeler-deWitt equation, which
we will encounter in section 2.3. The implication of equation 2.17 is that the Schro¨dinger
equation for physical states is then
i~
∂ψphys
∂τ
= Hˆτψphys = 0. (2.18)
The state vector does not evolve and the quantum dynamics is ‘frozen’. This static result
is known as the ‘problem of time’, although in the context of general relativity there are
other, related issues summarised under this label (see section 2.4).
The above treatment of canonical quantisation does, of course, not constitute a rigor-
ous discussion. As we discussed in chapter 1, a more rigorous approach would be for-
mulated in terms of an operator algebra whose commutator structure is inherited from the
Poisson algebra of the classical theory. For a thorough treatment, see ref. [128]. Suffice
to say, the problem of time is unaffected.
The Hamiltonians Hτ and HBBτ were derived by extending the set of configuration
variables to include Newtonian time t. One might consider this counterintuitive to the
stated goal that is the elimination of an external time parameter. Is this the cause of the
problem?
Not so. Return instead to the parameterised action 2.1. Suppose we wish to eliminate
any dependence on t, which only appears in the form of its derivative t′. If t is to be
meaningless in the desired dynamics then t′ merely denotes some arbitrary non-negative5
5What about dtdτ = 0? This would suggest that an extended interval of τ would correspond to a single
point on the t-timeline. A physical interpretation of this is not immediately apparent. However, later on we
will discover examples with such a relationship between two choices of time parameter, for example, York
time with de Sitter space.
18
function, which we will call N(τ). Its counterpart in general relativity, which we will
meet in section 2.3, is referred to as the ‘lapse’ function and we also adopt this nomencla-
ture here. Our proposed action is then
Action =
∫ τ2
τ1
dτ N L
(
q1, . . . , q3n;
q′1
N
, . . . ,
q′3n
N
)
. (2.19)
Having ‘forgotten’ the origin of N(τ), this is now an arbitrary function that encodes the
freedom of choice with regards to the temporal parameter.
In many texts the argument proceeds by treating N like another dynamical variable.
One then introduces its conjugate momentum pN , which must vanish since dN/dτ does
not occur in the action. Such variables do not introduce dynamical equations of motion
but so-called primary constraints. The easiest way to see this is to write the action in
canonical form, that is, introduce conjugate momenta and perform a Legendre transfor-
mation of the integrand,
Canonical action =
∫ τ2
τ1
dτ
[
3n∑
i=1
piq
′
i −H(q, p)
]
, (2.20)
where H(q, p) is a function such that the expression matches the original Lagrangian up
to total derivatives and is, of course, the Hamiltonian of the system. The new variable N
does not contribute to the sum since pN vanishes. Note that the canonical action presents
a new variational problem with 6n variables {~q, ~p} and its Euler-Lagrange equations are
just Hamilton’s equation. The Hamiltonian formalism can therefore be understood as
a special case of the Lagrangian formalism, namely limited to problems in which the
Lagrangian takes the form of a sum made up of pairs of variables one of which (the ‘q’)
appears as a time derivative while the other one (the ‘p’) does not, minus a function of
the variables only (without time derivatives). This result is independent of any notion of
reparameterisation invariance and the nature of the temporal parameter. It applies just the
same to mechanics in terms of standard Newtonian time [72]. In the case of the action
2.19, the canonical action is
Canonical action =
∫ τ2
τ1
dτ
[
3n∑
i=1
piq
′
i −NH (~q, ~p)
]
, (2.21)
that is, the Hamiltonian is
H(N, ~q, ~p) = N ·H (~q, ~p) = N ·
(
3n∑
i=1
1
2m
p2i − V (~q)
)
. (2.22)
The Euler-Lagrange equation for N then implies that
H (~q, ~p) = 0, (2.23)
which is exactly the Hamiltonian constraint obtained above.
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The reasoning of the last paragraph — that is, the reasoning of most texts reviewing
the subject — is, on the whole, correct. The one step that may be objectionable is the
very first: Why should N be treated as a dynamical variable? It is a function of τ but has
no obvious physical meaning. The point we wish to make here is that it is, in fact, not
necessary to adopt N as a dynamical variable. First note that the form of the canonical
action is independent of this step. The system is expected to follow the ‘path of least
action’ for any choice of N (since our dynamics is to be independent of that choice),
which is akin to demanding that it be extremised with respect toN . That is, the variational
principle for N is justified on physical grounds, not because the function is adopted to the
pool of variables that are subject to the well-known Lagrangian machinery. The formal
consequence, namely the appearance of the Hamiltonian constraint, is the same as in the
standard argument. Here we merely took issue with its justification.
The derivation of the Hamiltonian constraint (and the resulting frozen dynamics fol-
lowing canonical quantisation) via the lapse function N is, in fact, the way the problem is
usually understood in the context of general relativity. There treating N as a variable may
more justified depending on one’s perspective: The lapse is effectively the information
contained in the time-time entry of the spacetime metric (4)gµν (i.e. µ = ν = 0) and so
from a spacetime point of view is indeed one of the variables. On the other hand, if a
‘3+1’ formalism is considered fundamental (that is, a slice of space evolving in time),
then N should not be considered a physical variable. We will discuss these perspectives
and the contrast between them in greater detail below.
Below we will also show that the problem of time may be addressed by supposing
the existence of a physically meaningful time parameter. Formally this is done via a so-
called ‘reduced Hamiltonian formalism’, where the choice of physical time T is extracted
from the physical variables and a corresponding (non-vanishing) Hamiltonian function is
derived. At this stage however it is important to acknowledge that this is by no means
the only possibility. In particular, the procedure of canonical quantisation—itself ques-
tionable as we argued in chapter 1—may be abandoned in favour of perhaps some other
method to arrive at a quantum theory with the appropriate classical limit (corresponding
to the classical system with which we started) but without the suffering from the problem
of time. This more ambitious endeavour is began in chapter 11.
The relational particle dynamics of Barbour et al.
The elimination of a theory dependent on t in favour of a reparameterisation-invariant de-
scription was in part motivated by the fact that t had no physical role (although it did lead to
the simplest equations of motion). Yet t is not the only variable that has that property. Any
gauge degree of freedom should similarly be eliminated. In the context of Newtonian parti-
cle theories, for example, concepts such as absolute position and orientation are physically
meaningless unless reference to a notion of ‘absolute space’ is made. But since absolute space
plays no role in the physics, its introduction is unwarranted. For a system of N particles in
three dimensions the real number of degrees of freedom is therefore not 3N but 3N − 6, the
coordinates of all the particles minus the centre-of-mass position (three degrees of freedom)
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and the overall orientation in three-dimensional space (three further degrees of freedom, for
example in the form of Euler angles).
Eliminating unphysical degrees of freedom of this kind motivated Barbour and various col-
laborators to develop the ‘shape dynamics’a of particles and fields [e.g. 9, 10, 8, 2, 12]. They
include not only the six degrees of freedom mentioned but also the overall scale (only ratios
of distances are considered physical), so that a total of seven degrees of freedom are elimi-
nated. Why this leaves the dynamics of ‘shape’ is best illustrated by an example: Consider
three particles, effectively forming the three vertices of a triangle, naı¨vely having nine de-
grees of freedom. However, the orientation of the plane of the triangle in space is physically
irrelevant (using up three degrees of freedom), as is the position of the centre of mass on the
plane (two more degrees of freedom) and its orientation in the plane (one degree of freedom).
Finally, the overall size of the triangle is presumed physically irrelevant (so that geometrically
similar triangles are considered just representations of a single physical triangle), eliminating
a seventh degree of freedom. The remaining two degrees of freedom determine only the ratios
of the three sides to one another — in other words the shape of the triangle.
Formulating the dynamics explicitly in terms of physical quantities only is difficult. Instead
these ideas are implemented via a procedure called ‘best matching’. The idea is this: two
system configurations differing only by the value of variables considered unphysical are con-
sequently themselves physically equivalent. At each instant one can therefore freely ‘slide’
the configuration-space point representing the system up and down these gauge orbits. Now
choose at each instant the gauge variables such that the resulting system (the triangle, for ex-
ample) matches that of the previous instant most closely. This minimisation procedure (one
is minimising the difference in Newtonian representation between temporally adjacent sys-
tem configurations (triangles)) implies that certain boundary terms in the action are forced to
vanish, resulting in constraints.b In particular, the constraints are that the momenta conjugate
to the unphysical degrees of freedom vanish, namely
~P ≡
n∑
I=1
mI ~˙xI = 0 (Total linear momenta)
~L ≡
n∑
I=1
MI~xI × ~˙xI = 0 (Total angular momenta)
D ≡ 2
n∑
I=1
MI~xI · ~˙xI = 0 (‘Dilational’ momentum).
In addition, the elimination of an specific time parameter introduces the Hamiltonian con-
straint. Applied to a universe made up of particles, the consequences are that this universe
has zero total energy (due to the Hamiltonian constraint), zero total linear momentum, zero
angular momentum and zero dilational momentum. The value of energy is not detectable
anyway since shifting the potential by a constant has no dynamical effect. The value of the
total linear momentum is also undetectable unless Galilean relativity were violated. The total
value of angular momentum is however detectable, at least in principle (a rotating reference
frame can be dynamically distinguished from a non-rotating one from within, and a similar
result holds for the dilational momentum. Hence this theory would be falsifiable via measure-
ment of the universe’s total angular or dilational momentum if indeed we lived in a universe
whose fundamental building blocks are point particles in three-dimensional space.
A question here is however whether specifying initial data independent of the gauge vari-
ables is sufficient to uniquely determine the future evolution of the physical variables. If it
is, this would arguably constitute an implementation of Mach’s Principle, a concept that has
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received ample philosophical discussion over the last one hundred years but disagreement
persists over what exactly the principle is.
One can apply analogous ideas to gravitational field theories, which led to a series of papers
on ideas such as conformal geometrodynamics [e.g. 12, 2] and ultimately Shape Dynamics
(see footnote a).
Finally, the question arises whether the Hamiltonian constraint itself can be the generator of
physical transformations, since all the other constraints relating to the total momenta do not,
and according to Dirac’s classification scheme [36] the constraint is primary and first-class,
normally associated with physically irrelevant motion. Barbour and Foster [11] have however
pointed out that the argument relies on a absolute time being the independent variable. This
assumptions is explicitly violated in time-reparameterisation invariant systems. The Hamil-
tonian constraint may therefore be a generator of physical change, not just movement along a
gauge orbit.
a Without capitalisation we use this term to refer to any theory, which aims to eliminate unphysical
degrees of freedom as described. When capitalised, ‘Shape Dynamics’ refers to a particular theory of
gravity based on three-dimensional conformal geometries evolving in time, developed in the last six
years or so [e.g. 54, 53, 13, 84]. The terminology (shape dynamics versus Shape Dynamics) is my
choice. In the literature context and author usually determines which is meant.
bWe will use a very similar construction in the development of a new wavefunction-free quantisa-
tion procedure in chapter 11.
2.3 The problem of time in general relativity
2.3.1 General relativity
General relativity is a classical theory that describes gravity. General relativity postulates
a space-time, represented by a four-dimensional (pseudo-)Riemannian manifold. The
fundamental physical variables are encoded in the spacetime metric (4)gµν(x), that is, ten
real numbers for each point of spacetime in the form of a four-by-four symmetric matrix.6
The metric encodes the geometry, that is, the notion of length and angles by defining the
scalar product between two four-vectors A,B at a spacetime point x,
(A ·B)(x) = (4)gµν(x)Aµ(x)Bν(x). (2.24)
The length of a vector is then given by |A| = √A · A. The equations governing the
behaviour of the metric are the ten independent Einstein Field Equations (EFEs),
(4)Rµν − 12 (4)R (4)gµν =
8piG
c4
(4)Tµν , (2.25)
where (4)R and (4)Rµν are, respectively, the scalar and Ricci curvature derived from
(4)gµν , and (4)Tµν is the stress-energy tensor of the appropriate matter fields, G being the
6Throughout this thesis we will use the raised prefix ‘ (4)’ to denote quantities relating to four-
dimensional space-time (e.g. (4)gµν , (4)R, ,,,), while quantities concerning three-dimensional space are
written without a prefix (e.g. gab, R, ...). Greek indices assume values 0, 1, 2, 3 with 0 representing the tem-
poral direction, while Latin indices take values 1, 2, 3, ranging over spatial directions only. Except where
otherwise indicated (e.g. section 7.2) we follow the usual Einstein summation convention, assuming a sum
over repeated indices.
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gravitational constant. For a full introduction to general relativity we refer the reader to
[86] or another book of their choice. In what follows we will assume the use of units such
that the speed of light c is unity.
The number of geometric degrees of freedom is however less than ten. This is because
the entries in the matrix (4)gµν are coordinate dependent. In other words, a single geometry
corresponds to an infinity of possible coordinate representations of that geometry. The
EFEs take the same form in all coordinate systems. That is, they are generally covariant,
whence the name ‘general relativity’. Furthermore, every measurable quantity must be
independent of the choice of coordinate system.
The precise physical meaning of general covariance and its relation to notions such
as ‘background independence’ (the absence of non-dynamical structures) and diffeomor-
phism invariance (roughly, that the theory possesses a certain number of continuous sym-
metries) is, oddly, still somewhat contentious. See ref. [99] for a recent contribution and
references therein. In brief: Coordinates have no physical content. They are labels of
points in space and time, that is, methods of describing physical entities. Whether or
not the description of the physics (that is, equations and their formal solutions) is un-
changed when the labelling of points is changed is a question concerned entirely with
our description of the physics, not the physics itself. General covariance is a property of
our description, not physical reality. Indeed any theory can be cast into a fully covariant
form.7 This, in effect, was a point raised as early as 1917 by Kretschmann [69] as a re-
sponse to the undue importance some researchers — including, arguably, Einstein himself
— attached to general relativity being general covariant.
The Einstein Field Equations follow from an action principle that is simply the ex-
tremisation of the scalar four-curvature, the so-called Einstein-Hilbert action,
EH action = 1
2
M2Pl
∫
d4x
(√
| (4)g| (4)R + Lmatter
)
, (2.26)
where Lmatter is the four-covariant Lagrangian of the matter content and may include a
cosmological constant Λ.8
In equation 2.26 MPl denotes the reduced Planck mass. Its relationship to the cosmo-
logical constant G is
MPl =
√
~c
8piG
(2.27)
but throughout the rest of this thesis we choose units such that ~ = 1 and c = 1. We
refrain from setting MPl = 1 (or equivalently 8piG = 1) since it can at times be insightful
7For example, to obtain standard Klein-Gordon scalar-field theory in Minkowski spacetime, promote
spacetime derivatives ∂µ in the Klein-Gordon equation to covariant derivatives ∇µ and introduce an addi-
tional equation to determine the spacetime properties,
Rµνρσ = 0.
8Whether or not this is conceptually appropriate depends on the proposed origin of Λ [see e.g. 17].
Either way, mathematically it is unproblematic.
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to see the dependence of the dynamics on these constants explicitly. We have to choose
if we wish to make reference to MPl or G in our derivations. While this is ultimately
only an aesthetic choice, the two options do suggest slightly different physical insights:
how quantities and dynamics depend on the Planck scale MPl, which presumably en-
codes where our classical theories break down entirely, versus how they depend on the
‘strength of gravity’ G. Since ultimately we are interested in the construction of a theory
of quantum gravity, we choose to make reference to MPl in this thesis.
2.3.2 The Arnowitt-Deser-Misner formalism
The spacetime description of general relativity given above is widely accepted as the cor-
rect way to interpret general relativity. Some particular solution of the Einstein Field
Equations is a description of a block universe, the geometry (and value of matter fields)
at all points in spacetime. It is not a sequence of configurations labelled by a time pa-
rameter. This makes a Hamiltonian formulation of the theory impossible since a Hamil-
tonian is to be understood as a generator of time translations, and this in turn means that
the system cannot be canonically quantised. Early attempts to construct a Hamiltonian
formulation of general relativity culminated in a series of papers by Arnowitt, Deser and
Misner in the late fifties and early sixties, in particular [4]. Their approach became known
as the Arnowitt-Deser-Misner (or ADM) formalism and forms the basis of much of the
subsequent work on canonical quantum gravity. Other terminology used is the ‘3+1’ or
‘Cauchy’ formulation of general relativity.
For a naı¨ve approach to a Hamiltonian formulation of general relativity one might pro-
pose the following: Choose some coordinate system that covers the region of spacetime
for which we wish to arrive at a Hamiltonian description. Slices of constant t automati-
cally provide a foliation of the spacetime into spatial slices. Two points in space on slices
labelled by t1 and t2 respectively are considered the same point if and only if they have
the same spatial coordinate. Now construct a Hamiltonian density (by some appropriate
method) that adequately describes the evolution of all field values (matter field and the
spatial geometry induced on the slice) at all spatial points from slice t to t+ ∆t.
Such an approach, or a variant thereof, would be, however, deeply problematic. First,
whether or not this can be carried out depends crucially on the original choice of coor-
dinate system. For example, the spatial coordinates must cover the same ranges on each
temporal slice, which is by no means guaranteed. Second, even if the procedure can be
carried out, the Hamiltonian theory has lost a crucial feature of general relativity: its
general covariance.
Part of the feat of ADM was to come up with a formulation that retains the full general
covariance at the Hamiltonian level. That is, the formulation has to be general enough to
allow for any choice of foliation, and any choice of coordinates on each slice, after the
Hamiltonian has been derived, but no such choice must be made prior to it. In what
follows we will not reproduce the full derivation, which can be found in any textbook or
set of lecture notes on the subject (e.g. [86]) but merely highlight critical points.
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The first step is the decomposition of the spacetime metric (4)gµν into a spatial metric
gab that represents the geometry on a given spatial slice and four functions, which establish
the spatio-temporal relationships between one slice and infinitesimally nearby ones and
points thereon. The decomposition is as follows:
(4)g00 = −(N2 −NiN i), (4)g0a = Na, (4)gab = gab. (2.28)
The function N is the lapse function and will be shown to indeed correspond to a close
analogy to the notion of lapse explored in section 2.2. The three functions Na are the
‘shift’, which relate the coordinate values of points of one slice with those of infinitesi-
mally close ones. For reference, we also note the expressions for the inverse metric,
(4)g00 = −N−2, (4)g0a = N
a
N2
, (4)gab = gab − N
aN b
N2
, (2.29)
and for the spacetime volume element,√
|det( (4)gµν)| = N
√
det(gij) = N
√
g, (2.30)
where the last equality is purely notational, g ≡ det(gij).
The lapse N receives its name from the fact that it denotes how much proper time
dτ lapses per interval of coordinate time dt in the direction in spacetime that is orthogo-
nal to the embedded spatial slice. This interpretation relies on the existence of the entire
spacetime, in which spatial slices have geometrical relations to one another. This is a
natural assumption if we consider the four-dimensional spacetime picture to be funda-
mental and our ‘3+1’ formalism to be merely a re-description. On the other hand, if we
consider a picture in which the geometric properties of a spatial slice evolve in time (in
conjunction with matter fields defined on the slice), then this interpretation is nonsensical
as there is no notion of orthogonality to a slice since there is no embedding. In this case
N (and Na) must be considered free functions without geometric content, although it is
the appearance of these functions in the formalism that ultimately allows the reconstruc-
tion of a spacetime picture by ‘welding’ spatial slices together in an appropriate manner.
The situation is mostly analogous to that in section 2.2, where N may be understood to
encode a relationship of the arbitrary time parameter and Newtonian time if and only if
Newtonian time is considered to have a meaning in the first place, that is, if and only if
the parameterisation-invariant formalism is not considered the original starting point. The
situation is not entirely analogous however because not being able to ascribe N with an
obvious interpretation is due to slightly different reasons: In the particle formalism it was
due to the ‘non-existence’ of Newtonian time, while here it is due to the absence of the
notion of orthogonality. In the ADM formalism N relates the arbitrary coordinate time to
proper time rather than some ‘background’ time a` la Newton. We will discuss the notion
of proper time in section 4.2.
Whether the ADM formalism is considered to describe the relation between spatial
slices and geometric variables thereon or rather the evolution of a single slice also deter-
mines whether N and Na should be considered dynamical variables. In the former case
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they describe geometric properties between slices and the identification of points from
slice to slice, and can therefore be considered geometric variables, namely just a transfor-
mation on the time-time and time-space components of (4)gµν . In the latter case N and
Na are simply arbitrary function without dynamical meaning and therefore should not be
treated as variables. However, just like in the case of parameterised particle mechanics
there is no distinction between the resulting equations and dynamics, merely between the
lines of reasoning used to arrive at them.
I am not aware that this point concerning the ambiguous nature of N has been made
explicitly in the literature, although at least some authors are clearly aware of it. For
example, Unruh and Wald [132] introduce N and Na as arbitrary functions on the spatial
slice “which have the interpretation of lapse function and shift vector in the spacetime
constructed from the time evolution.”
In the space-time picture the shift Na relates the identification of points by spatial co-
ordinates on neighbouring spatial slices. In particular, they denote how the point identified
by a particular spatial coordinate value x is shifted from the point that lies orthogonally
to the future of the point identified by x on the infinitesimally previous slice. This implies
that unlike the lapse N the shift Na depends on the purely spatial coordinates chosen on
the slice. As a consequence, the choice of how to split spacetime into space and time
fixes N , but Na is only determined once a coordinate system is chosen on the slice. If
one therefore makes some choice of physical time, such as the ‘York time’ we will choose
later in this work, the shift remains undetermined. In other words, because the way space-
time is separated into space and time is more physically meaningful than the choice of
spatial coordinates (in particular with regards to subsequent quantisation), the lapse and
shift are not exactly analogous to one another.
In order to establish the dynamics of the ADM picture, we must rewrite the Einstein-
Hilbert action 2.26 in terms of the new variables. This is not fundamentally difficult,
although the decomposition of the scalar 4-curvature (4)R into a scalar 3-curvature R
and other terms is somewhat involved algebraically. Helpful here are the Gauss-Codazzi
relations (see ref. [86]). The final result is the ADM action,
ADM Action =
∫
dt d3x N
√
g
(
R + gacgbdKabKcd −K2
)
+ matter terms. (2.31)
All terms in the Lagrangian density are understood to be functions of time and space.
The term Kab denotes the extrinsic curvature and K ≡ gabKab its trace. We will explain
their meaning momentarily. We first wish to remark however on the form of this La-
grangian density, which matches the usual ‘kinetic-minus-potential’ form where the terms
involving Kab constitute the kinetic term (which is furthermore a squared first-order time
derivative, as will become clear) and the term −R, which depends only on the geometric
variables gab and not their time derivatives, takes the role of the potential.
The extrinsic curvature Kab describes how the spatial slice is embedded in the space-
time manifold in relation to other, temporally infinitesimally separated slices. An isolated
slice cannot be said to have an extrinsic curvature, so at least at this stage we must still
assume that the spacetime picture is the fundamental one and the ‘3+1’ formalism only
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a re-description. Formally the extrinsic curvature may be defined as the Lie derivative of
the spatial metric along the normalised vector nˆ orthogonal to the spatial slice,
Kab ≡ −12Lnˆgab = −12Lnˆ (4)gab = −12
(
nˆµ∂µ
(4)gab +
(4)gaµ∂bnˆ
µ − (4)gµb∂anˆµ
)
. (2.32)
Another possible expression is in terms of a covariant derivative, Kab = −∇bnˆa. In more
useful and intuitive terms, the extrinsic curvature denotes the fractional rate of deforma-
tion of a volume element—or equivalently, the rate of change of gab—with respect to
proper time τ , orthogonal to the spatial slice,
Kab = −1
2
(
∂gab
∂τ
− ∇aNb
N
− ∇bNa
N
)
, (2.33)
or in terms of an arbitrary coordinate time t,
Kab = − 1
2N
(
∂gab
∂t
−∇aNb −∇bNa
)
. (2.34)
The terms involving the shift Na ensure orthogonality since the time derivative alone
would measure the rate of change of the metric along the line connecting points of equal
spatial-coordinate value, which may be shifted relative to the point orthogonally ‘above’
the starting point. In many scenarios one is able to set the shift to zero, which constitutes
a partial gauge fixing of the spatial coordinates (a partial coordinate choice) and indeed
we will do so below since it significantly simplifies the algebra without significant loss of
insight.
The scalar extrinsic curvature K = gabKab is the rate of fractional shrinkage of vol-
ume with respect to proper time. In a homogeneous and isotropic cosmology like the one
we will consider below this implies that K is nothing but the Hubble parameter up to a
negative constant.
It is important to emphasise the importance of an embedding spacetime for the mean-
ingfulness of Kab. At the same time, however, it is not essential for Kab to have this
geometric interpretation. Instead it is possible to view Kab merely as a convenient way to
express the kinetic term of the ADM action.
The other point of note is that the ADM action 2.31 is already in parameterised form,
analogous to the particle action 2.19 we obtained in section 2.2. There we had to ‘manu-
ally’ introduce an arbitrary time parameter and treat Newtonian time as one of the dynam-
ical variables. Here this step is unnecessary. The reason is that in general relativity the
time parameter is already dynamical, or at least its rate of change (given by the lapse N
or equivalently the temporal components of the 4-metric) is. In the particle model there
was no notion of shift since it was not a field theory and the variables had discrete labels,
but otherwise the situation is exactly analogous. Consequently, as we will see shortly, the
ADM formalism also suffers from the problem of time.
In order to make this apparent, first introduce the geometric momenta,
piab =
∂L
∂g˙ab
=
√
g
(
Kgab −Kab) , (2.35)
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where the Lagrangian density L denotes the integrand of the action 2.31 and g˙ab =
dgab/dt. The action can then be written in canonical form,
Canon. ADM action =
∫
dt d3x
[
piabg˙ab + ‘φpφ’−NH −NaH a
]
, (2.36)
where ‘φpφ’ stands for the canonical kinetic term of the matter content (the q˙ ·p terms that
characterise the canonical action integral) and
H = −1
2
√
gM2PlR +
2
M2Pl
√
g
(
gacgbd − 12gabgcd
)
piabpicd +Hmatter, (2.37)
H a = −2∇bpiab +H amatter, (2.38)
with Hmatter and H amatter being place-holders for the terms appearing as a result of the
matter fields, which we are leaving general for now. It is common terminology to callH
andHa the Hamiltonian constraint and momentum constraint respectively, although this
is somewhat confusing since the literal ‘constraints’ are the demand that these expressions
vanish,
H = 0 (2.39)
H a = 0, (2.40)
not the name for the expressions themselves.
The reason that they do vanish is analogous to the situation in the particle model
of sections 2.1, 2.2. Either one takes the spacetime view, in which case N and Na are
dynamical variables and then the Hamiltonian and momentum constraints follow from
their respective variation, or, in the space-in-time picture, they are just arbitrary functions
but the action is required to be extremised for any choice of N and Na, in which case the
constraints also follow.
Note that each constraint describes the vanishing of a density and therefore constitutes
four constraint at each spatial point. An equivalent set of constraint could be imposed,∫
d3x ξ0H = 0 (2.41)∫
d3x ξaHa = 0 (2.42)
for any choice of the four functions ξ0(x), ξa(x). The expression on the left-hand side
have another role: The momentum constraint expressions 2.42 generate canonical trans-
formations that result from spatial diffeomorphisms on the slice, that is, infinitesimal
changes in the spatial coordinates. Expression 2.41 is the generator of canonical trans-
formations corresponding to diffeomorphisms of the spacetime metric (constructed from
gab, piab, N and Na if spacetime is not presupposed), although there are subtleties with
this interpretation since the correspondence only holds if the field equations are satisfied
[132]. On the phase-space hypersurface on which all constraints are satisfied however,
the set of expressions 2.42, 2.41 suffice to generate all the spacetime diffeomorphisms of
general relativity.
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2.3.3 The problem of time in the ADM formalism
From equation 2.36 we can read off the ADM Hamiltonian,
H =
∫
d3x
(
NaH
a +NH
)
, (2.43)
which vanishes in virtue of eqs. 2.39, 2.40 or eqs. 2.41, 2.42 (simply set ξa = Na,
ξ0 = N ). According to the canonical quantisation procedure one now ‘promotes’ the
canonical variables to operators, which are acting on ‘states’, as we discussed in the in-
troduction (chapter 1). The quantum Hamiltonian given by expression 2.43 with gab and
piab replaced by gˆab and pˆiab respectively (and similar replacements are made for the mat-
ter variables) determines the time evolution of those states. Operator-expressions derived
from the constraints now select which states are considered physically possible. The
Hamiltonian and momentum constraints 2.41, 2.42 therefore lead to the conditions[∫
d3x ξ0Hˆ
]
Ψphys = 0 (2.44)[∫
d3x ξaHˆa
]
Ψphys = 0. (2.45)
These constraints ensure that Ψ is invariant under the same set of spacetime diffeomor-
phisms as the classical theory. In particular, 2.45 ensures that Ψ only depends on the
spatial three-geometry and not its metric representation. This means Ψ is a function on
superspace, the space of three-geometries of the manifold, each of which is an equiva-
lence class of metrics related via spatial diffeomorphisms. An analogous interpretation of
2.44 is not possible since its meaning concerns the relationship between quantum states
at different times. In conjunction with 2.45 the effect is that acting with a spacetime dif-
feomorphism in the spacetime constructed from the spatial slice at different times on the
argument of the state Ψ does not change it.
Equation 2.44 is known as the Wheeler-deWitt equation. It is the equation central to
the problem of time, more so than eq. 2.45. The reason is that in the Hamiltonian 2.43
and equivalently in its quantum operator form
Hˆ =
∫
d3x
(
NaHˆ
a +NHˆ
)
(2.46)
one can setNa = 0 by an appropriate choice of coordinates but notN , sinceN = 0 would
lead to singular evolution—no proper time would pass during a finite coordinate-time in-
terval. That is, the contribution of the momentum constraint to the Hamiltonian essentially
reduces to a matter of coordinates, the Hamiltonian constraint does not. Equivalently the
Wheeler-deWitt equation may be written as one constraint per spacetime point,
Hˆ Ψphys = 0, (2.47)
in analogy with the classical case.
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In virtue of the Wheeler-deWitt equation 2.44 and of 2.45, the Hamiltonian annihilates
physical states,
HˆΨphys = 0, (2.48)
and this once again makes the Schro¨dinger equation imply a frozen dynamics,
i~
∂
∂t
Ψphys = 0. (2.49)
If Ψ is presumed to describe the physical state of the universe, which is the case in quan-
tum theory, then no evolution is possible. This is not only a formal problem but it appears
to outright contradict the fact that the state of the universe is evidently changing. This
constitutes the problem of time in quantum geometrodynamics, the quantum theory of the
dynamics of spatial geometry as derived from the ADM formalism, or at least one aspect
of it. There are other issues arising from the spacetime-diffeomorphism invariance (that
is, the ability to choose one’s foliation freely and parameterise the slices at will), which
we will discuss in the next section.
2.4 Other problems of time
The problem of frozen dynamics is only one of a number of difficulties and questions
that arises when quantising (or even just preparing to quantise) a classical theory that is
refoliation invariant. A number of these issues are essentially related to the fact that two
theories that are classically equivalent — or indeed two methods of expressing the same
theory (for example, once in a four-covariant and once in a ‘gauge-fixed’ form) — do not
necessarily lead to equivalent quantum theories when the rules of quantisation are applied.
Many of these problems do not have counterparts in a finite-dimensional models such as
the particle model studied above.
The classification of the following list is primarily due to Isham [64], Kucharˇ [70] and
Anderson [1]. However, a number of issues are linked and cannot strictly be separated,
and in some cases a solution to one issue would also constitute a solution to another.
Anderson fittingly calls them ‘facets’ of the problem of time.
The global problem of time. It is not in general guaranteed that a system allows for
a time parameter that can be defined consistently everywhere. In particular, there are
scenarios where no function of the physical variables is always monotonic. It is therefore
not guaranteed that a global notion of time can be constructed.
The (thin) sandwich problem. Suppose data of the intrinsic spatial metric (such that it
satisfies the momentum and Hamiltonian constraints) is given on two (possibly infinitesi-
mally) separated hypersurfaces, each of which is considered to be ‘space at a given time’.
It is unclear whether (or to what degree) this specification of the boundary data uniquely
determines the spacetime geometry. The reconstruction of a spacetime from a series of
spatial slices requires knowledge of the lapse and shift functions in addition to the intrinsic
variables on each slice. The problem is already a classical one.
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Spacetime reconstruction problem. In the quantum version of the sandwich problem
(presumably one would have to give a wave functional over spatial geometries as data for
the initial and final time) it is not even clear if and in what manner a spacetime geometry
(or functional over spacetime geometries) can be constructed at all. This touches on the
much bigger question on the role of spacetime in quantum gravity.
Figure 2.1: Different ways of foliating the spacetime into spatial slices while keeping the ini-
tial and final slice (the ‘bread’ of the sandwich) fixed. The sandwich problem and spacetime-
reconstruction problem concern determination of the foliation from data at the end points, while
the functional-evolution problem asks whether a quantum state (over geometries) on the initial
slice uniquely determines the quantum state on the final slice irrespective of the intermediate foli-
ation. At least the classical analogue, the question of the independence of the classical evolution
on the foliation, can be answered affirmatively.
Independence of evolution on the foliation. The (more or less) converse of the sand-
wich problem is: Suppose an initial and final spatial surface is chosen and the initial data
is fixed. If one then evolves the data via two different intermediate foliations, does one
arrive at the same final data? Classically it can be shown that this is guaranteed by the
first-class nature of the constraints (they Poisson commute with the Hamiltonian) [71]
(and so there is not actually a problem). But for a quantum theory this is not clear:
The functional-evolution problem. In particular, evolving an initial state Ψinit[g] via
two different intermediate foliations to a final state Ψfin[g], it is not guaranteed that the
two final states obtained in this manner are the same. In other words, are the quantum
Hamiltonian and momentum constraints all that is needed to determine consistent evolu-
tion of a state?
Multiple-choice problem. This is essentially the issue that forces us to carefully con-
sider how to identify a physical time parameter. Different choices, while associated with
classically equivalent theories, lead to non-equivalent quantum theories.
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These problems are mostly concerned with the relationship between space (or spatial
geometry) evolving through time and spacetime, in particular in a quantum theory. There-
fore, if we are willing to abandon the idea that spacetime is in some some fundamental,
or that it must play some role in the quantum theory, these problems are really no prob-
lems at all. In fact, these problems arguably hint at the fact that the notion of spacetime
ought to be abandoned in the quantum theory. A spacetime picture can be constructed in
the classical theory in virtue of the constraints. The construction is rather compelling —
so much so that one may be forgiven to consider it more fundamental than the theory of
spatial geometry evolving through time. However, ultimately the problems of time hint at
the fact that this may be a mistake.
That said, in the absence of a fundamental notion of spacetime it would be desirable
to have a better understanding of why the constraints ‘conspire’ in such a way that a
spacetime construction is possible at the classical level. More accurately, why is the
(quantum) theory that describes our universe such that its classical limit has a structure
(namely, the necessary symmetries) that allows for the construction of spacetime? Of
course, any question in physics beginning with ‘Why?’ is notoriously difficult to answer
and at best an answer consists of a reduction of the problem to more basic and simpler
statements (for example, in the form of a simple physical principle). Nonetheless some
reduction of the sort would be highly desirable in order to do away with the crutch of
spacetime in explaining why the laws of gravity are what they are. I am not at this stage
aware of any work on the subject, either by physicists or philosophers.
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Chapter 3
Physical time
In this chapter we explain how the existence of a physically fundamental notion of time
would alleviate the problem of time. We explain how to derive via ‘Hamiltonian reduction’
a theory with a fundamental notion of time from a classically equivalent theory with time-
reparameterisation invariance. We provide an example of how two classically equivalent
theories with distinct choices of time may lead to distinguishable quantum theories.
3.1 Choosing a physical time: Hamiltonian reduction
There are numerous ways to overcome or avoid the problem of time. Very broadly speak-
ing, these may be divided into two categories: approaches that modify the quantisation
formalism such that the vanishing classical Hamiltonian does not lead to frozen dynamics
in the quantum theory, and approaches that modify the classical theory in order to avoid
the vanishing Hamiltonian, although some ideas may fall into both categories. The former
require for the most part a radical departure from what is usually understood to constitute
the framework of quantum theory. In chapters 11 and 12 we explore a new method of
quantisation, although also in conjunction with a preferred spacetime foliation.
Among the latter type of approaches is what is perhaps the simplest idea of them all,
the choice of a fundamental time parameter. In the case of relativity, this includes two sep-
arate steps: (1) the choice of foliation, that is, how to split spacetime into space and time,
and (2) the choice of parameterisation of slices. In the case of the time-reparameterisation
invariant particle model of sections 2.1 and 2.2 only the second step is necessary.
Two claims constitute such a proposal, which a proponent will have to justify. First,
there is a claim of existence. The proponent claims that there is a physically preferred
foliation and time parameter. Second, the proponent identifies a particular choice of foli-
ation and time parameter and must explain why this is a plausible choice from the infinite
number of options. Of course, it is a perfectly viable position to make the first claim and
be agnostic with regards to the second. In fact, as conscientious scientists we do not, of
course, subscribe to any such proposal in particular. Rather, we consider this solution to
the problem of time plausible (it is no theoretical impossibility) and therefore worth of
investigation, but we do not believe that any particular choice of time parameter is correct
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until we have empirical or other1 evidence to support such a claim. However, in order to
guide our search for plausible choices of time parameter we must invoke some theoretical
ideas and since scientific inquiry is carried out by fallible human beings our respective
evaluation of particular proposals may vary.2 We will discuss a particular choice of time
parameter, York time, in the next chapter (chapter 4).
The basic idea is then as follows. Choose a time parameter that serves as the physical
time, derive a (non-vanishing) Hamiltonian that describes the dynamics with respect to
this parameter and quantise based on this new Hamiltonian. In this section we will aim
to understand the procedure that allows us to derive the non-vanishing, physical Hamil-
tonian based on a choice of physical time parameter. The procedure to do so is called
Hamiltonian reduction and the resulting theory with the choice of York time is the central
topic of investigation in this thesis.
Of course, a crucial question is whether or not the choice of time has any measurable
consequence. That is, is the claim that some particular choice is the correct physical
time parameter falsifiable? Fortunately, the answer appears to be affirmative at least in
principle. In section 3.3 we will illustrate this using a simple two-particle model.
The central idea of Hamiltonian reduction is that the Hamiltonian is the generator
of transformations in time. In general, the quantity that generates transformations in a
variable qi is the momentum pi conjugate to that variable. Therefore, if the physical time
T is one of those variables (and this is what we mean by T being a ‘physical’ time), then
motion with respect to T is generated by the momentum PT that is conjugate to T . The
physical Hamiltonian is therefore HT ≡ −PT , where the minus sign is due to convention.
If T is not one of the ‘qi’, then one must first perform an appropriate change of variable to
make it so. Depending on one’s choice of T , performing such a change of variable may
not always be possible—York time is a notable example of this—and one must instead
introduce T and PT as additional variables in conjunction with constraints. Furthermore,
the remaining reduced variables may then obey a non-standard Poisson structure. We will
see this explicitly in later sections.
The physical Hamiltonian, or equivalently the momentum PT , must be expressed as
a function of the other variables, so that equations of motion may be derived. Of course,
this assumes that PT is fully determined by the remaining variables. This it is in virtue
of the Hamiltonian constraint, which provides exactly the one condition (or one condition
per spacetime point in the case of field theories, in which one obtains the Hamiltonian
density via this method) that implies that having fixed all but one of the set of canonical
1It is highly questionable what other form of evidence there could be. Clearly a theory has to pass basic
tests of mathematical and physical consistency. However, any claims beyond this must be viewed very
critically. In fact, the tendency by a few physicists (specifically, some string theorists [33]) to argue for
non-empirical selection criteria for theories has prompted a critique by Ellis and Silk [41], which in turn
has led to a fair degree of argument within the high-energy theoretical-physics community over the last year
or two. For a very recent and insightful clarification on the subject, see ref. [109].
2We are not only fallible with regards to our ability for analytical assessment of theoretical proposals but
also, for example, with regards to our biases towards familiar concepts (what we understand and built our
career on appears more plausible) and the biases of our funding agency (proposals more likely to receive
grant money suddenly become a lot more plausible).
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variables, that last one is determined. Hence one has to solve the Hamiltonian constraint
for PT as a function of the other variables (including T ). This gives the desired functional
expression for HT . The existence of the Hamiltonian constraint is guaranteed by the
time-reparameterisation invariance of the original dynamical description, in other words,
the parameterised form of the action. If the system is not parameterised, it cannot be
deparameterised.
It is by no means guaranteed that the Hamiltonian constraint is analytically solvable.
In fact, the full Hamiltonian constraint of general relativity is not. This is the reason why
we are restricted to minisuperspace models and perturbative solutions in later chapters.
The physical time T must be chosen in such a way that T is monotonic. Otherwise
PT may become singular and at best the reduced-Hamiltonian description is limited to
time intervals during which T is monotonic. In the case of York time problems arise if
one attempts to describe a pure de Sitter space, in which T is constant over an extended
interval of conventional cosmological time t, for example.
Let us apply the Hamiltonian reduction procedure to the particle model of chapter 2.
The simplest possibility is a return to Newtonian time. The vanishing Hamiltonian Hτ
has the form 2.12, which is just
Hτ = ptt
′ +
(
3n∑
i+1
pi
dqi
dt
− L
)
t′. (3.1)
The Hamiltonian constraint Hτ = 0 is then solved straightforwardly for Ht = −pt and
one obtains
Ht(q1, . . . , q3n, p1, . . . , p3n, t) =
3n∑
i+1
pi
dqi
dt
− L, (3.2)
that is, the conventional Hamiltonian of such a finite-dimensional model.
A less trivial example would be to pick one of the particles to function as a ‘clock’. In
other words, have some function of its position and momentum correspond to the physical
time T . We will explore this choice for a particular two-particle model in section 3.3,
where we use it to illustrate that two quantum theories, derived via canonical quantisation
from a pair of physically equivalent parameterised and deparameterised classical theories
respectively, are not themselves observationally equivalent.
Proof: Classically the parameterised and deparameterised theories are equivalent
So far we have merely asserted that the dynamics generated by the reduced Hamiltonian
HT are identical with those generated by the vanishing Hamiltonian Hτ of the parameterised
description. We justified the reduction procedure by the fact that the ‘momentum’ conjugate
to ‘time’ is the Hamiltonian, but it is not necessarily clear that the functional expression
obtained by solving the Hamiltonian constraint for HT ≡ −PT should indeed lead to a set of
physically equivalent equations.
I am not aware of such a proof anywhere in the literature, although frequently it seems to
be tacitly assumed that the reduced and unreduced dynamics are identical. Nonetheless I do
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not doubt that workers in the field (such as Arnowitt, Deser and Misner, or Choquet-Bruhat
and York) were aware of a proof such as the one below or similar and that for one reason or
another it was just never written down in their publications (to my knowledge).
For easier readability we consider the case of a finite-dimensional model such as the particle
model of chapter 2. We also assume that the proposed physical time is identifiable with one
of the variables, T = q3n+1. This can either be achieved by a suitable chosen canonical
transformation or by the introduction of an auxiliary variable together with an additional
constraint. (The latter would be required, for example, in the case of York time, as we will
see in the anisotropic minisuperspace model discussed in section 7.2.) This also means that
the Poisson brackets are the standard canonical ones after deparamterisation and Hamilton’s
equations take their usual form. As a result the short proof given here is not fully general,
although a generalisation is readily possible if rephrased in terms of Poisson brackets.
Let us abbreviate functional dependence by writing f(~q) for f(q1, ..., q3n) and so on. The
parameterised system satisfies the Hamiltonian constraint,
Hτ (~q, ~p, T,−HT ) = 0
where T and −HT are just another canonically conjugate pair of variables and have not yet
been given any special significance. The Hamiltonian constraint also generates motion in the
arbitrary time parameter τ ,
dqi
dτ
= {qi, Hτ} = ∂Hτ
∂pi
,
dT
dτ
= {T,Hτ} = ∂Hτ
∂(−HT ) ,
dpi
dτ
= {pi, Hτ} = −∂Hτ
∂qi
,
dHT
dτ
= {HT , Hτ} = ∂Hτ
∂T
.
The Hamiltonian-reduction procedure now requires us to solve Hτ = 0 for HT as a function
of the other variables. Suppose we do so and obtain HT (~q, ~p, T ). Then define new function
G(~q, ~p, T ) as
G(~q, ~p, T ) ≡ Hτ
(
~q, ~p, T,−HT (~q, ~p, T )
)
,
that is, as the function Hτ with the functional expression of HT (~q, ~p, T ) substituted in for the
variable HT . By the nature of this construction,
G(~q, ~p, T ) ≡ 0
identically, that is, for all values of ~q, ~p and T , and so it is also the case that
∂G
∂qi
= 0,
∂G
∂pi
= 0 and
∂G
∂T
= 0.
One can now express dqidτ in terms of G(~q, ~p, T ),
dqi
dτ
=
∂Hτ
∂pi
=
∂G
∂pi
− ∂Hτ
∂HT
∂HT
∂pi
= − ∂Hτ
∂HT
∂HT
∂pi
=
dT
dτ
∂HT
∂pi
.
But also, by the chain rule, since T is a suitably monotonic parameter by hypothesis,
dqi
dτ
=
dqi
dT
dT
dτ
,
so that Hamilton’s equation for the deparameterised dynamics in T follows,
dqi
dT
=
∂HT
∂pi
.
The derivation of the equations for dpidT is exactly analogous.
The steps can also be easily inverted to obtain a proof in the other direction, so that full
equivalence is established.
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3.2 The meaning of the reduced Hamiltonian
A Hamiltonian is two things: First, it is a function of a set of variables representing the
physical degrees of freedom of a dynamical system, and possibly of time. Second, the
numerical value of the Hamiltonian has some physical interpretation, usually ‘energy’.
That is, having arrived at solutions to Hamilton’s equations one can substitute the values
taken by the variables at some time back into the Hamiltonian function to obtain a number.
In many conventional cases the dynamics is independent of t, which implies that the value
of the Hamiltonian, the energy, is constant. It is doubtful that the concept of energy would
even be considered physically meaningful were it not usually conserved. That is, we can
talk of a ‘flow of energy’ from one part of a system to another exactly because overall it is
conserved and can therefore be conceptualised as something that is passed around. This
interpretation is then applied to cases where the the numerical value of the Hamiltonian
is not conserved and we speak of energy being ‘lost’ or ‘gained’, usually representing
interactions with the world outside the system under consideration. In other words, even
here energy is taken to be conserved overall but the appearance of energy gain or loss is
due to our attempt to describe a system interacting with the rest of the universe as if it
were not. Yet the assumption is that if we were to provide a complete description, then
the Hamiltonian would once again be time independent.3
This assumption is justified. The conventional variable t has no physical meaning in
itself. While to Newton it was an absolute ‘background’ time at the very foundation of the
structure of the physical world, today we may view t as the one choice of time parameters
that brings the physical laws into their simplest form (see our discussion in chapter 2) and
that can be ‘read off’ most easily from the time evolution of systems such as pendula or
the motion of the planets (ephemeris time). Having no physical significance, the dynamics
cannot be t-dependent except in cases where a t-dependent term (usually the potential) is
used to represent evolution outside the system under investigation.
In a formalism with a physical time T however the situation is very different. The
interpretation of the numerical value of the Hamiltonian is not ‘energy’ but whatever the
physical meaning of −PT , the negative of the momentum conjugate to T , since this is
how the physical Hamiltonian was defined. Hence if the position of some particle is taken
for T , then the same particle’s momentum is identified with −HT . In general reduced
Hamiltonians are time dependent and their numerical values are not conserved in time.
In the case of York time, which we will explore in later chapters, the physical meaning
of the associated Hamiltonian density is the local spatial volume element and the full
3In gravitational system the notion of energy is more complicated since here the energy density is part
of the dynamics itself, co-determining the stress-energy tensor and hence via the Einstein equations the
curvature of space-time. The two notions are can be roughly identified with each other physically if we
place a finite-dimensional particle system into a gravitational field. This description is not entirely consistent
though and the two notions of energy should really be kept separate, ideally using different terminology.
37
Hamiltonian is the volume of the universe, both of which vary in time.
When quantising a reduced classical system, the eigenvalues and eigenfunctions of
the Hamiltonian are consequently not ‘energy eigenvalues’ and ‘energy eigenfunctions’
but also have physical interpretations depending on the meaning of the Hamiltonian, such
as ‘volume eigenvalues’ and so on in the case of York time.
3.3 Significance of the choice of time
If one takes a realist view of scientific inquiry — the idea that our theories not only pro-
vide models useful for predictions but in some way are also a reflection of at least some
properties of the world itself, properties that are ‘really there’ — then theories with differ-
ent choices of physical time are manifestly distinct as their ontology is manifestly distinct,
even if their empirical predictions are identical. A physicist who rejects a scientific real-
ism on the other hand would disagree. To them an empirical distinction, that is, a different
prediction for observation, is required for two theories to be distinct.
However, even a realist should find a situation where there are two or more competing
theories with identical predictions troubling. It would imply that a fundamental feature
of reality, namely, in our case, what the true physical time parameter is, is undetectable in
principle. The question of which theory is correct cannot be answered scientifically and
becomes one of metaphysics rather than physics. In some cases one of a set of empirically
equivalent theories may be strongly preferable for other reasons, such as mathematical or
ontological simplicity. However, here one invokes a priori assumptions about what reality
is really like: that it is ontologically simple or is governed by laws whose mathematical
form is concise.
While such assumptions, whether explicit or implicit, have undoubtedly propelled for-
ward progress in physics at multiple occasions in history, to elevate them to ontological
tie-breakers for observationally equivalent theories is rash. Furthermore, the occasions
that spring to mind, such as the departure from geocentrism, the unification of electricity
and magnetism, special and general relativity, the electro-weak unification and so on, all
were at least in part observationally motivated and verified. Mathematical and ontolog-
ical simplicity may have been ideas nudging the scientists’ minds in the right direction
but ultimately these theories made new predictions which could be subsequently experi-
mentally corroborated. By hypothesis, this would not be the case for equivalent theories
differing in their choices of fundamental time.
At the end of the last section we showed that classically the reduced-Hamiltonian the-
ory is equivalent to the parameterised theory of some particular system. This raises the
question whether or not quantum theories constructed via quantisation of these classi-
cal theories are themselves identical. In fact, that the choice of time does not matter even
when composing the quantum theory is a tacit assumption frequently made in particular in
the context of cosmological perturbation theory. Here one has to make a ‘gauge choice’,
meaning a choice of coordinates describing the small perturbations on the homogeneous
cosmological background. Changing the gauge leaves the background description undis-
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turbed (since the transformation is ‘small’) but transforms the representation of the per-
turbations. A choice must be made (although ultimately measurable quantities must turn
out to be gauge invariant) because the four-diffeomorphism invariance of general relativ-
ity implies that some of the degrees of freedom are merely coordinate freedom, although
there is no matter of fact of which ones these are. The gauge choice not only concerns
spatial coordinates on a slice but also small perturbations of the slice itself (small ‘bumps’
in the foliation), so that it involves small deformations in the time parameter. Classically
this is known to be indeed only a choice of description and not physical but it is then usu-
ally assumed without discussion that the gauge choice is also irrelevant for the physical
properties of the quantum theory obtained through quantisation of the perturbations.
Such an assumption is problematic. For example, different choices of gauge will lead
to Hilbert spaces whose degrees of freedom have different physical interpretations and
it is entirely unclear that the quantum dynamics is physically equivalent when moving
from one Hilbert space to another (the functional-evolution facet of the problem of time
in the context of cosmological perturbation theory). Different choices of time lead to
different reduced Hilbert spaces. A general argument against the equivalence has been
presented, for example, in ref. [79]. Here we will consider a concrete two-particle model
which illustrates that different choices of time can indeed lead to observationally distinct
theories.4 This saves the realist from having to rely on metaphysics, although there may
remain classes of time parameters which lead to equivalent physics, so that observation
might only provide the possibility of a partial determination of the true physical time.
Nonetheless it is encouraging to see that we might ultimately be able to detect what
this fundamental physical time is if indeed there is one. The observation would neces-
sarily be one of particular quantum phenomena. In particular, this model suggests that
differences may arise with regards to observations relating to the physical degree of free-
dom that has been chosen as time. If there may be other differences not directly related
to the choice of time itself remains uncertain. Furthermore, a theory with a fundamental
choice of time not only competes with other choices of time but also other, radically dif-
ferent theories of quantum gravity. How far observations can disentangle all such choices
is an open question and will depend on the details of the various theories.
Consider then a system of two particles, each with mass m = 1, and suppose they are
constrained to a one-dimensional ‘box’ (or infinite well) but are otherwise free. Denote
the position of the particles by x and y respectively and let the box be of length pi,
V (x, y) = −U if x ∈ [0, pi], y ∈ [0, pi], ∞ otherwise, (3.3)
where U > 0 is a constant. We consider two descriptions of this system. First, the
4There are, strictly speaking, a number of separate issues: (1) Can the canonical quantum theories
based on two distinct foliations be empirically separated? (2) Can quantum theories based on identical
foliations but distinct parameterisations be distinguished? (3) Can quantised reduced-Hamiltonian theories
be distinguished from quantisations of the unreduced theories with gauge choices corresponding to the
same foliation but different parameterisation? This last question is the one we answer in this section. A full
exploration of all three of these and the specific conditions that lead to empirical distinguishability is left
for future work.
39
conventional ‘textbook’ description using Newtonian time t. Second, a deparameterised
description using one of the two particles as a clock. The parameterised action for this
system is
S =
∫
dτ N
(
x˙2
2N2
+
y˙2
2N2
− V
)
=
∫
dτ (x˙px + y˙py −NHτ ) , (3.4)
where the second line is the canonical form. The momenta are
px =
1
N
dx
dτ
, py =
1
N
dy
dτ
(3.5)
and the function Hτ , whose vanishing constitutes the Hamiltonian constraint, is
Hτ =
1
2
p2x +
1
2
p2y + V = 0. (3.6)
As we discussed in chapter 2 the Hamiltonian constraint may be considered the equation
of motion for N . Note that the Hamiltonian constraint has no well-defined solution if one
particle is outside the box, since this would require
1
2
p2x +
1
2
p2y = −∞. (3.7)
Inside the box the Hamiltonian constraint implies that the total kinetic energy is fixed to
the constant U ,
1
2
p2x +
1
2
p2y = U. (3.8)
This equation illustrates why we chose to set the bottom of the well to a negative finite
constant rather than zero. Had we chosen the latter option, the particles would have been
forced to be at rest.
We begin now with the classical analysis in terms of Newtonian time t. Here we
simply set N = 1 and relabel ‘τ ’ as ‘t’. This would be the textbook description of this
scenario, although we also retain the Hamiltonian constraint, which now constrains the
total energy to be equal to zero.5 The Newtonian Hamiltonian is
Ht =
1
2
p2x +
1
2
p2y − U (3.9)
while the two particles are inside the well, which is guaranteed by the Hamiltonian con-
straint.6 Hamilton’s equations are just those of a free particle,
d
dt
px = 0,
d
dt
py = 0,
d
dt
x = px,
d
dt
y = py, (3.10)
5Dropping the Hamiltonian constraint in order to have the system as it would actually appear in a text-
book indifferent to parameterisation invariance would not change the conclusions drawn from the analysis
of this section.
6It is a noteworthy if somewhat pedantic point that without the Hamiltonian constraint one must addi-
tionally impose the requirement that the initial conditions are such that the particles are inside the well, or
equivalently that the total energy is finite. In that case, they can never leave the well. Otherwise starting
with a particle outside the well would constitute perfectly reasonable boundary conditions.
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excluding the instances when a particle hits a wall. For the purposes of this model we are
content not to treat collisions and instead limit the applicability of our analysis to a time
interval within which no collision occurs. If we wanted to treat collisions, we would need
to treat the well as the limit of a continuous potential, for example by expressing V as a
Fourier series terminated after n terms for the dynamical analysis before taking the limit
n→∞. The solutions of the equations 3.10 are, of course, trivial.
Now consider that we instead choose a physical time by considering the particle de-
scribed by y a ‘clock’. Specifically, define T and its conjugate momentum PT as
T ≡ py
2y
, PT = −y2. (3.11)
This choice will not only illustrate the point that the two resulting quantum theories are
observationally distinct, but it also is a choice of time that is remarkably similar mathe-
matically to York time in minisuperspace models such as the ones explored in chapters 5
and 9, and sections 7.2 and 10.1. The fact that T and PT do indeed form a conjugate pair
may be shown either by deriving their Poisson brackets (using the known Poisson struc-
ture for y and py), or by considering the canonical kinetic term dTdτ PT and showing that it
is equal to dy
dτ
py up to a total derivative. We now perform the coordinate transformation
(x, px, y, py)→ (x, px, T, PT ), that is, we substitute T and PT for y and py in Hτ ,
Hτ =
1
2
p2x +
1
2
· 4T 2(−PT ) + V, (3.12)
from which we can then solve the Hamiltonian constraint Hτ = 0 for PT in terms of the
other variables and derive the physical Hamiltonian according to the procedure described
in section 3.1,
HT (x, px, T ) ≡ −PT (x, px, T ) = − 1
4T 2
(p2x + 2V ). (3.13)
This leads to the Hamilton’s equations
d
dT
x = − 1
2T 2
px,
d
dT
px = 0. (3.14)
The second of these might have been predicted since x and px have been untouched by
the introduction of T and PT and ddtpx = 0 above (something no change in time param-
eter chan change–if it is constant, it is constant no matter how time is measured). The
equations of motion can be solved:
x =
p0x
2T
+ x0 =
p0x
p0y
y + x0 (3.15)
with p0x, p
0
y and x0 being constants determined by the initial conditions. We know that the
dynamics must be equivalent in virtue of the proof given in the previous section, but one
can also verify explicitly that the equations in t and T are indeed physically equivalent.
Let us now canonically quantise the two descriptions. We are going to be agnostic
about the underlying quantum ontology and simply perform the standard procedure of
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canonical quantisation of which we provided a discussion in chapter 1. In terms of t the
quantum system is well known from any introductory textbook on quantum mechanics
with the exception of inclusion of the Hamiltonian constraint. The quantum Hamiltonian
operator is
Hˆt =
1
2
pˆ2x +
1
2
pˆ2y + V (3.16)
where the momentum operators take their usual form in the position basis. In order to
solve the Hamiltonian eigenequation, consider the ansatz ψ = ψx(x)ψy(y), which leads
to the equation7
− ~
2
2
∂2xψx = (Ex − Vx)ψx (3.17)
for x-eigenfunction ψx and x-eigenvalue Ex, and an analogous equation for ψy and Ey,
with Vx + Vy = V . The infinite-well potential manifests in boundary conditions ψx(0) =
ψx(pi) = 0, with which the equation gives solutions (labelled by k ∈ N)
ψkx =
√
2
pi
sin(kx). (3.18)
An anologous results holds forψy. For a Hamiltonian eigenstateψnm(x, y) = pinx(x)ψ
m
y (y)
the corresponding energy eigenvalue is
E =
~2
2
(n2 +m2)− U. (3.19)
This essentially completes the standard textbook analysis. We also consider the presence
of the Hamiltonian constraint. Constraints in a classical system manifest in the form of
conditions on the physical wavefunction. The quantum Hamiltonian constraint states that
physical states satisfy Hˆtψphys = 0, or
− ~
2
2
(∂2x + ∂
2
y)ψphys = Uψphys, (3.20)
while states not satisfying this condition are considered mathematical artifacts without
physical relevance. Expressed in the Hamiltonian eigenbasis,
ψphys =
∑
n,m
cnmψ
n
xψ
m
y , (3.21)
this condition becomes ∑
n,m
cnm
~2
2
(n2 +m2) = U. (3.22)
This has the rather peculiar implication that there are physical Hamiltonian eigenstates
(corresponding to having only one non-vanishing coefficient cnm) only if U is equal to
one of a subset of integer multiples of ~2/2. The physical meaning of this is somewhat of
an open question but since the infinite square well is not a realistic model of our universe
7For the purposes of this section only, we include the constant ~ explicitly.
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this peculiarity may not concern us for our purposes. The quantum constraint is effectively
a Wheeler-deWitt-like equation and implies that the dynamics is frozen
We alluded earlier that phenomenological differences arise when considering mea-
surements relating to observables associated with the physical time T , that is, the y-
particle. To see this, consider the expectation value 〈y2〉. For a general physical state
3.21 this is
〈ψ | y2 |ψ 〉 =
∑
k
∑
m
|ckm|2 ·
(
pi2
3
− 1
2m2
)
+
∑
k
∑
l 6=m
c∗klckm(−1)l+m ·
8lm
(l2 −m2)2 .
(3.23)
The term inside the sum in the first part of this expression is what one has for Hamiltonian
eigenstates, the second term corresponds to the cross-term contribution only present in
non-eigenstates. In general c∗klckm has a time-dependent overall phase factor, so that the
second sum itself is time-dependent, while the first is constant. However, suppose that U
is such that there exist physical energy eigenstates, that is, U is an integer multiple of ~/2.
Then for such states the second sum vanishes and there exist physically allowed states in
which 〈y2〉 is time-independent.
Now quantise the classical theory with physical time T . We will show that there are
no states in this theory such that 〈y2〉 is constant in time, illustrating disagreement with
the quantised theory in t. Here the configuration space of the system is one-dimensional
since only x remains as a variable, while y and its momentum have been ‘absorbed’ into
the notion of time. Denoting the eigenvalue of the Hamiltonian by F , the Hamiltonian
eigenequation HˆTψx = Fψx is
− 1
2T 2
(
1
2
p2x + V
)
ψx = Fψx. (3.24)
This is exactly analogous to the equation in the quantisation of the t-description except
that there is an additional time-dependent pre-factor. Hence the eigenfunctions are the
same as ψx obtained above,
ψnx =
√
2
pi
sin(nx), n ∈ N, (3.25)
(and vanishing outside the wel) and the eigenvalues are
Fn = − 1
2T 2
(
~2n2
2
− U
)
. (3.26)
The Hamiltonian constraint has been eliminated as part of the Hamiltonian reduction and
as a result is identically satisfied as is easy to check.
Above we calculated the expectation value 〈y2〉 and showed that at least for some
choices of U there are states in which it is constant in time. Here 〈y2〉 is, according to our
discussion in section 3.2, the Hamiltonian expectation value, since the physical meaning
of the Hamiltonian was defined as HT = −PT = y2. For a general state
ψ =
∑
n
cnψ
n
x (3.27)
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we find (using the orthogonality of the eigenstates)
〈ψ | y2 |ψ 〉 = − 1
2T 2
(∑
n
|cn|2~
2n2
2
− U
)
, (3.28)
which is time dependent for all states since the part in parentheses is not. This is in
manifest disagreement with the range of possible expectation values resulting from the
quantisation of the t-description.
There remains a question of how this would be measurable in practice given the above
model. One might think it possible to simply wait a sufficiently long time such that
the expectation values are sufficiently different to be easily distinguishable with good
probability from a single measurement, although one is of course limited by the limited
applicability of the model to the time frame between classical bounces. Furthermore, a
measurement process should be included dynamically, not considered external, since it
would have to be part of the Hamiltonian-reduction process. Furthermore, it is arguably
impossible to test the expectation value via repeated measurements of systems prepared
in the same state since in the reduced formalism there is only one time variable, not one
per copy of the system. Physical time is always extracted for the universe as a whole, not
multiple times within a universe, and multiple copies of a system are necessarily part of
the same universe if one claims to be able to make any statistical inference from them.
These considerations suggest that great care has to be taken on how to actually dis-
tinguish between the two quantum theories in practice, in particular in a more realistic
model. However, another way one might hope to establish the distinction experimentally
with a single measurement is by simply measuring y2 to high precision. For any value
of T other than a discrete set of values the possible outcomes of such a measurement do
not match the possible values of measurements obtained in the t formalism. Hence one
would be able to say with great probability whether or not the measured outcome could
possibly be one that is allowed in the t-formalism or not.
Despite these subtleties the above illustration is sufficient to show that one may plau-
sibly expect experimental differences in the respective quantum theories with different
physical time parameters. One might be hopeful that such a time parameter might there-
fore be detectable for our universe if indeed there is one. Considering York-time quantum
gravity is then not a purely formal exercise but may ultimately lead to concretely different
observable physics, at least in principle.
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Chapter 4
York time
In this chapter we introduce York time, arguably the most promising candidate for a phys-
ically fundamental notion of time. We explain its role in the initial-value problem of gen-
eral relativity and discuss some of its other properties and how it would address various
questions about the nature of quantum gravity.
4.1 The initial-value problem of general relativity
In the last chapter we discovered that different choices of physical time may lead to phe-
nomenologically distinct theories following quantisation. In principle, therefore, one can
hope that observation will ultimately constrain the list of temporal candidates, or rule out
such an approach to quantum gravity all together. However, a priori there are an infinite
number of ways to carry out the time-space split. We must therefore apply theoretical
considerations in order to identify viable candidates. Roughly speaking one may divide
proposals into three categories:
1. Intrinsic time: the time parameter depends only on the configuration variables
within a spatial slice, that is, the metric gab. Furthermore, the parameter ought
to be invariant under spatial diffeomorphisms, so that the parameter depends really
only on the geometry, that is, an equivalence class of metrics. One simple exam-
ple in cosmology would be to use a monotonic function of the scale factor a as a
time parameter. For example, Misner [85] proposed the use of − ln a to describe
cosmological history.
2. Extrinsic time: the time parameter depends only on geometrical degrees of freedom
but this includes the relationship between infinitesimally separated slices, so that it
may be a function of gab and the geometric momenta piab. Once again the parameter
ought to be invariant under spatial diffeomorphisms, which may vary from slice to
slice. York time is an example of an extrinsic time parameter.
3. Matter time: the time parameter is extracted from the properties of matter. Whether
some particular matter field and if so which, or perhaps a combination of all mat-
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ter should be used to formulate the parameter is entirely open. Some illustrative
proposals using dust have been made in refs. [26] and [63].
In principle one could define a time parameter also by mixing geometric and matter de-
grees of freedom, although it is difficult to see what proposal of this sort would have any
theoretical basis. Nonetheless it cannot be ruled out.
With a plethora of choices available and a finite number of hours in a researcher’s
life, how should one select a candidate parameter for further investigation? The most
promising route is to look at the structure of the theory, general relativity, itself. The
first point to note is that the physical degrees of freedom of general relativity are not the
variables themselves but only equivalence classes thereof. That is, general relativity is
generally covariant, meaning (roughly) the equations are identical for different choices of
coordinates. This coordinate freedom is not physical and our choice of time, as already
indicated above, should not depend on the chosen coordinates. It should not depend, that
is, on the metric representation of the geometry.
In addition to the dynamical equations that govern how the spatial geometry changes
over time the space of solutions is subject to four constraints, the three momentum con-
straints 2.40 and the Hamiltonian constraint 2.39. One consequence of the existence of
such constraints is that the initial-value problem of general relativity is non-trivial. The
initial-value problem is the task to specify a full set of Cauchy data on a spatial slice such
that the evolution is uniquely determined at all times thereafter (and before). In practice
this means specifying values for gab(x) and the geometric momentum piab(x) at every
point x on a spatial slice. Doing so uniquely determines their values on all other slices
via the evolution equations. This holds true no matter how the spacetime is foliated to the
future of the initial slice since gab(x, t) and piab(x, t) being fixed for one foliation means
they are determined for any foliation as such a change corresponds to a mere spacetime
coordinate transformation.
For many other theories the initial-value problem is simple. For example, in a system
with n particles one simply specifies the momentum and position of each particle. If the
total energy is constrained (to zero, for example, as the result of time-reparameterisation
invariance) then we can imagine placing n−1 particles as we like (depending on the form
of the potential function there might be a maximum total energy for those n− 1 particles
that we have to observe) and then the position and/or momentum of the nth particle is
at least partially determined by the constraint. The future evolution of the system is then
fully determined and the initial-value problem is solved.
In general relativity there is a catch, however. There is no obvious straightforward way
to specify initial data gab(x) and piab(x) such that all the constraints are satisfied. General
relativity is a field theory with an infinity of degrees of freedom and the constraints are
sufficiently non-trivial1 that no simple mechanical construction is possible.
1An (artificial) example of sufficiently trivial constraints would be constraints that are super-local, mean-
ing they do not involve spatial derivatives. In this case a finite set of data could be found at each point
individually and only continuity from point to point is required.
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A beautiful solution to the initial-value problem was found by James York in the
early 1970s [142, 143, 144, 28]. Specifically he showed that only the conformal part of
the metric and conjugate momentum, meaning the ‘scale-free’ or ‘shape-only’ geometric
degrees of freedom describing the anisotropy of space, may be specified, and only on
slices of constant extrinsic curvature. The local notion of scale and its rate of change
are then determined by the constraints. The details are as follows below. A reader not
interested in the technical details may choose to skip to the non-technical discussion at
the end of this section, taking note however of equation 4.12.
Recall that the Hamiltonian and momentum constraints are respectively the vanishing
of
H = −1
2
√
gM2PlR +
2
M2Pl
√
g
(
gacgbd − 12gabgcd
)
piabpicd +Hmatter, (2.37)
H a = −2∇bpiab +H amatter. (2.38)
Following [144], the first step in specifying a full set of data that satisfies the constraints
is to construct data satisfying the momentum constraints only. To do so, specify some
arbitrary functions for the metric and momentum, g¯ab(x) and p¯iab(x). From these one can
construct uniquely a set of data that satisfies the momentum constraints by decomposing it
into pure-trace, longitudinal and transverse-traceless parts at each spatial point. Consider
for the sake of generality a tensor ψab and write
ψab = ψabTT + ψ
ab
L + ψ
ab
Tr. (4.1)
The trace contribution is determined by single degree of freedom ψ,
ψabTr =
1
3
ψgab, ψ = gcdψ
cd (4.2)
while the longitudinal contribution may be expressed in terms of a vector W a,
ψabL ≡ (LW )ab ≡ ∇aW b +∇bW a − 23gab∇cW c, (4.3)
where indices are raised and lowered with the spatial metric gab and its inverse gab as usual,
and ∇a denotes the spatial covariant derivative associated with the given metric. The
transverse-traceless part is defined as what is leftover to satisfy equation 4.1, although the
fact that ψabTT really is transverse and traceless is still to be shown. We assume throughout
that all tensor quantities are C∞.
It is easy to show that ψabTT is indeed traceless since Tr(ψ) = Tr(ψTr) from eq. 4.2
and Tr(ψL) ≡ 0 for any W a in virtue of its definition 4.3. The non-trivial part of the
construction is to choose W a such that ψTT is indeed transverse,
∇bψabTT = 0. (4.4)
This effectively constitutes the requirement
∇b(LW )ab = −∇bψabTF , (4.5)
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where ψabTF ≡ ψab − 13ψgab denotes the tracefree part of ψab. Introducing the operator D
defined by
(DW )a = −∇b(LW )ab (4.6)
one can show thatD is linear, second-order, positive-definite and Hermitian. The first two
properties are easily seen by inspection, while the latter two may be shown by integrating
by parts a global scalar product over the manifold, giving
(W,DW ) ≡
∫
Wa(DW )
a = 1
2
∫
(LW )ab(LW )
ab ≡ 1
2
(LW,LW ) ≥ 0, (4.7)
and for any two vectors V a, W b one can show by integrating by parts twice that
(DV,W ) = (V,DW ) (4.8)
illustrating Hermiticity. The case LW = 0 is a special case, implying that either W = 0
or W is a conformal Killing vector field. In either case they do not affect the possible so-
lutions forW a (details are found in ref. [144]). These properties ofD imply that solutions
exist and can be found by considering eigenfunctions of D. The solutions are, formally,
W a =
(
D−1(−∇ · ψTF )
)a
, (4.9)
where the inverse D−1 of D exists in virtue of the same properties, although a solution
W a is unique only up to conformal Killing vector fields. Thus, strictly speaking, one
obtains an equivalence class of vectors W a for any one initially selected tensor ψab. The
tensor (LW )ab, which enters the definition of ψabTT is however unique for any one such
equivalence class. Having solved for W a, the transverse traceless part ψabTT now has those
properties provably by construction.
Applying this method to the initially chosen momentum data p¯iab helps one to find the
part piab of p¯iab that satisfies the momentum constraint with respect to the metric g¯ab, as
the momentum constraint is effectively a requirement of transverseness.
Suppose then we have a set of data (gab(x), piab(x)) satisfying the momentum con-
straints but not yet the Hamiltonian constraint. Consider a conformal transformation
gab → g˜ab = φ4gab, piab → p˜iab = φ−4piab, (4.10)
where φ(x) is an arbitrary smooth function on the slice. The momentum constraint is
invariant under such a transformation, that is, it is satisfied by the data (g˜ab, p˜iab) if it is
satisfied by (gab, piab), if the slice is maximal. A slice is maximal if and only if the trace
of the momentum vanishes everywhere, pi ≡ Tr(piab) ≡ gabpiab = 0.
Assume then that the data is indeed given for a maximal slice. The momentum con-
straints are assumed to be satisfied but the Hamiltonian constraint, in general, is not.
The goal is to perform a conformal transformation 4.10 such that the transformed data
(g˜ab, p˜i
ab) does satisfy the Hamiltonian constraint. If this can be done, then the trans-
formed data would indeed satisfy all constraints and the initial-value problem would be
solved, at least for data on maximal slices. Substitute therefore the transformed data in
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the form (φ4gab, φ−4piab) into the Hamiltonian constraint, which can now be understood
as an equation determining the correct choice of φ in terms of gab and piab, namely
8∇2φ+M−2Pl g−1piabpiabφ−7 −M2PlRφ = 0. (4.11)
This equation is known as the Lichnerowicz equation. Having solved this equation for φ
one has explicit data satisfying both the momentum and Hamiltonian constraints.
The method described in the last two paragraphs assumes that the data is given on a
maximal slice. This restriction may be weakened to slices of constant mean curvature
(constant scalar extrinsic curvature), that is, slices on which the parameter
T ≡ 2pi
3
√
g
(4.12)
is constant (pi here still denotes the trace of piab, not the constant relating geometric prop-
erties of circles). This requires an extra step, the replacement of piab by its traceless part
σab ≡ piab − 1
3
pigab. (4.13)
Since ∇agab = 0, one has that if piab satisfies the momentum constraint (∇apiab = 0),
then so does σab (∇aσab = 0). The crucial aspect of a slice of constant mean curvature is
that the decomposition 4.1 is invariant under conformal transformations.2 One proceeds
as for the case of maximal slicing by substituting the transformed data (g˜ab, σ˜ab) into the
Hamiltonian, which now yields the extended Lichnerowicz equation,
8∇2φ+M−2Pl g−1piabpiabφ−7 −M2PlRφ− 38M−2Pl T 2φ5 = 0. (4.14)
For T = 0 one recovers the (unextended) Lichnerowicz equation 4.11 as expected.
There are two key points that follow from this solution to the initial-value problem.
First, the degrees of freedom that may be freely specified are the conformal geometric
degrees of freedom, that is, the variables determining local ‘shape’ (or angles together
with anisotropy), and not the local absolute scale. Second, the initial data can only be
given on a a slice of constant scalar extrinsic curvature, or equivalently of constant T .
If we take the idea of a theory of gravity described by three-dimensional space whose
geometry evolves through time (rather than the four-covariant ‘spacetime’ picture) seri-
ously, then the latter fact strongly suggests that slices of constant T are slices of constant
time, so that the foliation on which the initial-value problem can be solved is indeed the fo-
liation that corresponds to stacking of spaces at consecutive instances. For if physical time
corresponded to a different time variable, that is, if the reconstruction of spacetime from
the space-through-time theory were not a reconstruction from a constant-mean-curvature
foliation, then as a consequence initial data could not be specified at a single instance in
time. This would pose a major conundrum for the notion of what determines the dynamics
of a physical system.
2The distinction between maximal and constant-mean-curvature slices is essentially that in the former
case the trace part piabTr as defined in 4.1 vanishes, while in the latter case the part has to be subtracted
‘manually’ to arrive at the transverse traceless part.
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Accepting that the correct physical foliation is one of constant T , two question remain.
First, is T itself a viable notion of time? In other words, is it monotonic? And is the
constant-mean-curvature slicing unique?
We will consider the question of uniqueness in the next section. Regarding the first
of these, note first that there are solutions to the equations of general relativity that do
not permit a global constant-mean-curvature slicing. One example is any solution with a
closed timelike loop. Such solutions of general relativity would therefore not constitute
solutions to our theory of gravity described by space evolving through time. This inequiv-
alence is likely unproblematic since such solutions of general relativity do not as far as
we know correspond to our actual universe and the theories are therefore phenomenologi-
cally equivalent given what we already know about our universe. For solutions of general
relativity that do allow a constant-mean-curvature slicing (such as universes with closed
or asymptotically flat cosmologies) one can indeed show as a result of the field equations
that T is non-decreasing.3
This leaves only the possibility that T is constant across multiple slices. One example
of such a scenario is de Sitter space, where homogeneous space expands at a constant
fractional rate. De Sitter space often serves as a first approximation for the behaviour of
the universe during inflation, which we will treat in detail in section 5.4. Fortunately there
de Sitter is only an approximation and a higher-order calculation shows that T is, in fact,
increasing during this cosmological period, albeit slowly (with respect to conventional
‘cosmological’ time). A true de Sitter space would pose issues for considering T as a
time variable. However, once again we know that our universe is not described by a pure
de Sitter space, so that the viability of the York parameter T is as a time parameter is not
threatened.
The second insight gained from the initial-value problem was that ‘scale’ (and its
conjugate momentum) are not freely specifiable but are determined by the Hamiltonian
constraint. This suggests that these variables do not have the same physical status as the
other, shape-determining variables. Indeed, the (fractional) rate of change of scale is just
the value of the York parameter on the slice, or the answer to the question ‘what time
is it?’ The scale itself (expressed as the local volume element
√
g) is the momentum
conjugate to the time T .
Considering T as our physical time parameter implies then that
√
g is equal to the
physical Hamiltonian density, as discussed in section 3.2. The status of volume is there-
fore analogous to that of ‘energy’ in conventional theories; not a physical variable (al-
though arguably not void of physical meaning) and given by the numerical value of the
Hamiltonian. Exploring this idea will constitute the majority of the remainder of this
thesis.
In our argument there is one caveat. While it is true that York’s solution to the initial-
value problem gives reasons to take the proposal of York time as physical time seriously,
it is unproven that the initial-value problem can indeed not be solved in another manner,
3This is in general true provided a sufficiently well-behaved matter content is assumed.
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in particular with another foliation. It is the case that no other solutions are known4, but
at least the possibility of other solutions has not been ruled out.
York time and constant-mean-curvature slicing do however also have a number of
other properties that support the plausibility of their fundamental physical significance.
This will be the subject of the next section.
4.2 Properties of York time
The York parameter T plays a central role in the initial-value problem in that it is to our
knowledge only surfaces of constant T on which the problem can be solved. The notion of
local scale and its rate of change is ‘extracted’ from among the physical variables. Taking
the implication of this seriously, we argued, means to consider the York parameter as the
true physical time and its conjugate momentum as the Hamilton density, whose physical
interpretation is that of local volume.
York time however does have other properties as the result of which it stands out from
among the candidates for physical time. Suppose we were unaware of York’s work on
the initial-value problem and we wished to identify a physical time based on a few simple
theoretical considerations. First, we wish to extract it from the geometric degrees of free-
dom only (no matter-dependent definitions) and furthermore we believe that it should only
depend on the local degrees of freedom, that is, ‘what time is it?’ should be answerable
without reference to the properties of other, distant points in space. The latter criterion
enables subsequently the identification of a local Hamiltonian density. So physical time
and the Hamiltonian density at x are functions of gab(x) and piab(x) only.
Further, it is reasonable to suppose that the time parameter be identified as an isotropic
quantity. There is nothing that leads us to believe that there is any sort of fundamental
anisotropy in the laws of the universe. This then implies that any of the ‘shape’ degrees
of freedom, which determine the notion of angles, are not to be used. Only the overall
scale and its rate of change (or conjugate momentum), that is, the metric determinant
g = det(gab) and the momentum trace pi = gabpiab, remain.
This still leaves various options. For example, one might consider the local scale
√
g
to be time and its conjugate momentum to be the Hamilton, essentially a reversal of the
roles we propose. The issue here is however that in general
√
g does not change mono-
tonically according to the laws of general relativity. Disallowing such solutions would be
far more restricting than disallowing spacetimes that cannot be foliated in the manner of
constant mean curvature, although in cosmological contexts (assuming a homogeneous
universe) such a time parameter may be viable and has been considered in the literature
(by Misner, for example, [85]). The requirement of monotonicity rules out the vast ma-
jority of possible functions of g and pi.
I cannot say with certainty that only constant mean curvature slicing guarantees mono-
tonicity, although I am unaware of any other, non-equivalent foliation of the sort. How-
4although there were attempts along different lines preceding York, for example due to Baierlein, Sharp
and Wheeler [6]
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ever, the simplicity of the interpretation of the Hamiltonian is uniquely compelling. So,
even if there are other options, York time must be considered a favourite among them
based only on a few theoretical principles.
In the last section we also left unanswered the question whether the constant-mean-
curvature slicing of a spacetime that forms a solution of the field equations of general rel-
ativity is unique. We already discussed that not all such spacetimes are, in fact, constant-
mean-curvature slicable and those that are not would not be solutions of our theory of
York-time geometrodynamics. However, if the spacetime is slicable by a constant-mean-
curvature foliation, can there be more than one such foliation?
The last question has been answered in the negative by Marsden and Tipler [80]. They
established that the constant-mean-curvature slicing of a spacetime, if indeed there is one,
is unique, at least for a subset of solutions of general relativity. Specifically, these are the
cases of closed universes, that is, those that, roughly speaking, experience a ‘big crunch’
after some finite proper time. However, their argument also applies to universes which
are asymptotically flat, that is, where space in the infinite distance approaches a Euclidean
geometry.
Figure 4.1: Surfaces of finite constant
T wrap around singularities, which are
all part of a single final singularity at
T = ∞. The image is taken from ref.
[100].
Another encouraging aspect of constant-mean-
curvature slicing is the shape such a foliation takes
in the presence of singularities. In the 1980s Qadir
and Wheeler [100] discovered that the scalar extrin-
sic curvatureK, or equivalently−T , approaches in-
finity as the singularity is approached. This applies
equally to a final singularity that is the ‘big crunch’
in universes that have such a singularity and to local
singularities such as black holes. As a result slices
of constant T ‘wrap around’ a singularity and all
black holes are part of the single, final singularity
found at T = ∞.5 Consequently there are no geo-
metric singularities on any slice labelled by a finite
T .6
This completely preempts a difficult conceptual
issue that any theory of quantum gravity has to ad-
dress. The issue concerns the existence of singu-
larities. The first question is whether or not singu-
larities, which are clearly solutions of the classical theory, are also part of the quantum
theory. If yes, then what is the quantum description of such singularity? If not, then how
5As in all parts of this thesis, a slice is itself a three-dimensional object with non-zero volume, and ‘wrap
around’ is to be understood as a three-dimensional (hyper)slice ‘wrapping’ in the fourth dimension.
6However: In a universe that expands forever (and T → 0 as t → ∞ in the homogeneous approx-
imation), what is the shape of the York foliation then? In the vicinity of a singularity the cosmological
properties are irrelevant and T → ∞ but in other parts of the universe T ends at zero. This apparent con-
tradiction motivates us to propose a cosmological extension for such universes. This we discuss in detail in
chapter 6.
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do singularities arise as classical approximations? I am not aware that any approach of
quantum gravity has answered these questions fully and with certainty.
The York slicing avoids classical singularities entirely since they are ‘banished’ to
T = ±∞. Hence the quantum geometrodynamics, the quantum theory of spatial geome-
tries, can be defined on those slices without concern regarding the recovery of classical
singularities in any limit.
Proper time
The attentive reader will have noticed that the notion of constant extrinsic curvature and
York time was introduced with reference to another, more familiar notion: proper time. In
particular, the physical understanding of the scalar extrinsic curvature is the local fractional
rate of growth of volume, where ‘rate of growth’ refers to growth with respect to proper time.
Does this reliance on another notion of time, proper time, spell doom to our idea to consider
York time a physically fundamental time parameter? What about proper time as a physically
fundamental time parameter? And what is this proper time anyway?
Our endeavour is not doomed. Referring to proper time provided a physical intuition for
the York parameter but in its formal definition in terms of the geometric momenta piij and the
metric gij no such reference was made. The expression for the momenta, when traced back to
the original action principle, involved the lapse N , whose own physical interpretation is the
amount of proper time passing per coordinate time, but recall that mathematically N merely
encodes the freedom to choose any monotonic time parameter. Its physical meaning is not
relevant for this, nor for the procedure of Hamiltonian reduction, which will be used to derive
the dynamical equations. The notion of York time does not, in fact, rely on the idea of proper
time at all.
In fact, if we take the view that our theory of gravity is fundamentally one of the time
evolution of a spatial geometry and not just a ‘3+1’ description of a spacetime geometry, then
the lapse N and proper time τ were never more than a crutch that allowed us to come up with
a theory that is phenomenologically equivalent with general relativity anyway.
Proper time itself does not constitute a viable fundamental time parameter. For one, it does
not actually define a single preferred foliation. At any point on a slice chosen in any desirably
way one can define the notion of proper time (of a comoving observer), but ‘what proper time
it is’ is not a notion that can be answered in an absolute manner. A ‘slice of constant proper
time’ is not a meaningful notion unless there already is another such slice that is assumed
to be such and relative to which absolute values of proper time can be assigned. That is, a
constant-proper-time foliation is determined by choosing a single slice, but how to choose
that first slice is not unique. Proper time further lacks a relation to what constitutes, arguably,
the physical variables given the initial-value problem.
Another issue proper time faces is the criticism made by Valentini [134] that we discussed
above.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to deny that the notion of proper time must have some direct
physical significance. After all, it is exactly the time parameter that is measured by a clock,
∆tclock =
∫
path
dτ =
∫
path
√
dt2 − gijdxidxj .
A clock may be considered a ‘hodometer of spacetime’ [23], measuring the Lorentzian length
of the spacetime path taken akin to the mileage counter of an automobile. Clocks are physical
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systems governed by dynamical equations depending on the exact constituents of the clock.
It is a remarkable conspiracy that all clocks — no matter whether consisting of pendula,
vibrating atoms or systems of orbiting bodies — ‘tick’ at the same rate. There are two views
one can take: either this conspiracy shows that there is an underlying spacetime structure
that the clocks ‘sense’; or it is exactly this conspiracy that allows a description in terms of
spacetime, but the conspiracy is purely a matter of matter dynamics.
The first view is the one commonly presented in the majority of textbooks on relativity,
although too often clocks (and rods) are simply considered as primitive entities that — al-
most by definition — display the spacetime structure. Opening many a textbook one finds
diagrams of coordinate grids with clocks drawn at each intersection, or similar. This appar-
ently compelling view is called into question however when we try to understand the details
by which actual clocks sense this spacetime structure. We are forced to consider the interac-
tion between dynamics and spacetime, but this then is just a rephrasing of the second view.
The notion of spacetime can be invoked because the universality of the dynamics allows for
a geometric description but the clock conspiracy is ultimately a question of dynamics.
This universality is essentially due to the way the gravitational field represented by the
spacetime metric (4)gµν is coupled to the matter fields via minimal coupling. (Co-)vectorial
quantities (such as spatial derivatives of fields) are summed, for example in the kinetic terms
of a scalar field, via contraction of the indices by the metric. The spatial derivatives are
furthermore modified to be covariant, giving them the right transformation properties that the
gravitational field may be given a geometric interpretation.
The reliance on notions that ultimately require dynamical treatment, such as rods and
clocks, as primitive is as old as relativity itself. Early in Einstein’s celebrated 1905 paper
Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Ko¨rper [39] he writes,
“Like all electrodynamics, the theory to be developed here is based on the kine-
matics of a rigid body, since the assertions of any such theory have to do with the
relations among rigid bodies (coordinate systems), clocks, and electromagnetic
processes.”
Few authorsa have encouraged a dynamical understanding of relativistic effects such as clock
dilation and length contraction without relying on spacetime geometry as a primitive expla-
nation. One notable exception is Bell, who provides a beautiful discussion of the deformation
of a moving atom in terms of electrodynamics in “How to teach special relativity”, published
as something of an oddity among his collection of papers on quantum mechanics [15]. The
most careful discussion of the principles and assumption of special relativity of which I am
aware is due to Brown [23], who criticises the operationalist viewpoint of rods and clocks
exemplified by the above passage. Here we cannot do the subject justice. Our point is merely
that proper time, which can be understood as a geometric notion in the context of spacetime,
cannot be separated from the dynamics of physical systems.
To consider spacetime conceptually prior to the dynamics of matter would, one may argue,
be putting the cart before the horse.b Proper time is intrinsically dynamical, not an aspect of
spatial or spatio-temporal structure, and is therefore not obviously a viable choice of funda-
mental time parameter.
aMany years later Einstein himself however became uneasy with his approach to special relativity
as is evident from his autobiographical notes, in which he calls the primitive treatment of rods and
clocks “inconsistent” [40].
bThis statement is intentionally a reference to a claim by Balashov and Janssen [7], who defend
exactly the opposite view, although in the context of Minkowski’s non-dynamical geometry. The paper
is heavily criticised by Brown, who argues that “[t]he appropriate structure [to define a kinematics for
54
mechanics] is Minkowksi geometry precisely because the laws of physics of the non-gravitational
interactions are Lorentz covariant” (original italics) [23, p. 133].
4.3 The reduced variables and their Poisson structure
Hamiltonian reduction is a mathematical procedure that reduces the number of config-
uration-space degrees of freedom by one and the number of phase-space degrees of free-
dom by two (one ‘position’ and one ‘momentum’). If the variables extracted to serve as
time and as the Hamiltonian (or Hamiltonian density) are simply one pair of canonical
variables chosen from among the full set of canonical pairs, then the Poisson structure
of the set of remaining variables is unchanged. On the other hand, if the notion of phys-
ical time and Hamiltonian are definable only in terms of multiple variables and there
is no canonical transformation that avoids this, then the number of reduced variables is
not smaller than the number of original degrees of freedom. Instead the reduced vari-
ables must satisfy a new pair of constraints, so that the number of degrees of freedom is
nonetheless reduced. That these constraints remain satisfied with time irrespective of the
particular form of the Hamiltonian is however guaranteed by modified Poisson brackets.
The new Poisson structure is obtained directly from the Poisson structure of the original
variables and some basic properties of Poisson brackets.
The content of the preceding paragraph, describing abstractly how a non-canonical
Poisson structure arises, may appear obscure. A simple example helps to clarify this
mathematical process.
Consider a system described by three pairs of canonical variables Qi, P i, i = 1, 2, 3.
These may describe the position and momentum of three particles confined to move in
one dimension, for example. Let its (unreduced) Hamiltonian be the usual one (setting
the particle mass to m = 1),
Ht =
1
2
∑
i
P i2 + V (Q1, Q2, Q3), (4.15)
where the subscript t denotes the fact that this Hamiltonian describes evolution with re-
spect to t. We demand time-reparameterisation invariance (see chapter 2), so that the
system obeys a Hamiltonian constraint,
Ht = 0. (4.16)
Since the set of variables {Q1, Q2, Q3, , P 1, P 2, P 3} is by hypothesis canonical and there-
fore obeys the usual Poisson structure,
{Qi, P j} = δji , (4.17)
with all other Poisson brackets vanishing.
Define for convenience the quantities
G ≡ Q1Q2Q3, Π =
∑
i
QiP
i, (4.18)
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somewhat resembling the metric determinant g and the trace of the geometric momentum,
pi = gijpi
ij respectively. In fact, the model used here to illustrate the appearance of
non-canonical Poisson brackets describes a homogeneous but anisotropic spatially flat
universe and will be developed in full in section 7.2. We choose a physical time with
respect to which to perform a Hamiltonian reduction, namely
T ≡ 2Π
3
√
G
, PT ≡ −
√
G. (4.19)
The choice is obviously analogous to York time and its conjugate momentum. However,
for our present purposes (to derive the Poisson structure of the reduced variables) the exact
form does not matter, only that they are functions of the ‘scale’ variables: T = T (G,Π),
PT = PT (G,Π).
There is no canonical transformation from the set of variables {Q1, Q2, Q3, P1, P2, P3}
to another set {G, Q˜1, Q˜2,Π, P˜1, P˜2} such that the latter includes G and Π. This implies
that the set of reduced variables is not just an unreduced set of canonical variables minus
one canonical pair. Instead it is another set of six variables from which the ‘scale’ is ex-
tracted via constraints. The most obvious way to do this is to define the reduced variables
as
qi ≡ G− 13Qi, pi ≡ G 13 (P i − 13Π/Qi). (4.20)
The new variables configuration variables qi obey the constraint
q1q2q3 = 1 (4.21)
identically in virtue of their definition. However, if we ‘kick away the ladder’ and treat
the variables qi as fundamental, that is, if we ‘forget’ how we arrived at the reduced
description, then the constraint is a genuine one. The variables also obey∑
i
qip
i = 0, (4.22)
which ensures that the first constraint remains satisfied with time evolution irrespective of
the exact form of the Hamiltonian. The constraint also holds identically in virtue of the
definition of the momenta pi. In fact, the form of the momenta 4.20 is exactly such that
any motion generated by the momenta is tangent to the constraint surface defined by eq.
4.21. Other definitions, such as p˜i ≡ G 13P i, would not have this property. We will discuss
this in more detail in section 7.2.
For now we are only interested in the derivation of the Poisson structure for the
set {q1, q2, q3, p1, p2, p3}. The procedure to find the new Poisson structure (such that the
reduced dynamics is physically equivalent with the unreduced dynamics) is as follows:
First write the Poisson bracket to be determined in terms of the original variables. Second,
use the original Poisson structure together with general properties of Poisson brackets to
evaluate the selected bracket in terms of the old variables. Rewrite the result in terms of
the new reduced variables. This ensures consistency of the new Poisson structure with the
old.
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For illustrative purposes we wish to determine {qi, pj}. Following the procedure just
described we write,
{qi, pj} =
{
(Q1Q2Q3)
− 1
3Qi , (Q1Q2Q3)
1
3
(
P j − 1
3
∑
kQkP
k
Qj
)}
. (4.23)
Now use the property of Poisson brackets that for a function F (Q1, Q2, Q3) it is true that
{F, P j} =
∑
k
∂F
∂Qk
{Qk, P j}. (4.24)
This follows from distributivity of the Poisson brackets and the for our purposes reason-
able assumption that F is sufficiently well behaved to have a series expansion. Evaluating
the Poisson bracket in this manner gives (after rewriting the right-hand side in terms of
the new reduced variables):
{qi, pj} = δji −
qi
3qj
. (4.25)
Proceeding analogously with the other Poisson brackets, one finds
{qi, qj} = 0 (4.26)
{pi, pj} = p
i
3qj
− p
j
3qi
. (4.27)
The existence of the second term in the expression 4.25 and the non-vanishing of the right-
hand side of eq. 4.27 are the reason the new reduced variables are not canonical. We will
return to this model, which is a description of the geometrodynamics of a homogeneous
but anisotropic universe, in chapter 7 before proceeding to consider the analogous Poisson
brackets of the perturbation theory.
In contrast with this finite-dimensional model, the full theory of York-time geometro-
dynamics is a field theory. The theory is, however, local, so that Poisson brackets vanish if
compared between two distinct spatial points. Otherwise the Poisson brackets one obtains
(proceeding in the same manner as we did above) are very similar:
{g˜ab(x), g˜cd(y)} = 0 (4.28)
{g˜ab(x), p˜icd(y)} =
(
δ(ca δ
d)
b − 13 g˜ab(x)g˜cd(x)
)
δ3(x− y) (4.29)
{p˜iab(x), p˜icd(y)} = 1
3
(
g˜cd(x)p˜iab(x)− g˜ab(x)p˜icd(x)
)
δ3(x− y). (4.30)
Here g˜ab and p˜iab denote the reduced variables and x and y denote points on the spatial
slice. The argument of g˜ab and p˜iab on the right-hand sides has been written as ‘x’, al-
though we might as well have written ‘y’ since the expressions are non-vanishing only if
the two selected spatial points are one and the same.
If we consider the universe to be homogeneous and additionally restrict the metric to
have a form such that off-diagonal elements vanish, the expressions 4.28 - 4.30 reduce to
expressions 4.25 - 4.27.
In section 7.2 we discuss the meaning and consequences of the non-canonical Poisson
structure further, and its implication for quantisation in section 10.1.
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4.4 Cosmological history with York time
A conventional description of cosmological history in terms of cosmological time t may
be criticised for a variety of reasons: The universe began at some finite time t0 whose
value is essentially arbitrary. In other words, only intervals ∆t matter. However, at the
same time the universe might not end at a finite t, so that the cosmological timeline is
semi-infinite. Furthermore, different eras of interest vary hugely (by dozens of orders of
magnitude) in their duration. In particular, much of the early history of the cosmos took
place within the first 10−33 (inflation) or even 10−43 (Planck era) of a second.7
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with the description in t. One might, however,
consider it lacking in an aesthetic sense. Cosmological time t is a highly unnatural choice
of time parameter when discussing the very early universe.
In 1969 Misner proposed that the quantity − ln a — or (more or less equivalently) the
logarithm of the temperature in the homogeneous approximation — would provide a time
parameter with which to give an account of cosmic history that is more adequate than
the conventional cosmological time t [85]. The new parameter would avoid the absurdly
small numbers needed to describe early epochs. Misner wrote: ‘The universe is meaning-
fully infinitely old, since infinitely many things have happened since the beginning.’
In terms of York time it is the early history that takes up the longest period ∆T . In fact,
just as in the case of Misner’s parameter − ln a, the ‘beginning’ lies in the infinite past
and unlike in the conventional description in terms of t there is no notion of ‘before the
Big Bang’. The Planck era stretches from T = −∞ to just before the onset of inflation.
Recent data [96] leads to an upper bound on the Hubble parameter during inflation of
3.6 × 10−5MPl, so that in reduced Planck units (where MPl = 1) this number also gives
a rough estimate of T .
Following inflation and reheating, the energy density then becomes dominated by
radiation until t ∼ 104 years. At this point matter becomes dominant and the Hubble
parameter is of order 10−12s−1, or 10−53 in reduced Planck units, which is already within
the final moments of the universe when considered in terms of York time. Evidence
suggests that today, at T ∼ H ∼ 10−61, we are nearing a possibly final era dominated by
a cosmological constant.
The York time description clearly does not do away with absurdly large order-of-
magnitude differences in the way Misner might have envisioned. Rather, periods of large
T -duration are of short t-duration and vice versa. The infinite ‘York age’ of the universe
might however be considered an aesthetic advantage.
One might speculate whether York time really ‘ends’ at T = 0 or whether cosmic
history continues and our description ought to be extended. Indeed, if T does have funda-
mental physical significance, then it is unwarranted to conclude that the universe would
end then simply because the usual parameter t ceases to describe such speculative future
eras, although problems may arise if physical quantities are not well behaved during the
transition to T > 0. The existence of a cosmological constant also raises questions. In
7Changing units to, say, Planck units leads to absurdly large numbers for later eras instead.
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Figure 4.2: The cosmological timeline with York time. The entire known cosmological history
takes place within 10−5 from the end of the universe. If there is a cosmological constant then
cosmological history ends just short of T = 0. The figure is taken from ref. [107] by the author.
such a case the conventionally considered timeline never reaches T = 0 but stops slightly
short since H(t)→ Λ (up to constants) as t→∞ rather than approaching zero. An anal-
ysis concerning the viability or indeed necessity of such an extension will be performed
in chapter 6.
4.5 York time as a solution to the problem of time
In an important review on the subject of the problem of time and approaches to overcome
it, Isham [64] identifies the key questions that any theory of quantum gravity must answer.
The points raised are (verbatim):
1. the status of the concept of probability and the extent to which it is conserved;
2. the status of the associated concepts of causality and unitarity;
3. the time-honoured debate about whether quantum gravity should be approached via
a canonical, or a covariant, quantisation scheme;
4. the extent to which spacetime is a meaningful concept;
5. the extent to which classical geometrical concepts can, or should, be maintained in
the quantum theory;
6. the way in which our classical world emerged from some primordial quantum event
at the big-bang;
7. the whole question of the interpretation of quantum theory and, in particular, the
domain of applicability of the conventional Copenhagen view.
In this section we wish to briefly address what answer quantum geometrodynamics based
on York time and constant-mean-curvature slicing gives to each of these. Some answers
are not determined by this change of the classical starting point from four-diffeomorphic
general relativity to a space-through-time theory with spatial diffeomorphisms only, but
will depend on one’s favoured formulation of quantum mechanics. At this stage we will
remain agnostic about the latter question, although the reader will undoubtedly become
aware of our favoured approach.
York-time quantum geometrodynamics has a clear notion of time and simultaneity
across space, even if these simultaneity surfaces — the foliation — is not classically
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detectable. Hence the quantum theory is not plagued by the question of how to define
quantum states and similar issues. A quantum state Ψ is a complex function over the
configuration space of the theory, which is just conformal superspace, the space of all
equivalence classes of spatial geometries where two geometries are in the same class if
they are related via a local conformal transformation gab(x)→ φ4(x)gab(x).
The notion of probability is therefore well defined and conserved as much as this is
the case in any theory. Rigorously defining probability densities here requires defining a
measure on the configuration space, which has an uncountably infinite number of dimen-
sions. These complications are however inherent to all field theories and not generally
considered an issue. The main point here is that in York-time quantum geometrodynam-
ics instants of time are clearly-defined concepts and no additional issue arises.
Since the foliation is fixed, the quantum state of the universe evolves just like in other
more conventional systems as the state space is well defined. One quantum state follows
another, so if one understands causality in the sense of a temporal ordering with one state
being a necessary and/or sufficient condition for another state to arise at a later stage,
then the notion of causality makes sense. However, in general I do not find the introduc-
tion of such a notion helpful. For example, since the evolution of the quantum state is
deterministic and linear (given by a functional Schro¨dinger equation) if the universe is
described by a state Ψ1 at time T1, this is as much necessary and/or sufficient for Ψ2 to
be the state at a later time T2 as is the converse. So being necessary and/or sufficient is
surely not what the idea of ‘causality’ is trying to express. But then without any temporal
aspect to the notion of causality, how is one to understand the question ‘is A a cause of
B?’ The question is problematic independently of any notion of space, time, spacetime or
quantum theory and should be left to philosophers to discuss,8 although even there one
may ask how far the exercise of defining the notion of causality really is more than one of
semantics. Unitarity on the other hand is as well defined as in any field theory. One may
have to impose certain boundary conditions at spatial infinity, for example, for unitarity
and well-defined probability but there is no additional issue from the fact that the theory
is considered ‘gravitational’ or ‘geometrical’.
The canonical-versus-covariant debate has clearly been answered since four-covariance
is explicitly broken and only the more trivial covariance under spatial diffeomorphisms
remains. The approach to quantisation here is canonical, although in chapters 11 and 12
we suggest an alternative approach, which is neither canonical nor covariant.
Is spacetime a meaningful concept in York-time quantum geometrodynamics? This is
a more difficult question to answer. In the classical theory spacetime may be constructed
from a sequence of spatial slices, that is, from the classical state of the space and its matter
content at a continuous progression of instants. In other words, it may be constructed
from the trajectory of the system (the universe) in conformal superspace. In standard
quantum theory no such trajectories exist and such a construction is not possible. If
8The debate over what constitutes causation goes back at least as far as Hume [62], and more recently
has been tackled by philosophers such as Lewis [e.g. 75], Armstrong [e.g. 3], Mellor [e.g. 83] and others
too numerous to list.
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on the other hand one introduces quantum trajectories as in de Broglie-Bohm theory or
the proposal in chapter 11 of this thesis, for example, then spacetime may once again
be constructed. However, even in this case this constructed spacetime is not ‘all there
is’ since the wavefunction (in de Broglie-Bohm) that drives the evolution is a complex
function over the entire conformal superspace. It is also an open question whether or not
a quantum equivalent of the four-covariant field equations can be written down, that is, a
spacetime description of the quantum dynamics that is detached from the York foliation.9
Similarly the notion of the possibility of a geometric interpretation depends on the
chosen approach to quantum theory. For any particular trajectory the geometry is clearly
defined since each point on the trajectory exactly determines the conformal geometry
(and the conformal factor, that is the scale, may be recovered via the numerical value
of the Hamiltonian density at the respective point in space, which is a function of the
dynamical ‘shape’ variables and was obtained in the Hamiltonian reduction that produced
the classical theory in the first place). We discuss this in more detail in chapter 7. In the
absence of trajectories one still has a complex function over conformal spatial geometries,
so the concept is not lost, although it is impossible to associate a particular geometry with
the universe at any one instant of time.
Instead of considering the emergence of some primordial quantum event at the big
bang, York-time quantum geometrodynamics denies the existence of such an event since
the big bang is simply a name of the infinite past, T = −∞. One can, of course, instead
ask about properties of the universe prior to some very early time such as the Planck
time, but even here the quantum evolution is at all times well defined. The York-time
approach to quantum gravity gives no explanation of a beginning because the universe
simply has none. It is infinitely old. There are however a series of questions one can ask
about the early universe, such as how the classical approximation of the universe that we
observe today can be extracted from the dynamics and whether one can expect such a
classical limit to arise independently of the boundary conditions or whether some special
assumptions must be made about the quantum state of the early universe (a ‘quantum
past-hypothesis’?) and how that state might be explained.
Finally, as Isham’s wording indicates, the ‘whole question of the interpretation of
quantum theory’ is just that. It is a whole separate question. Irrespective of the choice of
York time however certain things can be said. For example, by definition (of the universe)
there is no notion of an external observer who could perform a measurement. Hence any
approach to quantum theory that relies on such a notion is inconsistent. Second, there
is only one universe, so the notion of probability cannot be understood in a frequentist
manner. Similarly, in de Broglie-Bohm theory, there is no notion of an ensemble density
ρ,10 so also the idea of quantum equilibrium versus non-equilibrium is meaningless when
applied to the entire universe, although it may apply to subsystems of which many copies
9If such a feat were accomplished, could one kick away the ladder of York time all together?
10In the approach proposed in chapter 11 the situation is different since there is, ontologically speaking,
an infinity of ‘classical’ universes (defined by classical variables, although not evolving according to clas-
sical laws). However, here one really ought to view the entire collection as ‘the universe’, so the exception
is really one of nomenclature rather than substance.
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exist within the universe, such as hydrogen atoms or some primordial particle species.
The conventional Copenhagen view is not applicable although it may be possible to show,
with an appropriate definition of what constitutes a measurement dynamically, how mea-
surement processes within the universe appear to obey Copenhagen quantum mechan-
ics. There is nothing fundamental about these processes though. Copenhagen quantum
mechanics is problematic irrespective of the application of quantum theory to the entire
universe, although the latter certainly makes some of the issues more apparent.
In summary, the answers York-time quantum geometrodynamics gives to the concep-
tual questions of quantum gravity engendered by the problem of time are on the whole
relatively conservative in that quantum gravity is reduced to a conventional field theory
via the choice of a preferred slicing. Even issues particular to gravitational theories, such
as the question concerning geometric singularities, are avoided via the particular foliation
chosen. In this limited sense the proposal made in this thesis is anything but revolutionary
and arguably less exciting than other proposals that present more radical departures from
the gravitational and matter theories we understand. Observation must be the ultimate
arbiter.
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Part II
Classical York-time cosmology
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Chapter 5
The homogeneous isotropic universe
with York time
In this chapter we explore the Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre universe in the context of York time
and perform Hamiltonian reduction explicitly in the case of a minisuperspace model with
a scalar field. We also discuss cosmological inflation in the York-time description. The
contents of this chapter were published in ref. [106], with the exception of section 5.4,
which was presented in ref. [107].
5.1 The role of cosmology in gravitational theories
The equations of the full theory of general relativity are too complicated to allow us to
visualise or otherwise intuitively grasp some given solution thereof. It is, of course, not
strictly necessary to have an intuition or visualisation of such solutions in order to under-
stand the theory or arrive at new insights, purely formal or otherwise. However, it would
be insincere to state that intuitions play no role in how we as human beings with limited
mental capabilities (and with brain functions primarily evolved to ensure survival and
procreation rather than consider mathematical abstractions) develop and indeed advance
comprehension of theories in physics.
Intuitive insights into a theory are gained via simplification. For example, in Newto-
nian mechanics one might consider a small number of rigid, perhaps pointlike bodies and
neglect the rest of the universe or model its influence as an external field. Indeed, this is
how we spend much of our early physics education. In some cases the simple scenario
considered may, in fact, provide a relatively good approximation to a real-world system.
This is also the case in general relativity and reduced-Hamiltonian theories derived there-
from. To consider a cosmology of a gravitational field theory is to impose a large number
of symmetries (such as spatial homogeneity) on the solution space, reducing the degrees
of freedom that characterise the physics to a finite number. The remaining dynamics is
then no longer a field theory. Such a model is also commonly called a minisuperspace
model since superspace — the infinite-dimensional configuration space of the gravita-
tional field — is reduced to a ‘smaller’ finite-dimensional subspace. This terminology is
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perhaps less ambiguous than ‘cosmology’, which is used differently in other contexts.
Cosmologies (or minisuperspace models) can, in general, be visualised because of
their simpler mathematical structure and therefore allow for an intuitive grasp of some of
the implications of the equations of the gravitational theory. Furthermore, observational
evidence strongly suggests that the universe is highly homogeneous at sufficiently large
scales, so that at least some cosmological models give solutions that approximate the
actual universe.
Considering cosmologies is clearly worth our time. However, one cannot expect to
gain a full understanding of a gravitational theory by looking at cosmologies. Some fea-
tures may be hidden by the symmetries. For example, in this chapter we explore a model
universe that is homogeneous and isotropic (a ‘Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre’ cosmology). How-
ever, as we will see, this hides the non-canonical form of the Poisson brackets of the
reduced variables since these are related to the anisotropic degrees of freedom. In con-
trast, in section 7.2 we develop an anisotropic (but still homogeneous) cosmology where
their presence becomes apparent, before proceeding to the perturbation theory itself in the
rest of chapters 7 and 8.
Minisuperspace approximations also hide a number of the ‘problems of time’ dis-
cussed in section 2.4. Fortunately for our illustrative purposes the problem of the frozen
dynamics remains since it is a result of reparameterisation invariance rather than anything
strictly related to field theories (in fact, we introduced it in chapter 2 first in the con-
text of finite dimensional theories). Yet evidently one cannot rashly generalise from the
cosmological theory to the full theory.
Later we also quantise the minisuperspace models (chapters 9 and section 10.1). Do-
ing so is comparatively simple since the classical theories are by design finite dimen-
sional. This can be insightful as it gives us a feel for some of the features of the theory
of quantum gravity obtained via quantisation of the Hamiltonian-reduced theory. Strictly
speaking however there is a missing step if the insights are to be of any value: One first
must have reason to believe that the cosmological (dimensionally reduced / symmetrised)
limit of the quantised theory of gravity is the same or at least sufficiently similar to the
theory resulting from quantising an already cosmological (dimensionally reduced / sym-
metrised) classical theory. In other words, one must have reason to believe that quantising
the cosmology gives the same result as ‘cosmologising’ the quantum theory. This proviso
ought to be kept in mind.
5.2 Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre cosmology ‘translated’ into
York time
Our purpose here is to explore the cosmology that is the York-time reduced gravitational
theory when restricted to spatially homogeneous and isotropic solutions. We learned in
chapter 3 that at least classically a reduced theory is equivalent to the original theory.
We therefore expect to recover the standard results of classical Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre cos-
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mology expressed in the ‘language’ of York time. We can exploit this in order to check
that our procedure is correct. To do so, in this section we ‘translate’ the standard results
of Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre cosmology, usually expressed in cosmological time t or confor-
mal time η, into the York-time description. Only later in section 5.3 do we perform the
Hamiltonian reduction explicitly and derive and solve the resulting equations.
Consider then a homogeneous and isotropic universe. For the matter content we
choose a single scalar field φ with potential V (φ) for simplicity. The Einstein field
equations reduce to a set of equations equivalent to the so-called Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre1
equations:
a˙2
a2
+
k
a2
=
1
3M2Pl
ρ (5.1)
a¨
a
= − 1
6M2Pl
(ρ+ 3P). (5.2)
The first of these corresponds to the time-time component of the Einstein field equations
and the second to a combination of the space-space and time-time components. Here a
dot denotes differentiation with respect to cosmological time t, corresponding to a choice
of lapse Nt = 1. The parameter k takes values 0,+1,−1 for a flat, closed and open
universe respectively. The energy density is denoted by ρ and for a scalar field takes the
form ρ = 1
2
φ˙2 + V (φ). The pressure P is given by P = 1
2
φ˙2 − V (φ). A cosmological
constant may be included formally as a constant contribution to V (φ).
Using T = −2M2Pl a˙a , written in terms of York time, equation (5.1) becomes
T 2
4M4Pl
+
k
a2
=
1
3M2Pl
ρ, (5.3)
which is purely algebraic if ρ does not contain any time-derivatives, as is the case for a
dust-dominated universe, or if we have a field for which appropriate “slow-roll” condi-
tions — for example during an inflationary phase — are satisfied, in which case we can
ignore the kinetic term. In cases where the equation is algebraic, it does not describe a
time evolution (how a quantity changes from one instant to the next) but merely a time
progression (what a quantity is at any given time). This possible reduction of order in
return for explicit time dependence will be a key feature we encounter in the reduced
Hamiltonian formalism below. Note though that if ρ does contain time-derivatives as it
is the case for a general scalar field, then we must convert the derivative with respect
to t into one with respect to T in order to avoid reference to t. In general this requires
determination of the York lapse NT , defined by dt = NTdT (since Nt = 1).
As elsewhere in this thesis, let a prime denote differentiation with respect to T . It
is N−1T a
′ = a˙, which together with T = −2M2Pl a˙a implies N−1T = − 12M2PlT
a
a′ . Having
1Frequently the homogeneous isotropic model is at least in part attributed to Robertson and Walker
and the equations are referred to as the FLRW or FRW (omitting Lemaıˆtre) equations. However, the de-
velopment of this model is due to Friedmann [46, 47] and separately Lemaıˆtre [74]. The contribution of
Robertson and Walker was to write influential review articles on the subject a few years later, hence our
chosen nomenclature.
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determined the lapse in this manner, we can replace φ˙ by N−1T φ
′ explicitly, for example.
Since a′ appears in the lapse, the resultant form of the first Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre equation
is not algebraic. In the simplest case, namely a free scalar field (V = 0) in a flat (k = 0)
universe, it takes the form a˙
2
a2
= 1
6M2Pl
φ˙2, which gives
a′2
a2
=
1
6M2Pl
φ′2 (5.4)
after multiplying both sides by the N−2T . In this particular case, since the equation is ho-
mogeneous in time derivatives (all terms have two first-order derivatives) explicit knowl-
edge of NT would not have been necessary.
In order to ‘translate’ the second Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre equation to York time, one
observes that
N−1T =
dT
dt
= −2M2Pl
d
dT
a˙
a
= −2M2Pl
a¨
a
+
1
2M2Pl
T 2 (5.5)
and combines this with the previous expression for NT to obtain
a¨
a
=
1
4M4Pl
(
T 2 +
aT
a′
)
. (5.6)
For the scalar field the equation 5.2, after some appropriate rearrangement, takes the
form
a′
a
= − T
T 2 + 2
3
M2Pl(ρ+ 3P)
, (5.7)
which is a first order equation even after replacement of φ˙ byN−1T φ
′. Here the reduction of
order in return for explicit time dependence is general, provided ρ does not contain second
or higher order time derivatives, a property that holds true in most conceivable physical
examples. Alternatively this equation could have been obtained by explicit differentiation
using d
2
dt2
= N−1T
d
dT
(
N−1T
d
dT
)
together with N−1T = − 12M2PlT
a
a′ .
For a scalar field the last relevant equation is the Klein-Gordon equation. In terms of
t this is given by
0 = φ¨+ 3
a˙
a
φ˙+
∂V
∂φ
(φ). (5.8)
Expressed in terms of dependence on T rather than t this equation can be written in the
form
0 = φ′′ +
φ′
T
+ 4
a′
a
φ′ − a
′′
a′
φ′ +
4M4Pl
T 2
a′2
a2
∂V
∂φ
(φ) (5.9)
where extra terms have arisen from the differentiation of the lapse in φ¨ = N−1T
d
dT
(N−1T
dφ
dT
).
We have transformed the Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre and Klein-Gordon equations from the
language of cosmological time t to that of York time T . Since the classical dynamics are
of the standard theory and the reduced-Hamiltonian theory developed below are provably
equivalent, the ‘translated’ equations found in this section give us the ability to check the
results of the reduction procedure.
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5.3 Reduced-Hamiltonian Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre
cosmology
5.3.1 Derivation of the Hamiltonian
In the previous section we arrived at equations for the dynamics of a homogeneous
isotropic universe by a transformation of the time coordinate from cosmological time t
to York time T . However, the equations — in particular the Klein-Gordon equation in T ,
eq. 5.9 — is rather awkward to use. In fact, these equations are not the ‘natural’ equa-
tions to describe York-time dynamics. In this section we begin with an action principle
for the Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre universe and perform a Hamiltonian reduction to arrive at a
different set of equations, which forms a more natural description (although is, of course,
equivalent to the equations above).
The action principle with which we start is simply the Einstein-Hilbert action for an
homogeneous isotropic universe, that is, where the spatial metric takes the form
gab(t) = a
2(t) γab, (5.10)
where γab is constant and in spherical coordinates given by the diagonal matrix
γab =
 (1− kr2)−1 0 00 r2 0
0 0 r2 sin2 θ

ab
, (5.11)
for k = 1 (spatially closed), k = 0 (spatially flat) or k = −1 (spatially open). In the flat
case (k = 0) one can also use Cartesian coordinates, in which case γab is just the identity
matrix.
The only geometric variable is the scale a, which is only a function of time and not
of spatial position. This makes the Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre universe a special case in that
the York-time Hamiltonian reduction, in which the notion of scale is ‘absorbed’ into the
time parameter, reduces the number of geometrical dynamical variables to zero and only
leaves the degrees of freedom pertaining to matter. For simplicity here we consider a
single scalar field. One could envision a scenario with no matter content at all except
for a cosmological constant. In this case the reduction would lead to an expression for
the Hamiltonian that is only a function of time and directly encodes the volume of the
universe. There would be no dynamics, merely time passing.
With a scalar field φ with a potential V (φ) the action takes the form
Action =
∫
dτ Na3 (Lgrav + Lφ)
= 1
2
M2Pl
∫
dτ
(
6Nka− 6
N
aa˙2
)
+
∫
dτ
(
a3
2N
φ˙2 −Na3V (φ)
)
, (5.12)
where N is, of course, the lapse associated with the arbitrary temporal parameter τ and
k ∈ {0,±1} encodes the global properties of space. A dot refers to differentiation with
respect to τ (and not cosmological time t as elsewhere).
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In order to obtain this expression from the Einstein-Hilbert action one must integrate
a spatial constant (essentially the instantaneous value of a) over all space. This just intro-
duces an overall constant factor. However, unless the universe is spatially closed (k = 1)
this integral is technically infinite, so one must choose a ‘normalisation volume’. Here
we use a normalisation such that the volume is given by a3 without any numerical factor.
For the flat case, on which we will restrict our focus shortly, the choice of normalisation
has no effect and a numerical factor C drops out at the level of the Hamiltonian constraint
when written in terms of York variables (since York time T and its conjugate momentum
PT are then rescaled by 1/C and C respectively). For a closed universe the appropriate
expression for the volume is 2pi2a3 rather than a3.
The standard Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre equations in cosmological time t (eqs. 5.1, 5.2) can
be obtained by variation of N and a, setting N = 1 in the resulting Euler-Lagrange equa-
tions and identifying the time coordinate with cosmological time t. The Klein-Gordon
equation (eq. 5.8) in cosmological time is obtained via variation of φ, with N = 1.
The canonical momenta conjugate to a and φ are
pa = −6M
2
Pl
N
aa˙, pφ =
a3
N
φ˙. (5.13)
Using these to rewrite the action in canonical form gives
A =
∫
dt
[
a˙pa + φ˙pφ −N(Hgrav +Hφ)
]
(5.14)
where
Hgrav +Hφ = − 1
12M2Pl
p2a
a
− 3kaM2Pl +
p2φ
2a3
+ a3V (φ). (5.15)
Variation of N implies the Hamiltonian constraint,
Hgrav +Hφ = 0, (5.16)
which is the origin of many of the problems in canonical quantum gravity (see the discus-
sion in chapter 2).
We now begin with the Hamiltonian reduction. Recall that the procedure consists of
first transforming the Hamiltonian constraint from the variables (a, pa), encoding scale
and its rate of change, to York time T and its conjugate momentum PT , then solving it
for PT as a function of T and the other variables. York time and its momentum (eq. 4.12)
take the form,
T ≡ pa/3a2, PT = −a3 (5.17)
in the Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre universe. It is easy to verify that indeed PT T˙ = paa˙ up to
a total derivative (which does not change the equations of motion). With the change of
variables (a, pa)→ (T, PT ) the Hamiltonian constraint is now
Hgrav +Hφ = −
p2φ
2PT
+
3
4M2Pl
T 2PT + 3kM
2
PlP
1
3
T − PTV (φ) = 0. (5.18)
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This is the equation we must now solve for−PT , which will be identified with our reduced
(physical) Hamiltonian HT . It is the minisuperspace counterpart to the Lichnerowicz
equation, written in terms of the York variables. The equation is seen to be a depressed
cubic in P−2/3T , which may be solved by standard methods, giving
H = −pφ
[
U + 3
(
1
4
U2 − C2k
) 1
3
((
1
2
U + Ck
) 1
3
+
(
1
2
U − Ck
) 1
3
)]− 1
2
, (5.19)
where we define
U = U(φ, T ) ≡ 3
2
M−2Pl T
2 − 2V (φ) (5.20)
Ck = Ck(φ, pφ, T ) ≡
√
1
4
U2 − (2kM2Pl)3p−2φ (5.21)
for notational convenience. This solution is not valid for PT = 0, that is, the singular
case a = 0. The physical interpretation of the numerical value of H — as discussed in
chapter 3 — is that of a ‘volume’ (although in the flat and open case only volume ratios
are meaningful).
In principle there is no reason not to work with this Hamiltonian, except that it is alge-
braically rather unwieldy, as are the derived Hamilton’s equations. We therefore choose
to consider the case of a spatially flat cosmology (k = 0), which simplifies the expression
significantly,2
Hk=0 = ±(p2φ/U)
1
2 = ± |pφ|√
3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)
. (5.22)
In fact, the flat case is physically the most relevant as current data suggests that the uni-
verse is, in fact, spatially flat. Recent data leads to an effective energy-density contribution
of curvature given by Ωk = −0.011 ± 0.012 or −0.014 ± 0.017 depending on the exact
choice of data and dark-energy model [37] (flatness corresponds to Ωk = 0). For the
remainder of this section we will focus on the flat case and we will drop the subscript
‘k = 0’ when denoting the Hamiltonian.
Since the Poisson structure of the non-geometric degrees of freedom is the usual
canonical ones, Hamilton’s equations for this Hamiltonian are
φ′ = ± pφ/|pφ|√
3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)
(5.23)
p′φ = ∓
|pφ|
( 3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)) 32
∂V
∂φ
. (5.24)
The sign ambiguity arises from the fact that both sign choices for H are formal solutions
to the Hamiltonian constraint. The physical interpretation of the numerical value of H is
2The results of this section were published in [106]. However, there we erroneously wrote pφ rather
than |pφ| in the numerator. This had some consequences for the resulting analysis. The error was corrected
in [104]. There are implications of this for the rigorous quantisation of the model. This will be discussed in
chapter 9.
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‘volume’ (since H ≡ −PT = √g ∝ a3), from which one can readily infer that H > 0
constitutes the physically relevant choice. Aside from this interpretation, mathematically
speaking the choice is arbitrary. The set of solutions for (φ(T ), pφ(T )) is identical except
for a reflection in phase space (swapping the signs in the corresponding functions pφ(T )).
Henceforth we assume the positive solution H ≥ 0, although we emphasise that this is
only relevant for the physical interpretation, not the mathematical development.
One may be concerned that the radicand U = 3
2
M−2Pl T
2 − 2V (φ) in the denominator
of the Hamiltonian 5.22 (and 5.23, 5.24) may take non-positive values. Fortunately, this is
never the case. The easiest way to see this is to realise that the positivity of the radicand is
equivalent to the positivity of the kinetic energy. That is, using T = −2M2Pla˙/a it is easy
to show that 3
2
M−2Pl T
2 > 2V if and only if a˙2/a2 − (3M2Pl)−1V > 0, which by the first
Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre equation (5.1) is exactly the condition for the kinetic term φ˙2 to be
positive. That the Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre equations are obeyed follows from the equivalence
of the reduced-Hamiltonian and the standard formalism, which can be derived as follows.
5.3.2 Explicit equivalence between the reduced and standard formal-
ism in the case of the homogeneous isotropic universe
We already showed the equivalence of reduced-Hamiltonian and unreduced dynamics in
generality in section 3.1. Nonetheless it is insightful to see the equivalence explicitly for
the present cosmological scenario.
The Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre equations with a scalar field φ in a spatially flat universe
(k = 0) written in terms of York time T are
1
4
M−4Pl T
2 = (3M2Pl)
−1
(
1
2
N−2T φ
′2 + V (φ)
)
(5.25)
a′
a
= − T
T 2 + 4
3
M2Pl (N
2
Tφ
′2 − V (φ)) , (5.26)
where the inverse York lapse is N−1T = −12M−2Pl Ta/a′. These are eqs. 5.3 and 5.7 with
ρ = 1
2
φ˙2 + V (φ) = 1
2
N−2T φ
′2 + V (φ) and P = 1
2
φ˙2− V (φ) = 1
2
N−2T φ
′2− V (φ). To show
equivalence we must be able to recover these equations from the reduced Hamiltonian
dynamics, that is, eqs. 5.23 and 5.24 together with the interpretation of the numerical
value of the Hamiltonian as ‘volume’, a3 = H , with H given by eq. 5.22.
Begin by noting that a3 = H(φ, pφ, T ) is to hold at all times, and so da3/dT =
dH/dT . Using eq. 5.22, the right-hand side becomes the sum of three terms, two of
which cancel (since dH
dT
= ∂H
∂T
for a Hamiltonian function H , or equivalently by using the
equations of motion 5.23 and 5.24), leaving
3a3
a′
a
=
T
T 2 − 4
3
M2PlV (φ)
· pφ√
3
2
M−2Pl T 2 − 2V (φ)
. (5.27)
The second factor on the right-hand side is just the expression for the negative of the
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Hamiltonian H , which cancels with the a3 term on the left, up to a sign, so that
a′
a
= − T
3T 2 − 4M2PlV (φ)
. (5.28)
Using this and eq. 5.23 implies after a little algebra
3
2
M−2Pl T
2 = 1
4
M−4Pl T
2 a
2
a′2
+ 2V (φ), (5.29)
which, after division by 6M2Pl and identification of the lapse NT yields eq. 5.25.
In order to derive eq. 5.26 we return to eq. 5.28, writing it in the form
a′
a
= − T
T 2 − 4
3
M2PlV (φ) +
(
2T 2 − 8
3
M2PlV (φ)
) . (5.30)
Using eq. 5.25 and the expression for NT to eliminate the term in parentheses in favour
of 4
3
M2PlN
−2
T φ
′2 then gives the desired result.
The Klein-Gordon equation (5.9) is recovered by differentiation of eqs. 5.28 and 5.23
with respect to T and elimination of the term involving ∂V
∂φ
. Subsequent use of eq. 5.23
and 5.25 then allows rearrangement into the form of eq. 5.9.
Note the ‘holistic’ manner in which the dynamics is equivalent. All dynamical equa-
tions and the interpretation a3 = H were necessary together in order to derive all of the
standard Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre and Klein-Gordon equations (although these are not the
natural equations with which to work in practice in the reduced Hamiltonian formalism).
5.3.3 Evolution of the free scalar field
In order to discuss some of the features of cosmological Hamiltonian dynamics in York
time, we begin by discussing the free massless case, setting V (φ) = 0. Dynamics with
a general potential is treated in section 5.3.4 below. Mathematically this case is rather
trivial. However, it is our first actual application of the reduced-Hamiltonian formalism in
cosmology and helps to illustrate the role of the various physical quantities and a number
of features of such a reduced theory in practice.
The equations of motion are
φ′ =
√
3
2
MPl
sign(pφ)
|T | (5.31)
p′φ = 0. (5.32)
An interesting feature of these equations is that the evolution of the field value φ(T )
depends only on the sign of the momentum, and not its magnitude. With the momentum
a constant, this sign does not change, so that eq. 5.31 is easily solved. The physically
viable range for T is T ∈ (−∞, 0) for a spatially flat universe, so that |T | = −T in all
cases (unless we consider the extension discussed in chapter 6). Leaving the sign of pφ
unspecified, we solve
φ′ = ±
√
3
2
MPl
1
−T (5.33)
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to find
φ(T ) = φ0 ∓
√
3
2
MPl ln
( |T |
|T0|
)
, (5.34)
where φ0 = φ(T0) is an integration constant that has to be fixed by boundary data at some
reference time T0. Throughout the history of the universe the field changes monotoni-
cally from positive to negative infinity or vice versa (depending on the sign of pφ),how to
approach such problems in practice
φ(T → −∞) −→ ∓∞ (5.35)
φ(T → 0) −→ ±∞. (5.36)
The physical interpretation of the value of the Hamiltonian is volume. In order to
make this explicit within the reduced-Hamiltonian framework, we can re-introduce the
scale factor a, now defining its third power as the value of the Hamiltonian H(T ),
a3(T ) ≡ H(T ) ≡ H(φ(T ), pφ(T ), T). (5.37)
That is, we consider the reduced formalism the fundamental theory and ‘kick away the
ladder’ used to derived it. The scale factor a has no natural role in the reduced formalism
and is merely introduced as a way to connect the results to the standard picture. In no way
does a have any dynamical role however. The time evolution of the scale factor is then
easily calculated:
3a3
a′
a
= −
√
3
2
MPl
|pφ|
T 2
(5.38)
and therefore (using H(T ) = a3 again)
a′
a
= − 1
3T
=
1
3|T | . (5.39)
As expected, the universe grows from zero volume at T → −∞ to infinite volume as
T → 0. Eq. 5.39 is independent of the arbitrariness in the volume normalisation and in
the definition of the scale factor a.
5.3.4 Evolution of a scalar field with a potential
In the presence of a field potential V (φ) the full equations 5.23 and 5.24 must be con-
sidered. Once again the rate of evolution φ′ of the field depends only on the sign of the
momentum pφ, not its magnitude.3 However, the momentum pφ is not constant and can
change sign, leading to a discontinuity in φ′. Let us call such events ‘turning points’ and
examine them more closely.
3This is not a general feature however. In the presence of multiple scalar fields φA with corresponding
momenta pAφ the numerator on the right-hand side of the corresponding equation of motion for φA reads
pAphi/(
∑
B p
B2
φ )
1
2 ), so that at least the ratios of the momenta matter, although φ′A is invariant under a
uniform rescaling of all momenta by the same factor.
73
If φ′ or equivalently φ˙ is considered to pass through zero at the turning point (for exam-
ple, if φ′ is treated as some appropriate limit of a sequence of continuous functions), one
finds that at such points 3
2
M−2Pl T
2 − 2V (φ) = 0 (one may infer from the first Friedmann
equation 5.25 and T = −2M2Pl a˙a that φ˙2 ∝ 32M−2Pl T 2 − 2V (φ), which also guarantees the
non-negativity of the radicand as discussed above). It appears that the expressions for the
Hamiltonian 5.22 and the rates of change of field and momentum 5.23 and 5.24 become
singular.
Since we consider York time to be fundamental, let us frame our discussion entirely in
terms of T without reference to t or the Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre equations. A turning point is
defined by a change in sign of pφ, that is, by pφ = 0. Note that unlike φ′, the momentum pφ
changes continuously, so its vanishing at the turning point is established without reference
to any kind of limiting procedure. But then the expression for the Hamiltonian 5.22
implies that eitherH = 0 (and therefore a3 = 0, constituting an initial or final singularity),
or (if the turning point is to occur at finite volume) that 3
2
M−2Pl T
2 − 2V (φ) → 0 as the
turning point is approached, specifically (3
2
M−2Pl T
2 − 2V (φ)) 12 ∼ |pφ|. The implication
is that φ′ → 0 with opposite signs for approach of the turning point from the future and
past.
Figure 5.1: Schematic illustration of
the evolution of the scale factor near
a turning point. The rate of growth
becomes infinite at a single point but
there is no discontinuity in the scale
factor a.
In order to understand the nature of these
turning points, consider the ‘interpretation’ of the
Hamiltonian as volume, H ∝ a3. Using expression
5.22 and differentiating with respect to T gives
a′
a
= − T
3T 2 − 4M2PlV (φ)
, (5.40)
so if the turning point is to occur at finite volume
(and therefore finite T ), we see that a′/a → ∞
as we approach the turning point. At the turning
point the fractional rate of expansion (with respect
to York time) diverges, although the total fractional
growth remains finite and there is no discontinuity
in a (see fig. 5.1). This corresponds to a de Sitter
phase (of infinitesimal duration in terms of cosmo-
logical time), where the fractional rate of expansion is constant and the York lapse di-
verges, NT → ∞. Note that even in a universe with a single scalar field, where such
turning points are relatively generic, they do no necessarily occur. Their existence de-
pends on the form of the potential V (φ).
Finding general solutions φ(T ) is difficult even for comparatively simple forms of the
potential V (φ). However, one can draw some conclusions about the evolution for certain
regimes corresponding to different cosmological periods. Of course, the present model
containing only a single scalar field does not adequately describe our actual universe and
so its ‘epochs’ do not match what we know about actual cosmological history.
In the present model it is plausible to differentiate between an ‘early’ and a ’late’
epoch, respectively characterised by |T |  1 and |T |  1 and qualitatively different
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from one another with regards to which one of the two terms 3
2
M−2Pl T
2 and 2V (φ) domi-
nates. Sufficiently early the term in T 2 dominates and the field behaves like the free field
discussed in section 5.3.3 unless φ(T ) behaves such that V (φ) grows at least as fast as T 2
as one goes backwards in time. In the free theory the evolution of the field is characterised
by φ(T ) ∼ ln |T |, so that if 3
2
M−2Pl T
2  |2V (φ)| is satisfied at some point in time and
V (φ) is bounded by some polynomial in φ, then it is also satisfied at all earlier times.
Indeed if V (φ) being at most polynomial is a sufficient condition for such a sufficiently
early time to exist. If the model were considered as offering a partial description of our
universe — for example, if φ is considered as the field driving inflation — then one might
wonder how viable candidates for the inflaton potential fare. For an overview over such
contenders based on recent observation, see ref. [81].
The end of this early epoch is reached when 2V (φ) = α2· 3
2
M−2Pl T
2, where 0 < α2 < 1
is chosen to suit one’s desired level of accuracy (α = 1 would correspond to the end of
the universe, T = 0 as the end of the early period). For concreteness, consider a simple
viable potential, such as a simple mass term, instantiating so-called large-field inflation
for parameter p = 2 (section A.3 in [81]), that is,
V (φ) = M4(φ/MPl)
2, (5.41)
where M is a constant corresponding to a mass scale (related to the chosen CMB normal-
isation if the proposal of φ as the inflaton field in our universe is taken seriously). For
a first (and rather rough) approximation, let us assume that the free theory remains valid
until equality is reached. Then the boundary TB between epochs is given by the equation
α2 · 3
2
M−2Pl T
2
B = 2M
4
(√
2 ln(−TB)√
3
)2
(5.42)
whose solution is
TB = − exp
[
−w
(
3α√
8M2MPl
)]
(5.43)
where w(x) is the Lambert Product-Log function.
For any potential that is strictly non-negative, as is the case in the chosen example, the
free evolution forms a lower bound for the (magnitude of) the scalar-field velocity φ′ as
well as the fractional rate of change of the scale factor. That is, the existence of a positive
potential accelerates the rate of change of φ as well as the expansion of the universe in
comparison to the free theory. This applies to all epochs.
In the late epoch 2V (φ) becomes comparable to 3
2
M−2Pl T
2 in magnitude (by definition
of the onset of the late epoch). This implies that the denominator in eq. 5.22 becomes
small faster. Thus the interpretation a3 = H implies that the existence of a potential
causes an increase in expansion when compared to the free theory.
5.4 Inflation
Before concluding our treatment of the homogeneous isotropic universe in the York-time
reduced-Hamiltonian formalism we return briefly to the classical theory and consider a
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particular cosmological process that plausibly characterised part of the early history of
our actual universe: inflation.
The theory of inflation poses an immediate puzzle for a description in terms of York
time. Inflation is characterised by a de Sitter phase, that is, a phase during which the rate
of spatial expansion (with respect to proper time) is exponential. The Hubble parameter
is constant and therefore so is the York parameter as the two are proportional. During
this ‘era’ the universe appears to expand by a finite amount while no time passes. The
York-time description appears singular.
The puzzle is resolved if we recall that in a realistic inflationary phase the Hubble
parameter is constant only to a first approximation and is, in fact, decreasing, albeit only
by a small amount. The implication is that an inflationary period corresponds to a very
short time interval and furthermore that the York-time description must use a higher order
of approximation than is conventionally used in the standard picture.
Conventional slow-roll inflation assumes that during this period the matter content
of the universe is dominated by a scalar field, whose contribution to the energy density
ρ = 1
2
φ˙2 + V (φ) is in turn dominated by the field’s potential function V (φ). (Recall that
φ˙ denotes the derivative of φ with respect to conventional cosmological time t, or, more
or less equivalently, proper time.) Specifically, one assumes the ‘slow-roll conditions’
1
2
φ˙2  V (φ), |φ¨| 
∣∣∣∣∂V∂φ
∣∣∣∣ , (5.44)
while the dynamics is determined by the Friedmann and Klein-Gordon equations. Pro-
vided the slow-roll conditions hold, in terms of York time T = −2M2PlH the Friedmann
equation 5.1 becomes
3
4
M−2Pl T
2 ≈ V (φ), (5.45)
which suggests that the numerical value of the potential effectively provides a measure of
York time. Approximating the potential to be roughly constant is therefore not a viable
description.
Instead one proceeds to calculate the next-order, time-dependent correction to H , and
hence T . At ‘zeroth’ order one ignores the contribution of the kinetic term to ρ, so that
equation 5.1 becomes
H ≈
√
V (φ)/3M2Pl, (5.46)
which can be substituted into the Klein-Gordon equation 5.8. Applying the second slow-
roll condition, the second-derivative term φ¨ can be neglected, so one is left, in general,
with a non-linear first order differential equation, which can be solved in many relevant
cases to yield a first time-dependent approximation φ1(t) for the scalar field. For example,
for V (φ) = λφb with λ, b ∈ R the solution is
φ1(t) =
[(
b
2
− 2
)(
b
√
λM2Pl/3 t+ A
)]1/(2− b
2
)
, (5.47)
withA being an integration constant that must obey certain conditions that follow from the
slow-roll conditions, namely that the constant contribution to the potential V (φ1) is large
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compared to the time-dependent one (we will show this explicitly below for a particular
example). This solution φ1 can then be substituted back into the Friedmann equation 5.1
to give the next approximation H1(t) to the Hubble parameter and therefore to the York
parameter.4 The function T (t) obtained can now be inverted to find φ in terms of T and
give a ‘York-time only’ account of the evolution during inflation.
To illustrate this, consider a particular example of an inflationary potential, namely
the case of so-called large-field inflation already considered above, V (φ) = m2φ2. This
simple choice helps to illustrate the method of obtaining a York-time description since
unlike many other cases it leads to straightforward algebra (although it is not a choice of
potential favoured by current observation [97]). One finds,
φ1(t) = ∓
√
4
3
M2Plm
2 t+ φ0, for φ0 ≷ 0 (5.48)
where φ0 is the value of φ at t = 0, which must be chosen such that the approximation
is valid at this time. We will justify the condition on the sign, which arises due to the
appearance of ‘
√
φ2’ in the Klein-Gordon equation, shortly. The first slow-roll condition
then says
2
3
M2Plm
2  m2
(
φ0 +
√
4
3
M2Plm
2 t
)2
, (5.49)
which must be satisfied throughout inflation, in particular at t = 0, that is,
φ20  23M2Pl. (5.50)
The constant contribution φ0 dominates the scalar field until t ≈ (43M2Plm2)−
1
2 , by which
point the approximation has ceased to be valid, presumably corresponding to a time well
after the end of inflation. While the approximation remains valid the sign of φ is just the
sign of φ0, hence the sign dependence in equation 5.48.
In this example the correction to ρ due to the kinetic energy contribution is constant,
1
3M2Pl
· 1
2
φ˙2 = 2
9
m2, (5.51)
while time dependence arises via the potential term,
V (φ1(t)) = m
2φ21 = m
2
(
φ0 +
√
4
3
M2Plm
2 t
)2
. (5.52)
This is consistent with the approximation since the time-independent contribution dom-
inates by virtue of equation 5.49. Substituting these back into the Friedmann equation
gives
H21 = H
2
0
[(
1∓ φ−10
√
4
3
M2Plm
2
)2
+H−21 · 29m2
]
, (5.53)
4One could repeat the procedure iteratively but in general this is not necessary for an approximate
description of the homogeneous cosmological background and would in any case not yield higher degrees
of accuracy due to our neglect of the contribution of other matter.
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where
H20 =
1
3M2Pl
m2φ20 (5.54)
is the initial, constant zeroth-order approximation to the Hubble parameter as given by
equation 5.46. From this one obtains the expression for York time as a function of cos-
mological time,
T (t) = −2M2Pl ·H0
(
1 +
m2
9H20
−
√
4
3
M2PLm
2
t
|φ0|
)
. (5.55)
This expression may be straightforwardly inverted in order to express φ1 as a function of
T rather than t,
t =
|φ0|√
4
3
M2Plm
2
(
1 +
m2
9H20
− |T |
2M2PlHo
)
. (5.56)
The primary characteristic of inflation is the rapid (approximately exponential) growth
of the background scale factor a. In the York-time reduced-Hamiltonian formalism a
ceases to be a dynamical variable however since the ‘volume’ a3 is the momentum conju-
gate to the time parameter (up to a sign). As we discussed in section 5.3, the volume (up
to some suitable normalisation) is therefore given by the numerical value of the reduced
York-time Hamiltonian, which for a spatially flat cosmology is given by eq. 5.22. The
York-time derivative a′ of the scale factor obtained was given by eq. 5.40, which read
a′
a
= − T
3T 2 − 4M2PlV (φ)
. (5.40)
Recall that the expression in the denominator is proportional to the total kinetic energy
as is apparent from the Friedmann equation (5.1). In the example above it is constant
and so one can easily calculate the number of e-folds that correspond to some inflationary
interval (Ti, Tf ),
Ne =
∫ Tf
Ti
dT
a′
a
= 1
2
κ
(
T 2i − T 2f
)
, (5.57)
where
κ ≡ 3
3T 2 − 4M2PlV (φ)
= const. (5.58)
has been defined for convenience. For other choices of potential the solution φ1(t) is in
general not a linear function of t and so the kinetic energy is not constant. However, even
then one can take the solution 5.47 and expand it, dropping terms of second and higher
order in t since these are small compared to the constant and linear terms by the first slow-
roll condition. As a result the non-constant contribution to the kinetic energy is negligible
even compared to the already small constant contribution. Equation 5.57 holds, therefore,
more generally.
Equation 5.40 is then trivially solved, giving
a(T ) = a0e
−κ
2
T 2 , (5.59)
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where the integration constant a0 hypothetically denotes a normalisation scale corre-
sponding to the value of a in the infinite t-future (T = 0), although such an interpretation
is not appropriate since the inflationary description only holds for a limited duration.
A numerical estmate for the parameter κ can be derived. For the example considered
above with the inflaton potential V (φ) = m2φ2, the empirical estimate for the value of
the Hubble parameter during inflation, 3.6×10−5MPl from ref. [96] (see section 4.4), can
be used to find an inequality (using equation 5.50) for the kinetic-energy correction 5.51,
K.E. 10−9, (5.60)
from which in turn one can derive an inequality for the constant κ,
κ 108. (5.61)
The expression 5.59 (with the definition 5.58) shows how the growth of the scale factor
during inflation is characterised by the potential. We have also solved (approximately) for
the behaviour of the scalar field during that period. In chapter 7 we will use inflation as
the background cosmology on which to study perturbations, in particular, the ‘freezing
out’ of tensor modes.
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Chapter 6
A cosmological extension
In this chapter we argue that York time as a physically fundamental notion of time suggests
a natural extension of the cosmological timeline. We explain how the existence of this
extension may have implications for the possible matter content of the universe, such as
viable inflaton potentials. The contents of this chapter were published in ref. [104].
6.1 An end to time?
Throughout this thesis we are concerned with developing an understanding of the uni-
verse, in particular, of cosmology, in terms of a description based on York time as a
physical time, and with associated formal developments. In a spatially flat universe —
and we have observational reasons to believe that we live in such a universe — cosmolog-
ical history apparently ends at some finite time Tend, either equal to zero or even earlier at
some small negative number (in the presence of a positive cosmological constant Λ or an
effective cosmological constant taking the form of a positive T → Tend limit of the matter
field potential V (φ)). This point corresponds to cosmological time t→∞ in the standard
description, where the Hubble parameter approaches zero or a constant proportional to Λ.
Our hypothesis is that York time is physically fundamental. A valid question is there-
fore: Why should time end at Tend ≤ 0? We leave it to philosophical discourse to deter-
mine whether or not it is possible or even meaningful for time to ‘end’ at some instant —
that is, if instants of universal history and the York timeline form a bijection — and what
the metaphysical implications are. Either way, there is no a priori reason to assume that
time indeed ends at some particular instant Tend, equal to zero or otherwise. Undoubtedly
the point has certain dynamical significance and given that time is physical it is not obvi-
ously absurd that the end of time should have a dynamical origin. In fact, this is in part
what we will explore in this chapter. However, this is a matter of fact that can only be
determined a posteriori, following analysis and comparison to the observed universe.
In this chapter we explore the consequences of extending the York timeline beyond
Tend, that is, beyond t = ∞. The usual description in terms of cosmological time t
fails to describe this era. In the t-description the transition corresponds to a coordinate
singularity. The idea is analogous to a Schwarzschild black hole, where a new region of
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space-time is revealed by the use of Kruskal-Szekeres coordinates, extending to the ‘other
side’ of the singularity (where the Kruskal-Szekeres variable usually denoted by ‘V ’ takes
negative values), a region not described by either Schwarzschild or Eddington-Finkelstein
coordinates [86, Ch. 31].1
Our reasons for pursuing this line of inquiry are not, however, purely philosophical.
In fact, there are concrete reasons (described in section 6.2) why such a cosmological
extension is necessary for a consistent quantisation. However, unfortunately there is (as
far as I can see) no viable way to explore the dynamics or even the existence of this ‘other
side’ of cosmological history in any direct empirical way.
The basic hypothesis here is that the dynamical equations in York time found via the
Hamiltonian reduction remain valid beyond T∞. We restrict our analysis to the homo-
geneous isotropic (‘Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre’) universe explored in chapter 5. In chapter 7
we will explore perturbations and it would undoubtedly be interesting to consider their
evolution as the universe transitions to the ‘other side’. However, this is left to future
work.
At least two questions require answering. First, how do the dynamical entities — in
our case the scalar field — evolve during the transition? Second, what evolution can we
expect on the other side? The second question is easier to answer and we will do so in
section 6.3. The first is more difficult and will be explored in section 6.4.
6.2 The necessity of a cosmological extension
Why should one take the extension seriously? There may be some purely philosophical
arguments: that time should not end at some finite value, or that the mere mathemati-
cal possibility of the extension should at least prompt us to allow for the possibility of
its physicality. However, there is a considerably more compelling, physical reason to
consider it more than mere fiction.
The model employed in this chapter and chapter 5 above is that of a homogeneous
isotropic universe. This is, of course, an approximation. Let us consider the existence of
inhomogeneities in this universe, in particular local singularities such as a Schwarzschild
black hole formed at some finite time from a collapsing cloud of dust (see [86, sec. 32]
and references therein for an introduction). Such a scenario can be described by smoothly
‘gluing’ together parts of a closed collapsing Friedmann universe shrinking to zero size
(the collapsing dust cloud), a Schwarzschild region of space-time (the near exterior of
the cloud) and the chosen Friedmann cosmology (the distant rest of the universe). When
described in terms of constant-mean-curvature surfaces it is found [22] that these surfaces
1Arguably there is another, simpler example: the extension of dynamics beyond a black hole’s event
horizon in the first place. The idea that spacetime extended beyond the horizon of a Schwarzschild black
hole into the region r < 2M took several decades to become apparent [38, 74, 127]. However, a crucial
difference here is that this extension concerns the removal of a mere coordinate singularity. No physical
quantities become infinite (and geodesics crossing the surface r = 2M are traversed in finite proper time).
In the York-time extension, as we shall see, physical quantities may become infinite depending on the
particulars of the matter content.
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smoothly connect between the different regions.2 Furthermore, K →∞ (T →∞) as one
approaches the singularity formed by the fully collapsed dust cloud, independently of the
choice of exterior cosmology.
If the cosmology is closed, all constant-mean-curvature slices inside the cloud and
Schwarzschild regions connect smoothly to exterior cosmological slices [100]. This is
one of the features of York-time slicing explored in chapter 4. If the cosmology is flat,
only slices up to K = 0 (T = 0) connect up smoothly and slices with K > 0 only
exist in disconnected patches around the local singularities [22, sections VI, VII]. An ob-
server falling into the black hole reaches the singularity in finite proper time and therefore
crosses all constant-mean-curvature surfaces up to T = ∞ in finite proper time. If York
time has fundamental physical significance, reaching the singularity constitutes arriving
at the end of the universe at T →∞ no matter the exterior cosmology. Therefore, without
the extension, different areas of the universe would end at different times: at Tend = 0 far
away from the singularity, but at Tend =∞ in its vicinity.
Classically this does not immediately cause a contradiction, at least not for physical
reasons. However, quantisation of the theory is now a problem. The quantum theory is
necessarily non-local — this was one reason motivating the idea of a physically funda-
mental space-time split in the first place — and non-local effects are incompatible with
partial spatial slices of this kind.
For example, consider a pair of entangled particles, one of which enters the Schwarz-
schild radius while the other remains in some distant part of the universe. When the
falling particle reaches T = 0 its partner encounters the end of time. What happens to the
quantum state at this point is entirely unclear. At T = 0 the configuration space (or Hilbert
space) would suddenly change its dimensionality since the space on which the dynamical
entities such as matter fields are defined shrinks to a set of disconnected finite patches.
This does not allow for a consistent definition of the quantum theory. Furthermore, since
the falling particle crosses into the region T > 0 in finite proper time this scenario cannot
be dismissed as unphysical. Our theory is furthermore supposed to be fundamental, so its
validity cannot be limited to the exteriors of black holes, for example.
Therefore there is a choice: Either York time is rejected as the fundamental time
parameter, or the consistency of quantisation demands the existence of the extension. In
this thesis we are interested in exploring the consequences of considering York time as
physically fundamental and so we require the cosmological extension.
6.3 Dynamics on the other side
The equations 5.23, 5.24 governing φ and its conjugate momentum pφ are invariant under
temporal reflection about T = 0 (with the direction of time unchanged, so that dT does
not transform). Furthermore, the sign of φ′ is the same as the sign of pφ. Therefore the
set of solutions for the interval T ∈ (0,∞) is exactly the same set of trajectories as for
2Interestingly, a description in terms of a conventional time parameter t allows only for continuous
surfaces, but not smooth ones.
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the interval T ∈ (−∞, 0) except that the latter are traced out ‘backwards’ and the sign of
the momentum is flipped. A solution (φ(T ), pφ(T )) for T < 0 may be used to define a
corresponding solution φ˜(T ), p˜φ(T ) for T > 0 via initial data at T0 > 0 given by
φ˜(T0) = φ(−T0), p˜φ(T ) = −pφ(−T ), (6.1)
as can be easily verified.
The equivalence between equations 5.23 and 5.24 together with H = a3, and the
conventional Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre and Klein-Gordon equations (eqs. 5.1, 5.2, 5.8) implies
that we should also be able to understand this symmetry in terms of the latter, even though
the cosmological time parameter t does not cover the period T > 0. Instead we are
able to define another analogous cosmological time parameter t˜ such that t˜ → −∞ as
T → 0+ and t˜ → 0 (or some other finite value) as T → ∞. This parameter t˜ does not
describe the period T < 0. Equations 5.1, 5.2 and 5.8 are invariant under reversal of the
direction of time, dt → −dt. One can therefore see that if t is mapped to −t˜ as part of
the correspondence between solutions then these equations remain satisfied for the time
variable t˜ instead of t.
However, note that in general for more complicated matter content there is no reason
to expect that the universe will simply ‘turn around’ and trace out its trajectory back-
wards, even if there is a one-one correspondence between solutions on ‘our side’ and the
extension.
6.4 Transition behaviour and classification of potentials
York time T is proportional to the Hubble parameter, so that T → 0 as t → ∞ only if
a˙
a
→ 0, which is the case, for example, in the presence of a free scalar field or a field with
a potential which goes to zero sufficiently fast as the end of conventional cosmological
history is approached. Specifically, note that 3
2
M−2Pl T
2 − 2V > 0 as we saw above. With
T → 0, this implies that if V ≥ 0 everywhere, then V → 0 faster than 3
4
M−2Pl T
2 if
T is to go to zero. Otherwise, in the presence of a positive cosmological constant, for
example, T does not reach zero in finite cosmological time. While in that case there are
still corresponding solutions on the ‘other side’, there is an intermediate interval T ∈
(T∞,−T∞) where the dynamics is not defined.
We are interested in identifying the class of potentials for which there is a smooth
transition from the T < 0 to the T > 0 region. Specifically, what we mean by this is that
• the dynamical equations 5.23, 5.24 describe the behaviour of the scalar field(s)
for the entire real line and there is no intermediate interval around T = 0 where
3
2
M−2Pl T
2 < 2V (φ),
• the energy density associated with the scalar field and the field value φ itself remain
finite everywhere.
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Figure 6.1: Overview of corresponding values of cosmological time t and York time T in the case
of a free scalar field. Only the left half of the time line is described by conventional cosmological
time for a flat universe. The right hand side is however a natural extension if the York parameter
is taken seriously as a fundamental time parameter. The finite ‘starting’ and ‘end’ values of t and
t′ respectively are up to convention (due to cosmological-time translation invariance).
The first condition is equivalent to the question in the cosmological-time picture whether
or not there are solutions to eq. 5.1 for all values of a˙/a. For example, the dynamics of
the free field (V (φ) = 0) can be analytically solved,3
φ′free = sign(p
free
φ ) ·
(
3
2
M−2Pl T
2
)− 1
2 , pfreeφ = const.
⇒ φfree =
√
3
2
MPl ln |T | (6.2)
for all T < 0 (fig. 6.1). The energy density is ∼ φ˙2 ∼ T 2 → 0 and therefore obviously
finite. However, φ diverges logarithmically with its sign equal to the sign of the initial
value pfreeφ .
On the other hand, consider the simple case of a positive cosmological constant,
V (φ) = 2M2PlΛ, Λ > 0, and no other potential term. In terms of cosmological time,
this is associated with an eternally expanding universe with a˙/a asymptotically approach-
ing a finite value proportional to Λ (de Sitter expansion). In the York-time picture,
3
2
M−2Pl T
2 − 2V (φ) > 0 only up until T∞ = −16M2PlΛ and again after −T∞ = +16M2PlΛ.
In the intermediate period the dynamics is ill-defined since φ was taken to be a real field
(fig. 6.2). While the dynamical equations can indeed be applied to T > −T∞, the transi-
tion is not smooth. We will provide a discussion of the meaning and implication of such
an intermediate period below.
A non-trivial example of a potential which leads to a well-defined transition, but with
diverging field value, is given by V (φ) = V0e−λφ/MP , where V0 and λ are constant pa-
rameters. Potentials of this form may arise in the effective four-dimensional dynamics
induced by Kaluza-Klein theories, for example. A discussion of this potential in terms
3The relation φ′free ∼ |T |−1 illustrates a feature of the York time picture: More and more ‘happens’ in
a finite time interval the closer we are to T = 0. As we discussed in section 4.4 a similar observation was
made about cosmological time regarding the very early history (close to t = 0) in the 1960s in [85], who
suggested that − ln a (or alternatively the logarithm of the homogeneous temperature, which turns out to
roughly equivalent) might be a more appropriate choice of temporal parameter to describe the history of the
universe. This is further exemplified in our language to describe the early universe in terms of ‘epochs’ such
as the ‘Planck’, ‘Grand Unifying’ and ‘Inflationary’ epochs, each of which is described by a vastly different
order of magnitude of duration. Another comparable choice is the parameter ln t as had been advocated by
Milne another twenty years earlier (cited in [85]).
84
Figure 6.2: Overview of corresponding values of cosmological time t and York time T in the case
of a scalar field with a positive cosmological constant. The left section of the line is described by
conventional cosmological time t, the right one by a similar parameter t′. In the middle section,
T∞ < T < −T∞, the dynamics of the scalar field is undefined, raising philosophical questions.
of conventional cosmological time t is given in [44] and references therein, in particular
[57]. This model can be solved exactly. Make the ansatz φ(T ) = φ0 + α ln |T |, then
realising that dV/dφ is monotonic one can infer that there is a time after which there is
no further turning point, so that sign(pφ) remains fixed and equation 5.23 effectively de-
couples from the momentum. Solving the equation with the proposed ansatz one obtains
the solution
φ(T ) =
MPl
λ
ln
(
8V0M
2
Pl
(6− λ2)
1
T 2
)
, (6.3)
which diverges as T → 0. However,
V (T ) =
(6− λ2)T 2
8V0M2Pl
(6.4)
approaches zero in this limit, as required for the existence of a well-defined transition.
Note that due to the fact that T is physically meaningful there is no time-translation in-
variance (see [106]).
A simple example of a fully smooth transition (with φ remaining finite) is provided
by a scalar field with a positive mass term, V (φ) = m2φ2, m2 > 0 (which is a version
of large-field inflation [82], albeit one not favoured by the most recent data [97]). One
does not need to solve the equations in order to analyse the behaviour as T → 0. In the
late-time limit one expects oscillatory behaviour with an amplitude decreasing over time.
Indeed, φ begins by rolling down the potential (if its initial conditions are such that it rolls
up, then eq. 5.24 ensures that pφ will pass through zero at some point, a turning point, and
φ changes direction) and passes through the minimum, at which point p′φ changes sign (eq.
5.24). The momentum pφ will therefore pass through zero eventually, so that a turning
point results and φ reverses sign. This repeats, resulting in oscillatory behaviour. The
amplitude of the oscillations decreases since 3
2
M−2Pl T
2 monotonically decreases, so the
turning point (recall that these can be identified by the condition 3
2
M−2Pl T
2 − 2V (φ) = 0)
are reached at a lower value of V (φ) and therefore at a lower value of φ2 than during the
previous cycle. It is noteworthy that in the cosmological-time picture appeal to ‘Hubble
friction’ must be made (the Hubble parameter appears as a frictional coefficient in eq. 5.8),
whereas in the York-time equations derived via the Hamiltonian reduction the decreasing
amplitude is encoded in the explicit time dependence.
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During the oscillations the field φ remains finite since it is bound by the field value
at the most recent turning point from above and below. Both potential and kinetic energy
density furthermore approach zero, so the finiteness of the energy density ρφ is guaran-
teed. In fact, we know that for oscillatory solutions that ρφ ∼ a−3 (see [44]), so even the
total energy remains finite if initially normalised.
Let us now attempt a more general characterisation. We restrict our discussion to
potentials bounded from below. For consider a potential without a lower bound. If there
is a local minimum the field may, initial conditions permitting, become trapped in the well
and the potential may be locally approximated by another potential bounded from below.
If on the other hand no such minimum exists or the initial conditions are such that the
field does not become trapped inside one, then V (φ) reaches arbitrarily negative values,
so that 3
2
M−2Pl T
2 − 2V (φ) >  as T → 0 for some finite  > 0. Therefore |φ′| is bounded
for all T greater than some reference time Tr. Since the interval (Tr, 0) is finite, φ remains
finite also. The ‘transition’ is perfectly smooth. However, it is also not a novelty since it
is reached in finite cosmological time [50]. That is, the universe recontracts even in the
conventional description. No new temporal region is revealed through the use of York
time.
Therefore, assume there exists α ∈ R such that α = inf V (φ). Table 6.1 summarises
the implications for the transition for different cases.
6.5 Discussion
The matter content of the real universe is considerably more complicated than a single
scalar field. However, during inflation a scalar field may have constituted the dominant
constituent of the matter content. Furthermore, with all other contributions to the energy
density falling to zero in the late-time limit of the universe, a non-zero contribution from a
scalar field potential may become once again significant. Therefore considering a scalar-
field model in order to explore the ‘other side’ is appropriate.
The question of the significance of the transition properties of such potentials arises.
Indeed, one may dismiss the cosmological extension presented here as purely mathemat-
ical speculation without any physical significance at all. However, if one considers the
possibility that York time may indeed play the role of a fundamental time parameter that
forms the basis of quantisation (where, as we showed, the extension is required for con-
sistency), then the existence of models (potentials) with an intermediate period around
T = 0 of ill-defined dynamics requires consideration. One may take one of the following
stances:4
1. Potentials which lead to such an intermediate period are ruled out by a theory in
which York time is considered fundamental. Conversely, if observational evidence
4Not including more radical attitudes such as the view that during the intermediate epoch the dynamical
evolution of matter and space cannot be derived from a variational principle, or that our mathematical tools
are in some way insufficient to provide a description of the dynamics at these times. Whether or not such a
view is viable is a philosophical question outside the scope of this thesis.
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Value of inf V (φ) Examples Value of T∞ Smoothness of transition(Existence of Transition) Field value finite? (|φ| <∞) Energy density finite?
inf V (φ) < 0
As be-
low but
with
cosm.
const.
(Λ < 0)
None. T∞ does not
exist, the universe
recontracts in finite
cosmological time.
No extension can
be made. The null
energy condition is
violated.
No real transition.
(Extension does not
exist.)
No real transition.
(Extension does not
exist.)
inf V (φ) = 0
AI, HI,
MHI,
RGI,
SBI
T∞ = 0 (transition
exists), unless there
is a local minimum
with V (φmin) > 0
in which the field
is trapped, in which
case behaviour as if
inf V (φ) > 0.
Possibly: Yes iff there
is an infinite num-
ber of turning points
(i.e. oscillating solu-
tions, requires exis-
tence of a minimum)
(e.g. HI, MHI, RGI,
SBI). Otherwise φ →
±∞ at least logarith-
mically (e.g. AI).
Yes.
Example: oscillating
solutions in V ∼ |φ|n:
ρφ ∼ a−m, m =
6n/(n+ 2) [44]
inf V (φ) > 0
As
above
but with
cosm.
const.
(Λ > 0)
T∞ < 0 (inter-
mediate epoch of
ill-defined dynam-
ics). C.f. model
with a cosmological
constant.
No transition.
(Epoch of ill-defined
dynamics before other
side reached.)
No transition.
(Epoch of ill-defined
dynamics before other
side reached.)
Table 6.1: Transition behaviour for potentials bounded from below. The second entry in each
line gives examples of potentials with the infimum as given in the first column from the most
favoured inflation potentials based on the 2013 Planck data as identified in [81] (although here
we do not differentiate between subcategories of a particular type of potential based on parameter-
value ranges), namely Arctan Inflation (AI), Higgs Inflation (HI), Mutated Hilltop Inflation (MHI),
Radion Gauge Inflation (RGI) and Supergravity Brane Inflation (SBI). The third column identifies
if York time reaches T = 0, the condition for a transition to the other side to exist without an
intermediate epoch of ill-defined dynamics. The last two columns provide information on the
smoothness of the transition.
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suggests that inflation, for example, is driven by such a potential, then this would
falsify a theory in which York time is taken to play a physically fundamental role.
2. Time may end at some finite value, so there is no contradiction in regarding York
time as physically meaningful but without taking the extension seriously. The ar-
gument of section 6.2 is avoided by postulating some different, non-equivalent and
at this stage unknown quantisation procedure which allows time to end at different
values in different regions of space, or a change in the classical theory that avoids
the ‘patchy’ time slices for T > 0. The resulting quantum theory would likely
be not equivalent to standard quantisation and observational corroboration may be
possible.
The second point of view may be found viable for example in the context of Shape Dy-
namics [54, 13, 84] (which we touched on on multiple occasions in part I of this thesis),
where what is presumed physical is a sequence of configurations (that is, a trajectory in
configuration space) without any physically fundamental time. There a preferred time pa-
rameter is obtained by the requirement that the dynamics be expressed in terms of dimen-
sionless, relational quantities only [13]. The time parameter is not physically fundamen-
tal but instead supervenes on the properties of the system. Therefore there is no a priori
imperative that this time parameter should constitute a surjection from the configuration-
space trajectory onto the real line. Furthermore, Shape Dynamics differs from general
relativity in its description of black holes [51, 52], so the theory may escape the argument
outlined in section 6.2. In fact, in our opinion this view is the strongest reason not to
believe in the physicality of our proposed extension. Note though that Shape Dynamics
is a different physical theory, which, while locally equivalent to general relativity in the
constant-mean-curvature gauge, does differ in the global structures it allows and so is at
least in principle5 observationally distinguishable. Hence, despite its similarities, it is not
the focus of this paper. Meanwhile the view adopted here, ascribing a more fundamen-
tal role to time, remains viable at least until there is sufficient observational evidence to
strongly favour theories (of quantum gravity, for example) which rely on a purely rela-
tional notion of time.
If we adopt the first point of view then a theoretical framework in which York time
is fundamental imposes a restriction on inflationary potentials (or, more accurately, the
complete matter content of the universe) and is therefore experimentally testable, pro-
vided cosmological flatness (Ωk = 0) is conclusively established. At the time of writing
the list of observationally unfalsified inflationary potentials is still too long to make any
definite conclusions in this context [81] and there is no obvious correlation between po-
tentials allowing for a smooth transition and those favoured by data on inflation. However,
it will be interesting to see whether ‘York-time friendly’ potentials are favoured or not as
data improves. It is, however, important to bear in mind that some inflaton potentials are
merely effective (derived from some underlying supersymmetry or string model, for ex-
5The observer would have to travel through the event horizon of a black hole in order to establish a
difference.
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ample) and their form may not stay the same throughout the entire history of the universe.
A more careful analysis of individual models is necessary.
At this stage, whether or not we should give credence to predictions concerning the
unobservable epoch T > 0 depends on the existence of other evidence for York time
as a physically fundamental time parameter. In this thesis we have argued that there are
certainly are theoretical reasons. If dramatic progress is made in the development of some
theory of quantum gravity that relies on York time, and observational evidence emerges
that corroborates this theory, then this would be reason to take the extension seriously.
Indeed it would be difficult to escape its necessity.
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Chapter 7
Cosmological perturbation theory with
York time: preliminaries
In this chapter we lay the foundations for the development of the Hamiltonian-reduced
York-time cosmological perturbation theory to be developed in the next chapter. We dis-
cuss some formal properties relating to the Poisson structure by looking at an anisotropic
minisuperspace model and we consider some physical processes such as the ‘freezing
out’ and ‘Hubble re-entry’ of cosmological perturbations in the York-time description.
The contents of section 7.2 were published in ref. [105], while sections 7.3 and 7.4 were
contained in ref. [107].
7.1 The importance of cosmological perturbation theory
Very broadly speaking, the study of cosmology can be divided into two areas: the study
of the homogeneous ‘background’, concerning global properties of the universe, and the
study of small-scale inhomogeneities. The former is logically prior to the latter in the
sense that the evolution of the background (or at least certain quantities describing as-
pects thereof) has to be sufficiently well understood before one can embark upon the
study of small inhomogeneities on that background. However, ex hypothesi there is no
‘backreaction’ of the inhomogeneities on the cosmological background. The background
value of some physical quantity (such as the value of some matter field φ, say) is chosen
to be the global average, for example, so that if one were to find that the local change
in the field δφ(x) is positive everywhere, it would be a sign that the ‘wrong’ background
was chosen.
It is not guaranteed a priori that this model of cosmology — background plus pertur-
bations — adequately describes our actual universe. In fact, on sufficiently small scales
(such as on the scale of the Earth-Moon system) it does not. Given what we know there is
however strong evidence that this model does provide a viable approximation of the early
universe, as well as today on sufficiently large scales (≥ gigaparsecs). The evolution of
small perturbations into large non-linear1 inhomogeneities such as planets, galaxies and
1‘Non-linear’ meaning that linearised (first-order) forms of the dynamical equations of gravity are not
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black holes (‘structure formation’) is a significant area of research, albeit one that we
cannot do justice here.
The full equations of general relativity are highly non-linear and therefore in general
difficult to solve analytically. Numerical relativity, the analysis of gravitational dynamics
via computer simulation has become its own field of study in modern theoretical physics.
Perturbation theory offers a method to reduce the complexity of the equation and therefore
allows one to find approximate analytic solutions, at least for certain regimes. The fact
that the early universe is such a regime is a fortunate ‘coincidence’.
Other than through structure formation, perturbation theory may be tested experi-
mentally via studies of the cosmic microwave background (CMB). Data from missions
such as WMAP (Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe [37]) and the Planck spacecraft
[97] have substantially increased our understanding of the early universe within the last
decade. The CMB provides a ‘picture’ of the universe at ca. 379,000 years after the Big
Bang when photons decoupled (photon-matter interactions became rare), leaving the uni-
verse transparent. The relative late time of this event limits what is known quantitatively
about the universe prior to that, which is for the most part inaccessible.2 In order to test
some theory of the early universe, one is therefore forced to evolve the universe forward
to the point of photon decoupling, which in itself brings theoretical and numerical uncer-
tainties.
Finding discrepancies between predicted data of the quantised York-time reduced-
Hamiltonian theory and more conventional (quantised) general relativity or other ap-
proaches to quantum gravity, remains work to be carried out in the future. In this thesis
we contend with developing the formal structure of the reduced-Hamiltonian description
of cosmological perturbations and gaining an understanding in terms of York time of key
physical processes such as the ‘freezing out’ of (Fourier modes of) perturbations during
inflation. This is the task undertaken in this chapter and the next. A feature of the reduced
theory that is relevant here is the non-canonical Poisson structure of the reduced variables,
which we study in isolation in section 7.2. In sections 7.3 and 7.4 we study the ‘freezing’
and ‘Hubble re-entry’ of modes relating to scalar and tensor perturbations. In chapter 8 we
perform the Hamiltonian reduction with respect to York time in the perturbative regime.
7.2 Classical anisotropic cosmology: Exploration of the
Poisson structure
In chapter 5 we developed in detail the classical theory of the cosmological background
for a homogeneous and isotropic universe in terms of York time. There was only one
canonical pair of variables associated with the geometric degrees of freedom, the scale
good approximations to describe the evolution.
2A proposed method to probe the universe at earlier times is by measurements of the cosmic neutrino
background (CNB). Neutrinos decoupled about one second after the big bang and would therefore provide
a much earlier snapshot of the universe. However, technologically accurate measurements of the CNB are
difficult at this point, although near-future experiments are not completely inconceivable [43].
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a and its conjugate momentum pa. These variables were eliminated in the Hamiltonian
reduction in favour of physical time T and its associated Hamiltonian. All anisotropic
degrees of freedom disappeared due to the symmetry assumptions, as did resultingly the
non-canonical aspect of the Poisson structure that we discussed in section 4.3.
In this section we focus on understanding the consequences of the non-canonical Pois-
son brackets for the classical and quantum theory. In particular we wish to isolate this
feature of our theory as far as possible from other mathematical aspects of our theory and
we therefore choose the simplest conceivable non-trivial model exhibiting this structure,
an anisotropic minisuperspace model. In chapter 8 we will develop perturbation theory
with the full Poisson brackets 4.28 - 4.30. Since the perturbation theory is truly a field
theory (the geometric variables have spatial dependence) we will encounter a number of
new complications. It is therefore extraordinarily useful to first study the meaning and
implications of the Poisson structure in isolation in the context of a finite-dimensional
model.
The spatial metric gab and its associated momentum piab each have six independent
components. Their determinant and trace respectively encode the overall scale and its
evolution, the ratios of the diagonal entries relate to the relative scale in different spa-
tial directions and the three off-diagonal elements concern the notion of angles. (Recall
section 2.3 where we introduced the notion of a metric as a quantity defining the scalar
product of two vectors in order to see this.) Of course, a change in the coordinates used
(or a change in the frame of reference) changes what constitutes the spatial directions and
can therefore mix diagonal and off-diagonal elements. However, in the case of a homoge-
neous minisuperspace model it makes sense to choose a metric representation that is itself
homogeneous. This is only possible in the case of a spatially flat cosmology and this is
what we choose to develop here. The coordinate system used in this case is just the Carte-
sian one.3 In order to ensure maximum simplicity, we choose to set all off-diagonal metric
elements to zero, so that there are only three geometric degrees of freedom, essentially
corresponding to how space is ‘stretched’ along the three Cartesian axes.
The resulting universe has little to do with the actual universe where no global anisotropy
is observed.4 Furthermore, the model developed here exhibits no stability around the
configuration-space point corresponding to isotropy, as we will see. As a description of
reality, the model is utterly abysmal. However, much can be learned from its mathemati-
cal features. In general General Relativity (without Hamiltonian reduction) the model is
known as the ‘Kasner models’ [86].
Introduce variables Qi ≡ gii and P i ≡ piii. The metric determinant is g = Q1Q2Q3
and the trace of the momentum is pi = QiP i. The York parameter is then the usual
3In spatially open and closed cosmologies one would have to use hyperspherical coordinates, analogous
to spherical polar coordinates in Euclidean space. In flat space such a representation is also possible, but
the Cartesian one is simplest.
4A recent study based on the Planck data calculated that the odds that there is a preferred direction in
the CMB are roughly 121, 000 : 1 against [110].
92
T = 2pi/3
√
g and its conjugate momentum is PT = −√g. The reduced variables are
qi = g
− 1
3Qi, p
i = g
1
3 (P i − 1
3
piQi), (7.1)
where Qi ≡ 1/Qi denotes the ii-component of the inverse metric gij . For convenience
we also introduce the inverse of the reduced metric variables, qi ≡ 1/qi. Because of
the ‘compression’ of two indices (gij, piij and g˜ij, p˜iij) into one (Qi, P i and qi, pi), we
employ the following summation convention for the purposes of this chapter: Indices are
summed over if they appear at least once as an upper and a lower index each. Indices may
appear multiple times as either upper or lower indices only however without implying a
summation.
The Poisson brackets derived from the general ones for g˜ij and p˜iij (eqs. 4.28 - 4.30)
are exactly those of the simple finite-dimensional model considered in the same section,
namely
{qi, pj} = δji −
qi
3qj
(4.25)
{qi, qj} = 0 (4.26)
{pi, pj} = p
i
3qj
− p
j
3qi
. (4.27)
In virtue of their definition the reduced variables obey the constraints
q1q2q3 = 1, (7.2)
qap
a = 0. (7.3)
The tracelessness 7.3 of pa ensures that the first constraint 7.2, the scale-free condition, is
preserved. In fact, the constraints are both first class. Furthermore, the constraints 7.2 and
7.3 are preserved by any motion generated by the momenta via this Poisson structure 4.25,
4.27. That is, for a small vector b, the constraints are preserved under the transformation
qa → qa + b{qa, pb}, pa → pa + b{pa, pb} (7.4)
At this point one may ask if the non-canonical structure of the Poisson brackets is
necessary following the Hamiltonian reduction, or if it is only the result of a poor choice
of coordinates and that a suitable coordinate transformation of the reduced variables will
result in standard canonical Poisson brackets. However, no such variables exist. One
way to see this is algebraically by performing a general coordinate transformation, de-
manding that the new coordinates satisfy canonical commutation relations and showing
that no such coordinate transformations can be found. A more geometric way to see that
the coordinates must be non-canonical is to look at the phase space constructed. Since
the momenta all generate motion within the two-dimensional constraint surface the space
spanned by the momenta is not the cotangent space of the kinematical configuration space,
which is three-dimensional. The underlying reason for this is that as part of the Hamil-
tonian reduction the momenta are constructed to generate motion within the constraint
surface.
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In terms of qa, pa the Hamiltonian constraint takes the form
0 = H = 2M−2Pl
[
− pi
2
6
√
g
+
1√
g
q2ap
a2
]
= 2M−2Pl
[
3
8
T 2PT − 1
PT
q2ap
a2
]
. (7.5)
The physical Hamiltonian associated with York time is given by Hphys = −PT (qa, pa, T ),
where PT (qa, pa, T ) is the function obtained when solving the Hamiltonian constraint for
PT in terms of the other variables. In the full theory the analogous equation is a difficult
elliptic equation with no known general solution. Here however it is a simple quadratic,
yielding
Hphys ≡ −PT = ±
[
8
3T 2
q2ap
a2
] 1
2
. (7.6)
As discussed in chapter 5 the choice of sign is not physical. For any given physical
trajectory corresponding to one sign choice there is a corresponding solution for the other
sign choice, characterised by qa(T ) → qa(T ), pa(T ) → −pa(T ). Since the physical
interpretation of the numerical value of Hphys is that of ‘volume’ however and volume is
conventionally defined as positive, we again assume the positive sign in eq. 7.6.
The Hamiltonian is of geodesic form N(T )(Gijpipj)
1
2 . The solutions may there-
fore be understood geometrically as geodesics in configuration space with respect to the
configuration-space metric Gij ∝ qiqjδij . Geodesic form is, in fact, a general feature of
York-time reduced Hamiltonians.
Motion generated by the Hamiltonian, qa → qa + δT{qa, H}, pa → pa + δT{pa, H},
also maintains the constraints, although the tracelessness constraint 7.3 is required to show
that the scale-free condition 7.2 is preserved. Specifically, the equation of motion are
q′a = {qa, H} =
√
8
3T 2 · q2kpk2
· q2bpbδba (7.7)
pa′ = {pa, H} = −
√
8
3T 2 · q2kpk2
· qbpb2δab . (7.8)
Explicit solutions to equations 7.7, 7.8 may be found by inspection using the fact that
pb′ = −qbpbδabq′a. One finds solutions
qa(T ) = (−4/3T )2(sa− 13 ), pa(T ) = (sa − 13)(−4/3T )−2(sa−
1
3
), (7.9)
with constant parameters sa satisfying s1 +s2 +s3 = 1, s21 +s
2
2 +s
2
3 = 1. These solutions
are exactly the Kasner models. In order to see this and to get a better intuition of the
relation of York time T and standard cosmological time t in these models, recall that
in the Kasner models g = t2 and the general fact that T was defined as−4/3 times the
fractional rate of change of volume, so that
T = − 4
3t
. (7.10)
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This makes it apparent that 7.9 are indeed the Kasner solutions [86]. The value of Hphys
is given by −PT = √g, so that Hphys = t — cosmological time is just the numerical
value of the physical Hamiltonian.
The fact that one obtains exactly the same solutions provides further illustration of the
consistency of the reduced formalism.
A cosmological constant may be included in the above formalism, leading to the sub-
stitution (8/3T 2) → (8
3
T 2 − 2Λ)−1 in Hphys. The solutions of the equations of motion
are then
qa(T ) = γa
∣∣∣∣∣T +
√
T 2 − 16
3
Λ
∣∣∣∣∣
+2(sa− 13 )
(7.11)
pa(T ) = γ−1a (sa − 13)
∣∣∣∣∣T +
√
T 2 − 16
3
Λ
∣∣∣∣∣
−2(sa− 13 )
(7.12)
where the parameters sa satisfy the same condition as in the Kasner model, γa are con-
stants chosen to satisfy eq. 7.2 and T is restricted to 3
8
T 2 > 2Λ.
The model developed in this section is not a good description of our universe. Global
degrees of isotropy have not been detected. However, it helped to illustrate the mathe-
matical interplay of the Poisson brackets and the constraints, insights that are useful in
the perturbation theory to be developed in chapter 8. However, it is first useful to gain
some intuition for the mechanisms accounting for certain physical processes in the early
universe when described in terms of York time. This is the subject of the rest of this
chapter.
7.3 Mode freezing during inflation
Inflation originated as an explanation for various puzzles relating to cosmological ini-
tial conditions such as the horizon and flatness problems [55]. Since then, however, its
greatest success has arguably been to explain the near scale-invariant power spectrum of
cosmological perturbations. Observations of the cosmic microwave background continue
to narrow down the range of possible inflaton potentials [for example, ref. 97].5 Cosmo-
logical perturbation theory is one of the cornerstones of modern cosmology, accounting
for both structure formation and CMB inhomogeneities. Understanding the evolution of
perturbations in terms of York time is therefore essential if T is to be considered the
physically fundamental time parameter.
Section 5.4 provided a description of inflation using the York time parameter. We
found that inflation occurs over a very short York-time interval ∆T . In fact, in the ‘naı¨ve’
de Sitter picture of inflation no York time would pass at all. Instead one has to employ a
higher-order description in which the universe is only almost de Sitter.
5Despite its broad appeal, there are rival theories to inflation aiming to explain our cosmological obser-
vations, such as, for example, bouncing cosmologies [see 21, for a recent review].
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The rapid expansion of space during inflation leads to the ‘freezing out’ of (Fourier
modes of) cosmological perturbations as physical wavelengths grow significantly faster
than the Hubble radius. This in turn leads to the scale-invariant power-spectrum. The
freezing-our process is well understood in the conventional picture in terms of cosmolog-
ical time t. In this section, we analyse the dynamics in terms of T via ‘translation’ of the
relevant equations. The mathematical mechanism by which freezing out occurs is rather
distinct from the usual, although the physics is ultimately equivalent, of course.
A more detailed analysis would lead us to consider scalar and tensor perturbations
separately. For our present purposes however it suffices to consider the single sufficiently
general equation of motion for a Fourier mode with wave number k,
d2yk
dη2
+
(
k2 − 1
a
d2a
dη2
)
yk = 0, (7.13)
where η denotes conformal time. The variable yk here might refer to a particular tensor
mode after rescaling by the scale factor. That is, we may parameterise the two independent
degrees of freedom of the tensor perturbation as
δgij = a
2
(
h1e
1
ij + h2e
2
ij
)
, (7.14)
where {e1ij, e2ij} form an orthonormal basis of the tensor perturbations of the spatial metric
gij , then rescale to y = 14M
2
Plah1 (and similar for h2) and perform a Fourier transform to
arrive at equation 7.13 (the equation of motion derived from the Einstein-Hilbert action).
A similar equation arises in the case of scalar perturbations (scalar metric and scalar-field
perturbations, for example), at least approximately in certain scenarios (most importantly
for us, in quasi-de Sitter scenarios), when expressed in appropriate variables (rescaling
the field φ by the scale factor a) and with an appropriate gauge choice [87]. Equation 7.13
is therefore rather general and will form the basis of our analysis.
The foliation is considered fixed. That is, we do not consider the back-reaction of
perturbations on the foliation and the constant-mean-curvature condition may therefore
be violated at the level of perturbations. However, at least for tensor perturbations there is
no such back-reaction anyway since the perturbations are traceless (Tr(e1ij) =Tr(e
2
ij) = 0),
as a result of which the volume element
√
g and the extrinsic curvatureK are unperturbed.
The York-time analysis performed in this section is therefore exact for tensor perturbation
and approximate for scalar perturbations (since there both equation 7.13 as well as the
foliation is approximate).
In a few cases equation 7.13 can be solved exactly, but in general one can consider
approximations in the super-Hubble and sub-Hubble regimes in which the wavelength of
a mode is respectively much larger and much smaller than the Hubble radius, or equiva-
lently k  aH and k  aH respectively. In the former case one can neglect the term in
k2 in equation 7.13, so that the equation has the general approximate solution (in terms of
conformal time η),
yk = c1a+ c2a
∫
dη a−2. (7.15)
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The first term is static, while the second is dynamic and decays fast, so that only the static
term remains relevant. In other words, the modes are ‘frozen’. For large values of k on the
other hand the equation is approximately that of a harmonic oscillator and such modes are
evolving. During inflation, of course, a large range of modes pass from the sub-Hubble to
the super-Hubble regime.
Equation 7.13 may be transformed to York time, giving
0 = y′′k +
(
1
T
+ 2
a′
a
− a
′′
a
)
y′k +
[
4M4Pl
k2
a2T 2
a′2
a2
− a
′
a
(
1
T
+ 2
a′
a
)]
yk, (7.16)
where primes denote derivatives with respect to T as usual and we used the relative time
lapse,
dη
dT
= −2M
2
Pla
′
Ta2
, (7.17)
obtained via the relationship between T and H (see section 5.2). One can study equation
7.16 for distinct eras by choosing an appropriate function a(T ). During inflation the scale
factor is given by equation 5.59, so that equation 7.16 takes the form
0 = y′′k −
(
T−1 + κT
)
y′k + κ
2
[
4M4Pl ·
k2
a2
− 2T 2
]
yk, (7.18)
with κ given by expression 5.58. Defining
β(T ) ≡ −(T−1 + κT ) (7.19)
ω2k(a, T ) ≡ κ2[4M4Plk2/a2 − 2T 2], (7.20)
equation 7.18 may be cast into the form of a damped-oscillator equation,
0 = y′′k + β(T )y
′
k + ω
2
k(a, T )yk (7.21)
(noting that β(T ) > 0 since T < 0 while the universe is expanding). The coefficients
are time-dependent, so this oscillator-like analysis does not provide solutions for yk over
an extended period. But it does give an indication of the qualitative behaviour of a mode
at some particular instant during inflation. Furthermore, inflation lasts for only a short
York-time interval ∆T as compared to |T |, so that the evolution of the coefficients is, in
fact, negligible apart from the time dependence entering via the scale factor.
The sign of ω2k now determines the nature of the evolution. If ω
2
k > 0, then ωk is a real
frequency and the evolution corresponds to damped oscillations. If ω2k < 0, the frequency
is imaginary, corresponding to decay and hence a freezing of the mode. Physically the
k-dependent term contributing to ω2k may be expressed in a more illuminating manner in
terms of the ratio k˜ of the actual wave number k with the wave number aH of the mode
instantaneously crossing the Hubble radius,
k˜ =
k
aH
, aH = −1
2
M−2Pl Ta, (7.22)
so that,
ω2k(a, T ) =
(
k˜2 − 2
)
κ2T 2. (7.23)
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Super-Hubble modes satisfy k˜  1, so that ω2k < 0 and the modes do not oscillate. In
the sub-Hubble regime, k˜  1, the frequency is real, ω2k > 0, and the modes oscillate
provided they are not overdamped (which is not the case, as we will see).6
We may study the effect of the damping term β(T ) by identifying whether a particular
mode is overdamped or underdamped.7 The relevant quantity to consider is
Dk(a, T ) ≡ β2(T )− 4ω2k(a, T )
= −16κ2M4Pl
k2
a20
eκT
2
+ 9κ2T 2 + 2κ+ T−2, (7.24)
where all terms are strictly positive except the first, which is strictly negative. Under-
damping and overdamping correspond toDk < 0 andDk > 0 respectively. Since inflation
occurs during a small York-time interval ∆T , where ∆T/|T |  1, one may approximate
T to be constant except for the T -dependence (entering via the scale factor) in the expo-
nential, which decreases during inflation by a factor e2Ne , Ne being the number of e-folds
given by equation 5.57. Because the exponential term changes by a factor N2e during the
course of inflation, a set of modes with k2 ranging over orders of magnitude given by this
factor pass from being underdamped to being overdamped. This is, of course, conditional
on the sign of ω2k not changing before the modes become overdamped. However, under
reasonable assumptions they do. That is, the sign of ω2k changes before a mode becomes
overdamped.
To see this last point, consider a mode with wave number k such that at some initial
York time Ti near the beginning of inflation ω2k(a(Ti), Ti) > 0 andDk(a(Ti), Ti) < 0. The
frequency changes from real to imaginary (ω2k = 0) roughly when crossing the Hubble
radius, k˜ =
√
2 ≈ 1, that is, after an interval ∆Tcross given by
e2κTi∆Tcross = 2/k˜2i , (7.25)
where k˜i refers to the value of k˜ corresponding to the mode k at time Ti. Here only the
leading-order change to the exponential has been considered, κT 2 ≈ κT 2i + 2κTi∆T ,
which is once again possible since ∆T/|T |  1. Explicitly,
∆Tcross = (2κTi)
−1 ln
(
2/k2i
)
. (7.26)
Meanwhile the mode passes from one damping regime to the other when Dk = 0, or
e2κTi∆TCD =
9κ2T 2i + 2κ+ T
−2
i
16M4Plκ
2k2/a2i
, (7.27)
which may be further approximated by dropping the second and third term in the numer-
ator if κ2T 2i dominates.
6The fact that physically the regimes are identified by k˜  1 and k˜  1 while mathematically the
critical value is
√
2 rather than 1 is of no significance provided we restrict analysis to modes sufficiently far
into the sub-Hubble or super-Hubble regime. Astrophysically speaking,
√
2 ≈ 1.
7The possibility of critical damping may be neglected since the coefficients are time dependent and
therefore no mode is critically damped for more than an instant.
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A numerical estimate for a given choice of inflaton potential makes this clear. For the
example considered in section 5.4 with the inflaton potential V (φ) = m2φ2, the empirical
estimate for H during inflation (from recent Planck data, [96]) of H . 3.6 × 10−5 (in
reduced Planck units) can be used to find an inequality (using equation 5.50) for the
kinetic-energy correction 5.51,
K.E. 10−9, (7.28)
from which in turn one can derive an inequality for the constant κ,
κ 108. (7.29)
This implies that the two expressions in the damping term β(T ) (equation 7.19) are of
roughly equal magnitude, while the term κ2T 2i does indeed dominate in equation 7.27.
One then has
∆TCD ≈ (2κTi)−1 ln
(
9/4k˜2i
)
, (7.30)
which is always strictly greater than ∆Tcross. Thus the frequency will change from real to
imaginary before the transition from underdamping to overdamping.
While it may be possible to construct conditions such that the above approximations
are not valid and for which this result would not hold, the result does hold under conditions
corresponding to inflation as it is presumed to occur in our actual universe. Hence the
freezing-out process occurs, mathematically speaking, as a result of the change of sign of
ω2k rather than a transition to overdamping.
This mathematical mechanism is fundamentally different from the mechanism in the
conformal-time description, namely the solution 7.15 applying to the super-Hubble regime
together with modes entering this regime during inflation. The physical evolution is, of
course, the same. The perspective on these processes from the York-time point of view, is
however new.
7.4 Re-entry of the Hubble radius in the radiation-
dominated universe
According to our best understanding of cosmic history inflation was followed by a period
of ‘reheating’ during which the inflaton field decayed into the known particles of the
standard model, although details of this process are uncertain. The energy density of the
universe became subsequently dominated by radiation and during this period the scale
factor behaved as a ∼ t 12 . The Hubble radius grew again as ∼ t, allowing modes to
‘re-enter’ and evolve after having previously been frozen. In this section we compare the
York-time and conformal-time descriptions of the ‘Hubble re-entry’ process of Fourier
modes of perturbations, much like we did for their ‘freezing out’ in the last section.
During the radiation-dominated era York time relates8 to cosmological time as T =
8Any explicit relationship between t and T can be modified by translation in t since the cosmological
equations in t are time-translation invariant. However, the York-time theory is not T -translation invariant
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−M2Pl/t, so that the scale factor behaves as
a(T ) = aPl
MPl
|T | 12 , (7.31)
where aPl is a proportionality constant formally referring to the scale factor at Planck
York-time, T = −M2Pl.
The physical Hubble radius H−1 (known as an explicit function of time since H =
−1
2
M−2Pl T ) may be compared with the evolution of the physical wavelength of a mode,
λphys(k) = aλ(k) = a0
(
t
t0
) 1
2
λ = a0
( |T0|
|T |
) 1
2
λ, (7.32)
where λ is the comoving wavelength and a0, t0 and T0 refer to the values of the corre-
sponding quantities at some reference time (usually today). The Hubble radius grows
faster than physical wavelengths and modes do indeed enter the Hubble radius during the
radiation-dominated era.
The equation of motion for this period takes the form
0 = y′′k +
1
2T
y′k +
M2Plk
2
a2Pl|T |3
yk. (7.33)
This can be solved exactly,
yk(T ) = c1 ·
√
|T |e−i
2MPl|k|
aPl
√
|T | + c2 · i
√
|T | aPl
4MPl|k|e
i
2MPl|k|
aPl
√
|T | , (7.34)
where c1 and c2 are arbitrary constants. The pre-factor of
√
T results from ‘absorbing’ a
factor of a into the variable y. The actual dynamical evolution is in the phases. A mode
becomes ‘unfrozen’ when its phase changes sufficiently rapidly. With d/dT [arg yk] ∼
|k||T |− 32 , once unfrozen the speed of evolution only increases as T → 0 from below.
Contrast this with the description in conformal time η. During the radiation-dominated
era it follows from a = a0
√
t/t0 that T = −M2Plt−1 and dt
√
t0/t = a0dη (so that
η = 2
√
tt0/a0 up to an additive constant). Hence the solutions 7.34 in terms of conformal
time are
yk(η) = c¯1 · η−1e−i
|k|
aPl
η
+ c¯2 · iη−1 aPl
4MPl|k|e
i
|k|
aPl
η
, (7.35)
where c¯1 and c¯2 are arbitrary coefficients (related to c1 and c2 respectively by a constant
factor). We see that the phase of each contribution is linear in η, so that the conformal
‘speed’ of evolution d
dη
(arg yk) is constant.
since T has a physical meaning and the equations are explicitly T -dependent. The relationship given here
therefore depends on the appropriate choice of time origin, namely that t = 0 corresponds to T = −∞.
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If the radiation-dominated period is taken to have begun at some point in time ηr =
2
√
trt0/a0 = 2M
2
Pl(a0
√|Tr||T0|)−1 when the scale factor had a value ar, then the condi-
tion k˜  1 for a mode to be super-Hubble may be expressed as
|k|  |T | 12 · piar|Tr| 12/M2Pl = |T |
1
2 · const. (7.36)
When the inequality becomes an approximate equality,
|k| ≈ |T | 12 · piar|Tr| 12/M2Pl, (7.37)
one expects the mode to evolve and indeed this is consistent with the solutions 7.34.
Once a mode k has become unfrozen (arg(yk) 6≈ 0), what are the time scales ∆ηk
and ∆Tk for its evolution? In terms of conformal time η the requirement for evolution to
occur is
|k|∆η ≈ a0ηr, (7.38)
while in terms of York time the condition 7.37 becomes ∆
√
T ≈ |k|M2Pl
ar
√
|Tr|
, or
∆Tk ≈ |T |
1− |k|2(
|k|+ arM−2Pl |Tr|
1
2 |T | 12
)2
 . (7.39)
In the short-wavelength limit (k → ∞), the York-time scale becomes small, ∆Tk → 0
and so evolution is fast, as expected. Similarly, for modes in the super-Hubble regime
(k → 0), which have not re-entered, one finds ∆Tk → |T |, that is, the York-time scale
approaches the full duration of the remaining history of the universe.
The description in this section and the last were not in terms of a reduced-Hamiltonian
formalism but through the transformation of the dynamical equations themselves from t
to T . This has allowed us to develop an intuition for the form of some of the mathematical
mechanisms that play a role in the York-time description. We started with the equations
of established conventional perturbation theory. In contrast, in the next chapter we be-
ing ‘from scratch’ with the ADM action applied to a perturbative regime and perform
the Hamiltonian reduction with respect to York time explicitly in order to arrive at the
fundamental equations of York-time cosmological perturbation theory.
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Chapter 8
Cosmological perturbation theory with
York time: Hamiltonian reduction
In this chapter we develop classical cosmological perturbation theory with York time
using a perturbative approach to Hamiltonian reduction. The contents of this chapter
formed part of ref. [103].
8.1 Principles of cosmological perturbation theory via
York-time Hamiltonian reduction
The developments in sections 7.3 and 7.4 gave us a ‘hand-on’ understanding of examples
of physical processes when viewed from the perspective of York time. This was achieved
by the transformation in the time parameter from cosmological time t to York time T
for a known background expansion a(t). In this section we finally develop the reduced-
Hamiltonian formalism for cosmological perturbation theory. The insights we gained in
section 7.2 about the non-canonical Poisson structure will be useful. In section 10.2 we
quantise the theory developed here.
Hamiltonian reduction applied to perturbation theory differs from the reductions car-
ried out for minisuperspace models (sections 5.3, 7.2) in a number of ways: First, vari-
ables have a spatial dependence (they are field variables and not homogeneous), so that
the momentum conjugate to T gives a physical Hamiltonian density, while the physical
Hamiltonian itself is recovered by integration over all space. Second, the Hamiltonian
density is derived perturbatively and therefore not exact. Third, the foliation is fixed at
the level of the background but not initially at the level of perturbations. So a gauge choice
has to be made. For reasons we will discuss, the choice that implements York time exactly
at the perturbative level (rather than only approximately) is not only theoretically the most
desirable but also algebraically advantageous. However, in principle other choices exist.
Quantising the theory developed here does not give a true theory of quantum gravity,
which would have to be non-perturbative. Analogous to the question that arose in the case
of the quantisation of cosmologies, a caveat of the perturbative approach of this section is
that it is not obvious that the quantisation of the perturbatively developed classical theory
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is physically equivalent to a perturbative limit of the full quantum theory. In much of
the literature on quantised perturbations (irrespective of any York-time reference) this is
tacitly assumed. However, in the absence of a complete theory of quantum gravity, all
such work is contingent on that final theory being compatible in this way. Fortunately we
know that the observed universe is well described in terms of a homogeneous isotropic
‘background’ together with perturbations described by linearised field equations. While
the reduced Hamiltonian at which we arrive is not fundamental and the quantised theory
does not constitute a fundamental theory of quantum gravity, the theory’s experimental
predictions may nonetheless be compared to the observed universe. Whether corroborated
or falsified, the result would narrow the search for the fundamental theory.
This chapter is without doubt the one heaviest on algebraic developments. For better
readability some of the details have been banned into ‘sidebars’ (boxes) and the reader is
welcome to skip them on a first reading.
The method we employ here in order to derive the cosmological York-time perturba-
tion theory is as follows. One first splits the geometric and matter variables and momenta
appearing in the Hamiltonian constraint into homogeneous isotropic background variables
and perturbations. For matter content we choose a set of scalar fields φa for simplicity.
One can then solve the Hamiltonian constraint to zeroth order and derive a Hamiltonian
for the background dynamics, essentially the result found in chapter 5. The zeroth-order
equations of motion may then be solved and one substitutes their solutions as functions
of York time back into the Hamiltonian constraint, which one can then solve to second
order in the perturbation variables in order to arrive at a reduced Hamiltonian that is also
second order in those variables. Note that first-order quantities in general vanish if the
background equations of motion are satisfied, so that the Hamiltonian describing the per-
turbations is second order only and therefore gives linear equations of motion.
Before we can write down the perturbative expansion of the dynamical variables and
the resulting Poisson structure explicitly, the matter of foliation-related gauge freedom
must be addressed. The issue is well known from conventional cosmological perturbation
theory [87, 88]: writing down some perturbative expansion of the three-metric and matter
fields does not by itself separate truly physical perturbations from apparent perturbations
due to the choice of coordinate system. Furthermore, small adjustments in the coordinate
system (the ‘gauge choice’) allow one to move the physical content of the perturbation
expansion between the different variables. Ultimately one is interested in the two phys-
ical degrees of freedom, manifest in gauge-independent quantities such as the Bardeen
variables [14].
When performing perturbation theory with York time the situation is similar, although
the gauge freedom is limited to three-diffeomorphisms on the spatial slice since the folia-
tion itself is fixed if exact York slicing is chosen. It is possible to make a different choice
of foliation (at the perturbative level) while still using York time as the time parameter
and performing the Hamiltonian reduction. In the case of a homogeneous isotropic back-
ground the zeroth-order (background) foliation is exactly that of the standard Friedmann
description, although the slices are differently parameterised, and one has the full gauge
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freedom of standard cosmological perturbation theory available. There is no bar to devel-
oping perturbation theory in this framework.1
However, it turns out that in this case the resulting expressions occurring in the dy-
namical equations, for example, are algebraically considerably more complicated. The
primary reason for this is that the partial2 gauge choice of what we will call the ‘York
gauge’ — implementing the York slicing on the perturbative as well as the background
level — imposes conditions that ensure that the determinant of the metric g ≡ det(gab)
and the trace of the conjugate momentum pi ≡ Tr(piab) remain unperturbed, or equiva-
lently that the linear change in the metric δgab and in the momentum δpiab are both trace-
less at first order. A change in these quantities would correspond to a shift in York time
T , perturbing the foliation. These conditions eliminate a large number of terms in various
stages of the perturbative expansion. Furthermore, the terms through which scalar fields
couple to the geometry are exactly those proportional to perturbations of the volume ele-
ment
√
g, so that the York gauge not only simplifies the algebra but also decouples matter
and geometry, at least to leading order. The York gauge is also the ‘correct’ gauge to use
if York time really is considered the physical time parameter.
Working in the York gauge from the beginning, we perturbatively expand the reduced
variables g˜ab, p˜iab only (rather than the original canonical variables gab, piab), and the
variables describing the scalar field. Throughout this chapter we denote zeroth-order
(background) terms by an overbar. We define the perturbation variables hab(x), νab(x) in
terms of the reduced variables g˜ab and p˜iab (see section 4.3 ) as
g˜ab ≡ γab + hab, , (8.1)
p˜iab ≡ ˜¯piab + νab = νab, (8.2)
where γab is the scale-free metric of the background (in the case of a flat universe this is
just the identity) and the last equality holds because the scale-free part of the background
does not evolve, so its conjugate momentum ˜¯piab vanishes. That is, the reduced momentum
is perturbation only. The associated Poisson brackets to first order are
{hab(x), νcd(y)} =
[
δ(ca δ
d)
b − 13γabγcd + 13γcdhab
− 1
3
γabh
cd + h.o.
]
δ3(x− y), (8.3)
{νab(x), νcd(y)} = 1
3
[
γcdνab − γabνcd] δ3(x− y). (8.4)
Indices of hab and νab are raised and lowered by γbc and γbc respectively and ‘h.o.’ stands
for higher-order terms. These equations are derived from the general Poisson brackets
4.28, 4.29 and we used the fact that the expansion of the inverse metric is (to first order)
g˜ab = γab−hab, with the scale-free inverse background metric γab defined via δca = γabγbc.
1The findings of sections 7.3 and 7.4 correspond to a description in terms of York time without choosing
the exact constant-mean-curvature slicing, although in the case of tensor perturbations exactness of slicing
was recovered in virtue of the perturbation type.
2Freedom to choose coordinates on each slice, that is, to perform a spatial three-diffeomorphism, re-
mains. Only the foliation itself is fixed
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By construction the physical Hamiltonian obtained in the reduction is quadratic be-
cause the perturbation expansion is to second order, although the terms contain time-
dependent coefficients determined by the solution of the background dynamics. Later on
both background and perturbations will be quantised. In order to obtain trajectories for the
background dynamics, that is, functions of time which will constitute the coefficients of
the perturbation terms, we employ the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave formulation of quan-
tum mechanics [34, 18, 59], where such trajectories are part of the fundamental ontology.
De Broglie-Bohm trajectories have previously been used as a mathematical tool in cos-
mological perturbation theory in [94, 95], although with conventional cosmological time
rather than York time. The fact that the Hamiltonian is a sum of quadratic terms means
that the quantisation procedure is straightforward (there are no ‘square-root’ operators at
the perturbative level) once a representation of the commutator algebra derived from the
non-canonical Poisson structure is found. The time-dependent coefficients do however
make finding solutions to the quantum dynamics more difficult.
The fact that the variables are not canonical does not hinder quantisation, as will
become clear in the following chapters. However, the fact that the momentum-momentum
bracket does not vanish implies that the quantum theory cannot possess a momentum but
only a position representation, a matter we discuss in section 10.1 below. The fact that the
quantum theory has a preferred basis, the position representation, may be taken to provide
hints for answering foundational questions in quantum theory. For example, formulations
in which the position representation has a special status, such as the de Broglie-Bohm
formulation, would not have to explain why the position representation should be taken
as fundamental.
8.2 The perturbative Hamiltonian constraint
As in the case of minisuperspace models, we begin with the ADM action for general
relativity (see section 2.3 and ref. [4]) minimally coupled to a set of scalar fields φA with
momenta pφA ,
3
S =
∫
dt d3x
[
g˙abpi
ab + φ˙ApφA −NiH i −NH
]
, (8.5)
where
H = −M2Pl
√
gR +
1
M2Pl
√
g
(gacgbd − 12gabgcd)piabpicd
+
1
2
√
g
p2φ +
√
g
2
gabφA,aφA,b +
√
gV (φ), (8.6)
H a = −2∇bpiab + pφAgab∂bφA (8.7)
3The choice to consider multiple scalar field rather than just one is not of further importance. The
zeroth-order terms found correspond to a mild generalisation of the minisuperspace model of chapter 5,
where we looked at a single scalar field.
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constitute the Hamiltonian and momentum constraints respectively for this choice of mat-
ter content. Summation over repeated field indices (A, etc.) is assumed. As before R
denotes the scalar three-curvature of space, MPl the Planck mass, p2φ =
∑
A pφA
2 and
V (φ) is a currently arbitrary potential of the scalar fields φ = {φ1, φ2, . . . }. We suppress
the spatial and temporal arguments of the field quantities where they are unambiguous in
order to avoid notational clutter.
The goal is to solve the Hamiltonian constraint,H = 0, for PT = −√g, the momen-
tum conjugate to the York time parameter T ≡ 2pi
3
√
g
. One therefore performs the change
of variables {gab, piab} → {g˜ab, p˜iab, T, PT} (see chapter 3). In the perturbative case con-
sidered here we instead make the change {gab, piab} → {hab, νab, T, PT} with hab and νab
defined by eqs. 8.1 and 8.2 respectively. The fields are expanded as
φA = φ¯A + δφA, pφA = p¯φA + δpφA . (8.8)
We keep terms up to second order in the geometric and matter perturbation variables.
While not difficult, this leads to some lengthy expressions.
The scaling of the matter terms in 8.6 is straightforward since their only scale-dependence
is in the prefactor g
1
2 ∼ PT or g− 12 ∼ P−1T . The curvature terms obtained in the expansion
of R are homogeneous in their scale dependence, R ∼ g− 13 ∼ P−
2
3
T and only the momen-
tum terms are inhomogeneous in their T, PT -dependence. The latter fact follows from the
expression obtained when writing piab in terms of p˜iab,
piab = g−
1
3 p˜iab + 1
3
pig−
1
3 g˜ab
= H−
2
3
T ν
ab + 1
3
(
3
2
THT
) · H− 23T (γab − γacγbdhcd + γacγdeγfbhcdhef) , (8.9)
the last equality holding to second order. The Hamiltonian constraint equation becomes
the equation determining HT ,
0 = HT
(
− 3
8M2Pl
· T 2 + [‘V ’]
)
+H
1
3
T
(
[‘R’] + [‘∇φ’]
)
+M−2Pl Thabν
ab
+H−1T
(
M−2Pl γacγbdν
abνcd + [‘pφ’]
)
, (8.10)
where we have introduced the shorthand [‘X’] to denote the terms in the perturbative
expansion after factoring out the scale dependence which are derived from the term con-
taining X in the Hamiltonian constraint 8.6. With the York gauge applied these are given
by
[‘R’] = −M2Pl ˜¯R−M2Plδ˜R
(1) −M2Plδ˜R
(2)
(8.11)
[‘pφ’] = 12 p¯
2
φ + p¯φAδpφA + δp
2
φ. (8.12)
[‘∇φ’] = 1
2
γijδφA,iδφA,j (8.13)
[‘V ’] = V (φ¯) + δφA
∂V
∂φA
∣∣∣∣
φ¯
+ 1
2
δφAδφB
∂2V
∂φA∂φB
∣∣∣∣
φ¯
. (8.14)
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For the algebraic details of the expansion as well as the form of the first and second-order
curvature-perturbation terms δ˜R
(1)
, δ˜R
(2)
, see the box below. Throughout this chapter
we use superscripts ‘(n)’ to denote the nth-order contribution to the preceding quantity.
At this point we have retained the first-order terms, although these will cancel when the
background equations of motion are satisfied. This is a general result following from the
fact that the equations are derivable via an extremisation principle.
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Expansion of relevant terms up to second order
Prior to application of the York gauge (that is, if York time is only implemented at the
background level and one retains the full gauge freedom of standard perturbation theory),
expressions 8.11-8.14 are
[‘R’] = − 1
2κ
(
˜¯R+ δ˜R
(1)
+ η(1) ˜¯R+ δ˜R
(2)
+ η(1)δ˜R
(1)
+ η(2) ˜¯R
)
[‘∇φ’] = 1
2
γijδφA,iδφA,j
[‘pφ’] =
1
2
(
p¯2φA − η(1)p¯2φA + 2p¯φAδpφA
+
(− η(2) + (η(1))2)p¯2φA − 2η(1)p¯φAδpφA + δpφA2)
[‘V ’] = V (φ¯) + η(1)V (φ¯) + δφA
∂V
∂φA
∣∣∣∣
φ¯
+ η(2)V (φ¯) + η(1)δφA
∂V
∂φA
∣∣∣∣
φ¯
+
1
2
δφAδφB
∂2V
∂φA∂φB
∣∣∣∣
φ¯
,
where
η(1) = 12habγ
ab
η(2) = 18(habγ
ab)2 − 14hachbdγabγcd
are the first and second order fractional perturbation in the metric. In the York gauge these are
set to zero. Note that the expansions of [‘pφ’] and [‘V ’] contain mixed terms, which would
lead to a coupling between matter and geometric perturbation in the linearised equations of
motion. However, in the York gauge the perturbation is set to zero, eliminating exactly those
terms.
The expressions for the perturbative expansion of R˜ are
˜¯R = g¯
1
3 R¯ = g¯
1
3 g¯ijR¯ij = γ
ijRij ,
δ˜R
(1)
= g¯
1
3 δR(1) = g¯
1
3 δ(gijRij)
(1) = γijδR
(1)
ij + (−γikhklγlj)R¯ij ,
δ˜R
(2)
= g¯
1
3 δR(2) = g¯
1
3 δ(gijRij)
(2)
= γijδR
(2)
ij + (−γikhklγlj)δR(1)ij + (−γikhklγlmhmnγnj)R¯ij .
with
δR
(1)
ij = ∂kδΓ
(1)k
ij − ∂iδΓ(1)kjk
δR
(2)
ij = ∂kδΓ
(2)k
ij − ∂iδΓ(2)kjk + δΓ(1)kij δΓ(1)lkl − δΓ(1)kil δΓ(1)ljk ,
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where
δΓ(1)qrs =
1
2γ
qt(htr,s + hts,r − hrs,t)
δΓ(2)qrs = −γquhuvδΓ(1)vrs
denote the perturbation in the Levi-Civita connection.
8.3 The physical Hamiltonian and the equations of mo-
tion
After multiplication by HT eq. 8.10 is a sextic equation in H
1
3
T , which in general cannot
be solved analytically. As previously anticipated, the procedure now is to first solve this
equation at zeroth order and use the solution as the basis for solving it up to second order
perturbatively. At each order only a new linear equation has to be solved. Since the
background is homogeneous the zeroth-order terms4 have no spatial dependence and the
equation is a simple polynomial,
0 =
(
− 3
8M2Pl
· T 2 + V (φ¯)
)
H
(0)2
T −M2Pl ˜¯RH
(0) 4
3
T +
1
2
p2φ. (8.15)
Since the H 0 term in 8.10 was second order only, the zeroth-order equation does not
have a corresponding term and therefore after multiplication by H(0)−2T takes the form of
a depressed cubic in u ≡ H(0)−
2
3
T , which has solutions
u = (A+
√
A2 − C3) 13 + (A+
√
A2 − C3) 13 , (8.16)
with
A =
1
p2φ
(
3
8M2Pl
· T 2 − V (φ¯)
)
, C =
1
6p2φ
M2Pl
˜¯R. (8.17)
These are, of course, exactly the solutions found in chapter 5, generalised to more than
a single scalar field. For the purposes of our model we now make the assumption that
the universe is flat at zeroth order, just as we did before. Again this choice is motivated
by the two facts that (1) the algebra in what follows is significantly less convoluted, even
at the level of the background and that (2) observation suggests that the universe is flat
on sufficiently large scales within experimental uncertainty. Having chosen the global
geometry of the background we can also fix the background frame of reference, making
the obvious (inertial) choice γab = diag(1, 1, 1). However, for the most part we will retain
reference to γab explicitly.
With the assumption of flatness one has ˜¯R = 0 and the background equation 8.15 is
trivially solved,
H
(0)
T = ±
[
1
2
p¯2φ
3
8M2Pl
· T 2 − V (φ¯)
] 1
2
. (8.18)
4At zeroth order (the background) the universe is homogeneous, so that the Hamiltonian itself is just
equal to the Hamiltonian density (up to a constant multiplicative factor). Hence we write H(0)T rather than
H(0)T , consistent with the notation in chapter 5.
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The ambiguous sign has no physical effect. Recall that a change in the choice of the
sign in 8.18 leads to the same set of physical trajectories with the exception that the sign
of corresponding momenta are swapped (see chapter 5). That is, the set of solutions
of the dynamical equations obtained from the Hamiltonian density HT in 8.18 with a
positive sign is related to the set of solutions of HT with a negative sign via a reflection
in phase space. The physical interpretation of the numeric value of the Hamiltonian is
that of volume (since HT =
√
g, see chapter 3), which suggests that HT ≥ 0 is the more
physically meaningful choice, and indeed we will adopt this convention here too.
For a single scalar field, the dynamics of this spatially constant Hamiltonian density
was discussed in chapter 5, where integration over a conformal normalisation volume
was assumed. The details depend on the choice of V (φ). Note that there are no remaining
geometric degrees of freedom at the background level since the scale variable g and its
conjugate momentum pi have been eliminated in favour of T and PT = −HT . In the case
of a set of free fields the momenta pφA are constant and the fields simply evolve according
to the Hamiltonian density 8.18 for V = 0, leading to
φ′A =
pφA√
3
4M2Pl
· p2φT 2
, (8.19)
so that, for an expanding universe (T < 0),
φA(T ) =
pφA√
3
4M2Pl
· p2φ
ln |T |. (8.20)
The volume of the universe is the numerical value of the background Hamiltonian density
obtained by substituting the solution back into expression 8.18, up to a constant deter-
mined by the coordinate volume chosen for normalisation in the case of a flat universe as
discussed above (the volume is well-defined without normalisation for a closed universe,
though here the Hamiltonian takes a more complicated form).
For general V (φ) one obtains solutions (φA(T ), pφA(T )) by an appropriate method of
solving Hamilton’s equation for the Hamiltonian obtained after integrating H(0)T over a
(comoving) normalisation volume. Assuming Hamilton’s equations for the background
to be satisfied one can show that the first-order terms in eq. 8.15 (note that these are matter
terms only) cancel out.
With H(0)T found, one can substitute the result back into eq. 8.10 and proceed to first
order. This is trivially [H
1
3
T ]
(1) = 0 since there are no first-order terms. The second order
equation may be solved to yield the [H
1
3
T ]
(2) from which one then obtains the second-order
contribution to the Hamiltonian density,
H(2)T (x) = F (T ) ·
[
M−2Pl γikγjlν
ijνkl +H
(0)
T ·M−2Pl Thijνij
−H(0)
4
3
T ·M2Plδ˜R
(2)
(hab) +
1
2
δp2φ −H(0)
4
3
T · 12γijδφA,iδφA,j
+H
(0)2
T · 12δφAδφB
∂2V
∂φA∂φB
∣∣∣∣
φ¯
]
(8.21)
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where
F (T ) ≡ H(0)−1T ·
[
3
4
·M−2Pl T 2 − 2V (φ¯)
]−1
=
[
2(3
8
·M−2Pl T 2 − V (φ¯))p¯2φA
]− 1
2 . (8.22)
The details of this procedure are spelled out in the box on the perturbative approach to
solving the Hamiltonian constraint to second order. The Hamiltonian determining the
perturbative dynamics is
Hpert =
∫
V
dvol HT (x), (8.23)
where V is the chosen normalisation coordinate volume. (Hence a change in the choice of
coordinates on the slice at this stage would imply a change in the limits, leaving value of
the Hamiltonian overall unchanged. However, having chosen some coordinates initially
one now has that dvol= 1 · d3x since the notion of scale has been extracted during the
Hamiltonian reduction.)
Perturbative approach to solving the Hamiltonian constraint to second order
Writing x ≡ H
1
3
T , eq. 8.10, after multiplication byHT = x3, has the form
0 = ax6 + bx4 + cx3 + d, (8.A)
where, separating different orders visually,
a =− 3
8M2Pl
· T 2 + V (φ¯) + δφA ∂V
∂φA
∣∣∣∣
φ¯
+ 12δφAδφB
∂2V
∂φA∂φB
∣∣∣∣
φ¯
b = −M2Plδ˜R
(1) −M2Plδ˜R
(2)
+ 12γ
abδφA,aδφA,b
c = M−2Pl Thabν
ab
d = 12 p¯
2
φA
+ p¯φAδpφA + δpφA
2 +M−2Pl γacγbdν
abνcd.
Here we assumed a spatially flat background, so that ˜¯R = 0. As in the text we let a(0) denote
the zeroth order term of a and so on. Similarly, we expand the sought function order by order,
x = x(0) + x(1) + x(2).
One first solves the zeroth-order equation,
0 = a(0)x(0)6 + d(0),
so that
x(0)6 = −d
(0)
a(0)
=
1
2 p¯
2
φ
3
8M2Pl
· T 2 − V (φ¯) , (8.B)
consistent with the result in chapter 5. The first order equation is trivial since a(1), b(1) and
d(1) vanish when the background equations are satisfied, hence x(1) = 0. Then the second-
order equation is
0 = a(2)x(0)6 + 6a(0)x(0)5x(2) + b(2)x(0)4 + c(2)x(0)3 + d(2),
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an equation linear in x(2), giving after substitution of the coefficients and the background
solution 8.B,
x(2) =
[
1
2
δφAδφB
∂2V
∂φA∂φB
∣∣∣∣
φ¯
x60 −
(
M2Plδ˜R
(2)
+
1
2
γijδφA,iδφA,j
)
x40
+M−2Pl Thijν
ijx30 + δpφA
2 +M−2Pl γikγjlν
ijνkl
][(
3
8M2Pl
T 2 − V (φ¯)
)
x50
]−1
.
The Hamiltonian density at second order is then
HT = (x(0) + x(2))3 = x(0)3 + 3x(0)2x(2). (8.C)
From the perturbation Hamiltonian one can obtain the equations of motion,
∂hab
∂T
= {hab(x), Hpert}
= F (T )
[
2 ·M−2Pl νab +H(0)T ·M−2Pl Thab
]
, (8.24)
∂νab
∂T
= {νab(x), Hpert}
= F (T )
[
−H(0)T ·M−2Pl Tνab − 2H
(0) 4
3
T ·M2Pl
(
δ(ab)(cd) − 1
3
γabγcd
)
γijhic,jd
]
(8.25)
where δ(ab)(cd) ≡ δ(amδb)n γmcγnd. The term in the last line is derived from the perturbation of
the scale-free curvature, ∂δ˜R
(2)
/∂hij , and is discussed in the box discussing the expansion
of curvature terms at the end of this section.
Since the Hamiltonian density contains only second-order terms, only zeroth-order
contributions to the Poisson brackets 8.3, 8.4 contribute to first-order terms in equations
8.24, 8.25. That is, the momentum-momentum Poisson bracket 8.4 is effectively canon-
ical, while the position-momentum bracket remains non-canonical due to the ‘−1
3
γabγ
cd
term. For the purposes of first-order perturbation theory the relevant Poisson structure is
therefore determined by the background only.
It is easy to confirm using eqs. 8.24, 8.25 that the tracelessness of hab and νab is in-
deed conserved as contraction of eqs. 8.24 and 8.25 with γab and γab respectively reveals.
Therefore the constraints γabhab = 0 and γabνab = 0 are first class.
The equations for the scalar fields are
∂δφA
∂T
(x) = {δφA(x), Hpert} = F (T ) · δpφA(x) (8.26)
∂δpφA
∂T
(x) = {δpφA(x), Hpert}
= −F (T )
[
H
(0) 4
3
T
∫
d3y γij∂i
(
δ3(x− y)∂jδφA(y)
)
+H
(0)2
T
∂2V
∂φA∂φC
δφC(x)
]
(8.27)
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It is a noteworthy feature that these equations have decoupled from the geometric degrees
of freedom. This is a particular feature of the York gauge since matter-field perturbations
would otherwise couple with perturbations in the local scale, that is, the metric determi-
nant. In the box at the end of the last section we discussed what the matter-geometry
mixed terms are and how they are eliminated by the York gauge. This result does not
generalise to any form of matter, however. In particular, tensor fields coupling to the
metric would lead to mixed terms not eliminated by the choice of gauge and therefore a
geometric-matter interaction even at the linear level.
By construction equations 8.24 and 8.25 (as well as 8.26 and 8.27) are linear and
therefore may be Fourier analysed. The behaviour of the solutions strongly depends on
that of the time-dependent factors F (T ) and HT (T ), which is in turn dependent on the
choice of potential V (φ). For an analysis of the behaviour of the background, in particular
at late times T → 0− and for candidates of inflationary potentials, see our discussion in
chapter 6. If we consider a free field, explicit functions of time for F (T ) and H(0)T (T )
can easily be written down since pφA(T ) = pφA(T0) is constant and fixed by the boundary
conditions at some time T0:
F (T ) =
√
4
3
M2Pl|T |−1, (8.28)
H
(0)
T (T ) =
√
4
3
M2Plp
2
φ(T0)|T |−1 =
√
p2φ(T0) · F (T ). (8.29)
For the Fourier analysis we first expand the perturbation variables,
hab(x) =
∫
d3k ξ(k)abe
ik·x, νab(x) =
∫
d3k µab(k)eik·x. (8.30)
Eq. 8.24 defines the relationship between h′ab and the momenta ν
cd and, after acting with∫
d3x e−il·x on both sides, yields
ξ′ab(k) = F (T ) ·M−2Pl
[
2γacγbdµ
cd(k) +H
(0)
T Tξab(k)
]
(8.31)
and is independent of the chosen mode. Eq. 8.25 contains the actual dynamics and leads
to k-dependent terms,
µab′(k) = F (T )
[
−H(0)T ·M−2Pl Tµab(k)
+ 2H
(0) 4
3
T M
2
Pl
(
δ(ab)(cd) − 1
3
γabγcd
)
γijξickjkd
]
, (8.32)
Terms relating to perturbations in the curvature
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Derivation of the classical equations of motion involves the term
{νab(y),
∫
d3x δ˜R
(2)
(x)} =
∫
d3x {νab(y), δ˜R(x)}
=
∫
d3x {νab(y), hcd(x)} ∂δ˜R
(2)
∂hcd
. (8.D)
For the flat background assumed in the text and expressed in a frame with Cartesian coordi-
nates, one has
δ˜R
(2)
= γijδRij + (−γikhklγlj)δR(1)ij
= γij
(
∂kδΓ
(2)k
ij − ∂iδΓ(2)kjk + δΓ(1)kij δΓ(1)lkl − δΓ(1)kil δΓ(1)ljk
)
− γikhklγlj
(
∂kδΓ
(1)k
ij − ∂iδΓ(1)kjk
)
.
Since δ˜R
(2)
is first order, the Poisson bracket only contributes at zeroth order and is there-
fore spatially constant and may be taken outside the integral. The remaining term is then,
abbreviating δ(3) ≡ δ(3)(x− y),
∫
d3x δ(3)
∂δ˜R
(2)
∂hcd
(y)
=
∫
d3y
[
τ
(1)k.cd
ij.k [δ
(3)]γij − τ onek.cdjk.i [δ(3)]γij + σ(0)k.cdij [δ(3)δΓ(1)lkl ]
+ σ
(0)l.cd
kl [δ
(3)δΓ
(1)k
ij ]− σ(0)k.cdil [δ(3)δΓ(1)ljk ]γij
− σ(0)l.cdjk [δ(3)δΓ(1)kil ]γij − γimδcdmnγnj(∂kδΓ(1)kij − ∂iδΓ(1)kjk )
− τ (0)k.cdij.k [δ(3)hij ] + τ (0)k.cdjk.i [δ(3)hij ]
]
(8.E)
with
σ(0)q.abrs [f ] = −12γqt(δabtr ∂s + δabts ∂r − δabrs∂t)f
σ(1)q.abrs [f ] = −γq(aδΓ(1)v)rs · f + 12γvtγqu(δabtr ∂s + δabts ∂r − δabrs∂t)(huvf)
τ
(0)q.ab
rs.i [f ] =
1
2γ
qt(δabtr ∂i∂s + δ
ab
ts ∂i∂r − δabrs∂i∂t)f
τ
(1)q.ab
rs.i [f ] = δ
ab
uvγ
qu∂i(δΓ
(1)v
rs f)− 12δabuvγquγvt(htr,si + hts,ri − hrs,ti) · f
+ 12γ
quγvt(δabtr ∂i∂s + δ
ab
ts ∂i∂r − δabrs∂i∂t)(huvf),
defined as ∫
d3x σ(0)q.abrs [f ] =
∫
d3x
∂Γ
(1)q
rs
∂hab
f∫
d3x σ(1)q.abrs [f ] =
∫
d3x
∂Γ
(2)q
rs
∂hab
f∫
d3x τ
(0)q.ab
rs.i [f ] =
∫
d3x
∂
∂hab
[
∂iΓ
(1)q
rs
]
f∫
d3x τ (1)q.abrs [f ] =
∫
d3x
∂
∂hab
[
∂iΓ
(2)q
rs
]
f,
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where f is any appropriate functions of the spatial coordinates. The mismatch of notational
superscripts (n) was chosen in order to remain consistent with their role of identifying the
order of perturbation, which is reduced by one as a result of the differentiation with respect
to hab.
Expression 8.E contains a number of total derivatives as well as a significant degree of
symmetry and evaluates to the simpler expression
∫
d3x δ(3)
∂δ˜R
(2)
∂hcd
(y) = −2δ(cd)(kt)γijhit,jk
after all boundary terms have been dropped, which follows from assuming appropriate bound-
ary conditions, and the constraint γijhij(x) = 0 has been used.
8.4 Analysis of the dynamics
The dynamics of the perturbations is now completely defined. However, it is useful to
develop an idea about some of the mechanisms that follow from this set of equations.
Equations 8.31 and 8.32 were derived as part of a framework that described the full dy-
namics of the universe: both background and perturbations. But carefully considering
the steps carried out above makes clear that the equations for ξab and µab are independent
of the specifics of the background, so that any background evolution may be chosen and
substituted into the expressions for H(0)T (T ) and F (T ). Hence it is possible, for example,
to describe perturbations for an inflationary scenario, whose background was developed
in section 5.4. There one would use (with all symbols defined as above)
H
(0)
T infl(T ) = a
−3
0 e
3
2
κT 2 (8.33)
Finfl(T ) = a
−3
0 e
3
2
κT 2 ·
[
3
4M2Pl
T 2 − 2m2φ0(1− 0 + µT )
]−1
(8.34)
for the inflaton potential V (φ) = m2φ2.
Here we are interested in some more general features of the dynamics defined by
equations 8.31 and 8.32. In particular, for each of the equations there are two regimes
corresponding to the dominance of one of the two terms inside the respective square
parentheses. Consider equation 8.31 in the regime where
H
(0)
T Tξab(k) 2µab(k). (8.35)
Indices are raised an lowered using γij and its inverse. This regime could correspond to
a very large universe (large volume H(0)T ) at a sufficiently early time, for example, or an
appropriately sized mode function ξab(k) versus the corresponding ‘momentum mode’
µab(k) for some given mode with wave number k. In this regime the equation becomes
independent of µab,
ξ′ab = M
−2
Pl F (T )H
(0)
T T · ξab, (8.36)
which is readily solved by
ξab(T ) = ξab(T1)e
M−2Pl
∫
dTF (T )H
(0)
T T , (8.37)
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where T1 is some reference time. Each mode just evolves as a function of time depending
on the background and, crucially, the details are independent of the wave number of the
modes, so that the overall shape of the perturbation (given by hab) is unchanged. There
is no genuine evolution, corresponding to frozen modes. During an inflationary scenario,
for example, H(0)T grows dramatically while T itself does not change significantly, so that
a large number of modes (modes with a large spread of ratios ξab(k)/µab(k)) enter this
regime and freeze out.
In the opposite regime,
H
(0)
T Tξab(k) 2µab(k), (8.38)
the resulting equation
ξ′ab(k) = 2F (T ) ·M−2Pl γacγbdµcd(k) (8.39)
has essentially the usual form ‘velocity ∝ momentum’, up to an overall time-dependent
scaling factor that depends on the background. This equation implies that the dynamics
are not frozen out (µab = 0 would contradict the assumption about the regime) and there-
fore corresponds to genuine evolution. Just like in the case of a particle system where
the corresponding equation is ‘x˙ = p/m’ the real content of the dynamics is found in the
equation describing the evolution of the momentum.
The regimes for the equation 8.32 describing the ‘momentum modes’ are not identical
to the regimes of equation 8.31 but instead correspond to long and short wavelengths
(small and large |k| respectively). In the long wavelength regime one has
|T |µab(k)M4Pl2H(0)
1
3
T
(
δ(ab)(cd) − 1
3
γabγcd
)
γijξickjkd, (8.40)
which means that the equation 8.32 has the approximate form
µab′(k) = M−2Pl F (T )H
(0)
T |T | · µab (8.41)
and therefore solutions (in an expanding universe, where T < 0)
µab(T ) = µab(T1)e
−M−2Pl
∫
dTF (T )H
(0)
T T , (8.42)
that is, all long-wavelength momentum modes scale alike (independent of the exact value
of k) as a function of time whose form is dependent on the background only and which
furthermore matches the (inverse of the) time evolution of the frozen ξab modes. In other
words, in the long-wavelength regime the momentum modes do not experience real evo-
lution.
On the other hand, for short wavelengths (large |k|) the second term dominates and
the equation approximates to
µab′(k) = F (T )H
(0) 4
3
T M
2
Pl
(
ξajkJk
b + ξbjkjk
a − 2
3
γabξijkikj
)
, (8.43)
which corresponds to genuine evolution since there is linear dependence on the variable
ξab. This is furthermore an indication that one could describe the system once again in
terms of a damped harmonic oscillator with time dependent terms (compare section 7.3).
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The system described by these equations is complicated and a full analysis likely
requires numerical tools. We will not explore the classical dynamics further here. Instead,
in the next part of this thesis we proceed with the development of the quantum theory
derived by canonical quantisation of the theory developed here.
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Part III
Canonical quantum cosmology with
York time
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Chapter 9
Quantum Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre
cosmology
In this chapter we canonically quantise the cosmological minisuperspace model devel-
oped in chapter 5. We discuss some of the features of quantum theories derived via canon-
ical quantisation from York-time Hamiltonian-reduced classical theories in the context of
this model. The contents of this chapter were published as part of ref. [106].
9.1 Quantum theory of the free scalar field
Whether or not the application of the quantisation recipe to gravity leads to a viable theory
of quantum gravity remains to be seen. However, our theory of gravity obtained via
Hamiltonian reduction from the ADM formalism does not suffer from the problem of time
and so canonical quantisation is at least possible. A fundamentally different quantisation
procedure will be proposed in chapter 11 and applied to cosmology in chapter 12.
Ultimately empirical data must determine the correct form of quantum gravity. With
such measurements however unavailable at the time of writing and, arguably, in the fore-
seeable future, theoretical motivations may be considered. The application of canonical
quantisation to the metric field is motivated by the success of its application to matter
fields, specifically the fields of the Standard Model. Canonical quantisation of gravity is
therefore plausible if the gravitational field is sufficiently ‘matter-field-like’. In the aside
on proper time in section 4.2 we touched on some arguments suggesting that gravity ought
to be considered a dynamical field like matter fields and that it is special only in that it
has dynamics which allows for a geometric representation. Specifically, it couples to all
other fields in a specific way, namely via so-called minimal coupling. In this picture the
geometric aspect is however not fundamental. If, on the other hand, the converse is true
and the gravitational field tensor gab (or (4)gµν) really is just a mathematical representa-
tion of actual spatial (or spatio-temporal) geometry, then treating it like a matter field with
regards to quantisation is ad hoc.1
1This is one example where philosophical reasoning and the details of one’s realist stance are tied to
how one proceeds mathematically.
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Conversely, the success of different treatments of gravity with regards to quantisation
may give an indication of which ‘view’ is correct. This requires the pursuit of all lines of
enquiry. Quantising the 3-metric field (with a particular, theoretically motivated choice
of foliation) is one such line. The simple minisuperspace model considered here is a first
step along that line, although it does, of course, have direct physical application given the
observed approximate homogeneity and isotropy of our universe.
To begin, we wish to construct a quantum theory using the classical theory developed
in chapter 5 as a starting point. For illustrative purposes, we first consider the free theory
(with V (φ) = 0). In the free theory the sign of the momentum is unchanging, so that
classically we may replace |pφ| → pφ,2 up to a sign (though recall that the sign of the
Hamiltonian is arbitrary anyway). The classical Hamiltonian is then
H = −
√
2
3
MPl
pφ
−T . (9.1)
We promote the canonical variables to operators, φ→ φˆ and pφ → pˆφ = −i ∂∂φ , to act on
a wavefunction Ψ(φ, T ) and as our law of evolution we take the Schro¨dinger equation:
i
∂Ψ
∂T
(φ, T ) = HˆΨ(φ, T ) = −i
√
2
3
MPl
1
T
∂Ψ
∂φ
(φ, T ). (9.2)
The Hamiltonian, being proportional to pˆφ, is a time-dependent generator of transla-
tions in the configuration space of φ. Thus the wavefunction is shifted in its entirety and
the evolution is real (in the sense that if Ψ only takes real values at one time T0, it takes
real values at all times). To see this explicitly, first consider the evolution of Ψ over a
small time interval T0 → T0 + δT . To first order in δT we have
Ψ(φ, T0 + δT ) = Ψ(φ, T0) + δT
∂Ψ
∂T
(φ, T0)
= Ψ(φ, T0)−
√
2
3
MPl
δT
T0
∂Ψ
∂φ
(φ, T0)
= Ψ
(
φ−
√
2
3
MPl
δT
T0
, T0
)
. (9.3)
Thus during the interval δT the wavefunction is shifted in the direction of decreasing φ
(since T0 < 0 by assumption). For T0 → T = T0 +∆T with finite ∆T , it is readily shown
that
Ψ(φ, T ) = Ψ
(
φ−
√
2
3
MPl ln
T
T0
, T0
)
(9.4)
2This assumption was made inadvertently in ref. [106] where we first reported these results. This treat-
ment is however technically incorrect: That the momentum is not changing sign is a result of the classical
dynamics and not a defining feature of the theory. The more accurate way to proceed would be the method
applied in the next chapter and briefly discussed in the box below, where a square-root Hamiltonian is in-
terpreted via diagonalisation of its square. Fortunately, the results obtained with the present method are
however encouraging. The pseudo-classical behaviour of the quantum trajectories (see below) has also
been deduced by John [65], although without reference to York time and with a slightly expanded notion of
quantum trajectory.
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satisfies eq. 9.2.
Eq. 9.4 implies that for T → −∞ the wavepacket is located at φ → +∞ and for
T → 0 at φ → −∞, matching the classical evolution of φ. Since the shape of Ψ in
φ-space remains unchanged, the probability current j(φ, T ) will be uniform in φ (though
T -dependent). This will be seen explicitly below when we consider the de Broglie-Bohm
trajectories.
In standard quantum mechanics (without trajectories) the ‘classicality’ of the quantum
evolution may be seen at the level of expectation values. For an appropriately narrow wave
function, we can apply Ehrenfest’s theorem and obtain
d
dT
〈φ〉 =
√
2
3
MPlT
−1,
d
dT
〈pφ〉 = 0, (9.5)
that is, the classical evolution, but for expectation values. Using trajectories, we will show
that the assumption of a narrow wave packet is, in fact, unnecessary in order to obtain the
classical-like behaviour.
First, however, consider now the role of the scale factor a. Previously we argued that
the numerical value of the Hamiltonian is to be interpreted as the volume of the universe
(section 3.2). This is also true for the quantum theory.
In a more usual context the classical interpretation of the value of the Hamiltonian is
that of energy. In the quantum theory this translates into an energy spectrum, given by the
eigenvalues of the Hamiltonian operator (with corresponding eigenstates). Analogously,
it is natural here to interpret the eigenvalues of the Hamiltonian as elements of a ‘volume
spectrum’ with corresponding ‘volume eigenstates’. In the quantum theory it is therefore
plausible to characterise the volume (or scale factor) associated with a particular state via
the expectation value of the Hamiltonian3
a3 ≡ 〈Ψ | Hˆ |Ψ〉 . (9.6)
In order to see that this makes sense, consider the eigenstates of the Hamiltonian. It
is easy to confirm that these are given by Ψk(φ) = Nke−ikφ, where k ∈ R labels the
eigenstate and Nk is a normalisation constant. The corresponding eigenvalues, which we
write as ‘a3k’ since they are to correspond to a volume, are
a3k =
√
2
3
MPlT
−1k. (9.7)
Thus the eigenvalue depends linearly on the wavenumber of the eigenstate and inversely
on York time T . Since k can take any real value, the spectrum is continuous. Note
that the time dependence is the same for all eigenstates and therefore also for arbitrary
linear superpositions. Since the set of Ψk form a complete basis the time dependence is
therefore identical for all states. Consider a linear superposition Ψ(φ) =
∑
k AkΨk(φ) =
3If a were a dynamical variable of our Hamiltonian system (as it was in the unreduced model), this
equation would denote a constraint imposed at the level of expectation values. However, in our case a is
not such a variable and is instead introduced as a definition.
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∑
k AkNke
−ikφ, where Ak ∈ C are arbitrary coefficients. The volume expectation value
(9.6) is
〈Ψ | Hˆ |Ψ〉 =
∫
dφ Ψ∗HˆΨ
=
√
2
3
MPl
1
T
∑
k.k′
∫
dφ A∗k′Ψ
∗
k′kAkΨk
=
√
2
3
MPl
1
T
∑
k
k|Ak|2 (9.8)
where in the last step we used the orthonormality of the eigenfunctions. The volume
expectation value is thus inversely proportional to T . The chosen state Ψ only determines
an overall factor
∑
k k|Ak|2.
Finally consider the time evolution of a3 for an arbitrary state Ψ. From da3/dT =
d 〈Ψ | Hˆ |Ψ〉 /dT , and using eq. 9.6, we see that
a′
a
= − 1
3T
(9.9)
independently of Ψ. Note that this is exactly the equation giving the evolution of a in the
classical theory.
If we consider quantum trajectories as they appear in the de Broglie-Bohm formulation
these will be geometrically parallel in the extended configuration space (φ-T -space). The
velocity (and therefore guidance equation for the trajectories) can be read off from eq. 9.4
to be
vφ(T ) =
√
2
3
MPl
1
T
. (9.10)
This result could also have been obtained by evaluating ∂
∂T
|Ψ|2 using the Schro¨dinger
equation in order to arrive at the continuity equation for the probability density. This
result matches eq. 5.31, the equation for the classical trajectories. Thus the de Broglie-
Bohm and classical trajectories are identical. This may have been expected for a free
theory. However, below we show that a similar result holds even in the presence of a
potential, which one would not naturally expect.
The use of quantum trajectories allows for an alternative method to calculate the evo-
lution of a via the identification of ‘local expectation values’ a3 ≡ Re[ψ∗Hˆψ/|ψ|2](φ, T )
(evaluated along the trajectory), in the sense of Holland [59, sec. 3.5]. However, in this
thesis we choose to employ the identification of a3 via eq. 9.6.
A more careful treatment of ‘square-root’ Hamiltonian
Above we treated the ‘square-root’ Hamiltonian via the simplification of considering the
quantisation of the Hamiltonian 9.1 rather than the more fundamentally correct expressions,
HT = −
√
2
3
MPl
−T
√
p2φ.
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This modification is adequate for the classical theory where the momentum pφ does not
change sign. In fact, we will use it again below in section 9.2 even in the presence of a
potential where the applicability of this modification of the Hamiltonian is more limited (see
our discussion of ‘turning points’ in chapter 5). The fact that it is classically adequate fol-
lows from the classical dynamics and so, strictly speaking, this should not be assumed in
the quantum theory. This raises the question how to interpret the operator resulting from the
quantisation of the classical phase-space function
√
p2φ. One might be tempted to write
√̂
p2φ =
√
pˆ2φ =
√
−∂2φ,
(with ∂φ = ∂∂φ ) which is not problematic but does not offer a resolution either since one is
left to interpret the mathematical meaning of the square root of a second derivative.
The way to deal with this difficulty is by interpreting the expression via diagonalisation.
In general, if |h〉 is an eigenfunction of hˆ with eigenvalue h, hˆ |h〉 = h |h〉, then it is also an
eigenfunction of fˆ ≡ hˆ2 with eigenvalue h2,
hˆ2 |h〉 = h2 |h〉 .
The converse is in general not true: there may be eigenfunctions of fˆ which are not eigen-
functions of hˆ. However, if fˆ is diagonalisable with a complete set of eigenstates (this follows
from Hermiticity), then these also form a set of eigenstates for hˆ = fˆ
1
2 with square-rooted
eigenvalues.
Regarding Hermiticity, if hˆ is Hermitian, then so is fˆ . Again, for arbitrary operators the
converse is not true: If Aˆ2 = Bˆ and Bˆ is Hermitian, then it is not guaranteed that Aˆ is
Hermitian. However, if Aˆ = Bˆ
1
2 is defined in terms of the diagonalised operator, then Aˆ
will be Hermitian too (up to a subtlety that we will establish below for the particular case
of the quantisation of the anisotropic universe in section 10.1, where we will deal with the
square-root operator more carefully than in the present chapter. The subtlety is that Bˆ must be
positive semi-definite, that is, it must have only non-negative eigenvalues, so that their square
roots are real). That is, not every square root of a Hermitian operator is Hermitian, but one
can always find one via diagonalisation.
Let us consider the implications for the minisuperspace model considered in this chapter.
Define the square of the Hamiltonian operator,
Fˆ ≡ Hˆ2T = 23M2PlT−2pˆ2φ
and find its eigenfunctions ψk, satisfying
Fˆψk(φ) =
2
3M
2
PlT
−2(−∂2φ)ψk(φ) = gψk(φ).
This is solved by the eigenfunctions
ψk(φ) = Ne
ikφ
with eigenvalues
g = 23M
2
PlT
−2(−k2).
The prefactor N is a normalisation constant. In general k could be any complex number.
However, the functions are only bounded for k ∈ R, so viable eigenfunctions are restricted to
real values of k.a The eigenvalues of the actual Hamiltonian are then
h = −
√
2
3MPl
|k|
T123
and are therefore unchanged from what was established in the text using the simplified square-
root-free Hamiltonian.
In order to derive the de Broglie-Bohm velocity v one needs the probability current [125],
given via the continuity equation
∂|Ψ|2
∂T
− ∂φ(|Ψ|2v) = 0.
Using the Schro¨dinger equation and its conjugate one arrives at an expression for the velocity:
v = −|Ψ|−2∂−1φ
[
i
(
(HΨ)†ψ − iψ†(Hψ)
)]
.
In general the inverse operator ‘∇−1’ cannot be evaluated explicitly and some other manipu-
lation is necessary for an explicit result. However, in the one-dimensional case the operator
∂−1φ simply denotes integration with respect to φ. The integration constant corresponds to
the general divergence-free term that may be added to the de Broglie-Bohm velocity without
affecting the probability density and its evolution. The application of Hˆ to a general state Ψ
is evaluated via the decomposition of Ψ into volume eigenfunctions,
Ψ =
∑
k
ckψk,
with the sum being over all values of k for which there is a non-vanishing complex coefficient
ck. The action of the Hamiltonian on ψk is known.
aThe functions must be bounded if it is to be possible to interpret |ψk|2 as a probability distribution.
It is not completely clear if the possibility of such an interpretation is a necessary feature of a theory
describing the evolution of a single isolated universe, especially if the universe were represented by
a de Broglie-Bohm trajectory and the role of the ψk is fundamentally that of a guiding wave. So
relaxing this condition may be a defensible option in the present case. However, complex k imply
complex volume eigenvalues. (This essentially relates to the fact that Hermiticity of the Hamiltonian
is not established for unbounded functions, a mathematical detail that is rarely relevant in conventional
quantum mechanics, where the existence of a probability interpretation is assumed.)
9.2 Quantum theory with a potential
The quantisation of the homogeneous isotropic minisuperspace model with a non-vanishing
scalar-field potential proceeds along similar lines. Here (as we did in ref. [106]) we will
also make the simplification of replacing the ‘square-root of the squared momentum’ op-
erator by the momentum itself. Unlike in the case of the free theory where the momentum
does not change sign classically, it may do so in the case of a potential, so that the appli-
cability of the quantised theory developed in this section is limited. A proper treatment
should proceed along the lines described in the box above. In the next chapter, we will
give an example of the proper treatment of a square-root Hamiltonian in the form of the
quantisation of the anisotropic minisuperspace model of section 7.2.
The recipe of quantisation is ambiguous for a non-zero potential V (φ) 6= 0 due to the
necessity of choosing a factor ordering in the Hamiltonian 5.22. Different choices will
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lead to different dynamics. It turns out that the symmetric choice
Hˆ = −1
2
(
Uˆ−
1
2 pˆφ + pˆφUˆ
− 1
2
)
= +
1
2
 i√
3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)
∂
∂φ
+
∂
∂φ
i√
3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)
 , (9.11)
results in a Hermitian Hamiltonian, as may be readily verified.4 The term U is a shorthand
defined by equation 5.20. At the end of this section we will also show that this ordering
has the special property that the resulting de Broglie-Bohm trajectories match those of the
classical theory just as they did in the free case, although the applicability of this result is
limited given that the modified Hamiltonian without the square-root operator is used.
Application of Ehrenfest’s theorem gives
d
dT
〈φ〉 =
〈
1√
3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)
〉
d
dT
〈pφ〉 = −
〈
1
( 3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)) 32
∂V
∂φ
pφ
〉
+
1
2
〈pφ, 1
( 3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)) 32
∂V
∂φ
〉 ,
(9.12)
where the equation for φ has the form of the classical evolution equation, while the mo-
mentum equation differs by the second expression. For a state that is sufficiently ‘clas-
sical’, that is, appropriately localised in both position and momentum (while consistent
with the uncertainty principle) such that for a relevant functions f(φ) it is the case that
〈f(φ, pφ)〉 ≈ f(〈φ〉, 〈pφ〉), (9.13)
we have for F (φ) = ( 3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ))− 32 ∂V
∂φ
that
〈[pφ, F ]〉 = 〈(pφF − Fpφ)〉 = 〈pφF 〉 − 〈Fpφ〉 = 0, (9.14)
having used the condition 9.13 for the choice f(φ, pφ) = pφ · F (φ) in the last equality.
Thus the final term in the second equation of (9.12) vanishes. Condition 9.13 also allows
us to replace the remaining expressions on the right-hand sides of eqs. 9.12 by the ap-
propriate functions of 〈φ〉 and we obtain classically evolving expectation values since the
equations have the same form as the classical equations fo φ′ and p′φ. Below we will show
the recovery of classicality more fully at the level of trajectories.
4Other orderings, while not in general Hermitian, are however PT-symmetric for even potentials V (φ),
and so they may conceivably be considered as other viable choices, provided the treatment is adjusted
accordingly (with appropriately modified inner products). See Bender [16] for an introduction to PT-
symmetric Hamiltonians in quantum theory. As always, ultimately the right choice is determined by obser-
vation.
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Let us consider the evolution of the scale factor a given by (9.6). Proceeding as for
the free theory, we first find the ‘volume eigenfunctions’. These are
ψTk = Nk
(
1− 4M
2
PlV (φ)
3T 2
) 1
4
e
−ik ∫ dφ(1− 4M2PlV (φ)
3T2
) 1
2
, (9.15)
as is easy to verify. Unlike the eigenfunctions for the free theory, which were time in-
dependent (only the eigenvalues carried time dependence), the functions here are time
dependent also. 5
Note that we could have rescaled the eigenfunctions ψTk by an arbitrary function of
time. This ambiguity is resolved by demanding that for early times −T  1 the eigen-
functions match those of the free theory. This is a reasonable condition since we have
already established that the early-time dynamics for the trajectories is well approximated
by that of the free theory.
The eigenvalues corresponding to these eigenfunctions (9.15) are
a3k =
√
2
3
MPl
k
T
, (9.17)
that is, they match those of the free theory. However, the eigenfunctions ψk are not nor-
malisable over the entire real line, φ ∈ (−∞,∞) unless the V (φ) falls off sufficiently
fast as φ→ ±∞, which is not the case for many commonly investigated potentials, such
as V (φ) = M4(φ/MPl)2 considered above.
Time-dependent eigenfunctions of a time-dependent Hamiltonian do not, in general,
evolve into eigenfunctions (that is, a general eigenstate ψT0k of H(T0) does not evolve into
an eigenstate ψT1k′ ofH(T1)) and few general results are known. We will postpone detailed
analysis of appropriate models to future work.
Instead, let us consider a general superposition Ψ(T0) =
∑
k Ak(T0)ψ
T0
k (T0) at time
T0. For later times, we write Ψ(T ) =
∑
k Ak(T )ψ
T
k (T ), where we must include the time-
dependence of the coefficients Ak(T ) in order to account for the fact that eigenfunctions
of H(T0) do not evolve into eigenfunctions of H(T ) for some T > T0. Setting a3 ≡
〈Ψ |H |Ψ〉, we find
a3 =
∑
k
|Ak(T )|2|Nk|2
∫
dφ
√
1− 4M
2
PlV (φ)
3T 2
·
√
2
3
MPl
k
T
. (9.18)
5Indeed, it is easy to see why this must be so. Suppose we wish to find time-independent eigenfunc-
tions χk(φ), satisfying Hˆχk = wk(T )χk(φ), where wk(T ) are the corresponding eigenvalues, which may
depend on time T . Evaluating Hˆχk, the condition on χk would be that
wk(T ) = iU
− 12
(
∂ lnχk
∂φ
− 1
2
U−1
∂U
∂φ
)
(9.16)
is only a function of time T (since the eigenvalue wk(T ) cannot have dependence on φ). But no time-
independent χ can satisfy this condition since U(φ, T ) is time dependent.
126
Differentiation with respect to T gives
a′
a
= − 1
3T
1−
∫
dφ 2V (φ)/
√
3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)∫
dφ
√
3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)
+ ∑k |Nk|2 · k · ddT |Ak(T )|2
3
∑
k |Nk|2 · k · |Ak(T )|2
.
(9.19)
We note that in this expression only the last term depends on the quantum state. In general,
the two integrals may be divergent and care must be taken when evaluating their ratio. In
practice, some regularisation method may have to be applied. The result for the free
theory is recovered in the case when V (φ) = 0.
Consider finally the de Broglie-Bohm trajectories. From the Schro¨dinger equation for
this Hamiltonian Hˆ it is straightforward to derive the continuity equation for the proba-
bility density,
∂|Ψ|2
∂T
=
∂
∂φ
(
U−
1
2 |Ψ|2
)
(9.20)
from which we read off the guidance equation for the de Broglie-Bohm trajectories,
vφ = −U− 12 = − 1√
3
2M2Pl
T 2 − 2V (φ)
. (9.21)
This is indeed the classical velocity φ′ for an arbitrary potential V (φ).
It is interesting to note that the velocity vφ is independent of the state Ψ and only
depends on the position in φ-configuration space. This is a result of the first-order form
of the Hamiltonian and contrasts to more conventional second-order systems (where the
velocity might depend on the phase of Ψ, for example).
The identical law for the classical and de Broglie-Bohm trajectories implies that our
considerations for the classical evolution of the universe apply to the quantum evolution,
too. This enables us to develop a perturbation theory that is entirely quantum, using the
fact that the homogeneous background evolves just as if it were classical and indepen-
dently of the quantum state.
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Chapter 10
Quantum York-time cosmological
perturbation theory
The goal of this chapter is the canonical quantisation of the reduced-Hamiltonian cos-
mological perturbation theory developed in chapter 8. As a preliminary step, in order to
discuss the unconventional commutator structure we first consider the canonical quantum
theory of the anisotropic minisuperspace model of section 7.2 before moving on to pertur-
bation theory proper. Section 10.1 was published as part of ref. [105], while section 10.2
formed part of ref. [103].
10.1 Quantisation, representations and the anisotropic ho-
mogeneous quantum universe
Whether or not following the canonical quantisation recipe is appropriate for arriving at
a quantum theory of gravity is yet to be determined. Rather than theoretical speculation
about what formal features we expect a quantum theory of gravity to have, our approach is
to examine the theory resulting from an application of the standard quantisation procedure
to the classical reduced-Hamiltonian theory. If the quantum theory is found to be wanting
with regards to internal consistency or empirical adequacy, another approach will have to
be proposed.
The quantisation procedure is not completely straightforward. In the homogeneous
case we were able to follow the canonical-quantisation procedure without difficulty (the
only ‘unusual’ feature was having a strongly time-dependent Hamiltonian and its ‘square-
root’ form). In contrast, in the present anisotropic model and in the general case the
non-canonical Poisson brackets must lead to a modified commutator-bracket structure.
It is therefore worth isolating this feature of the quantum theory by exploring the
canonical quantisation of the anisotropic minisuperspace model of section 7.2 before pro-
ceeding to the quantisation of perturbation theory itself. While empirically inadequate
with regard to our actual universe, useful insights about the structure of the quantum the-
ory are gained.
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10.1.1 Quantisation with non-canonical Poisson brackets
The natural generalisation of the usual bracket ‘promotion’, schematically expressible as
“ {q, p} = 1 ” −→ “ [qˆ, pˆ] = i~1ˆ ”, (10.1)
is that the right-hand side of the Poisson equations is also promoted to operators and
multiplied by a factor i~,
“ {q, p} = f(q, p) ” −→ “ [qˆ, pˆ] = i~f̂(q, p) ” (10.2)
and similar for other non-commuting brackets. Few works consider quantisation in gen-
eral for non-canonical Poisson structure. One notable exception is ref. [128]. In gen-
eral this promotion procedure leads to factor-ordering ambiguities however since the
right-hand side may contain (classically) products of ps and qs, or other non-Poisson-
commuting combinations (such as ps and ps in our case). This implies that there is, strictly
speaking, an ambiguity due to factor order in the function denoted by f(q, p) above. The
ambiguity is however ‘small’ since all possible orderings are related by adding or sub-
tracting a commutator bracket on the right-hand side. This commutator bracket, when
evaluated, introduces a factor of ~ (in addition to the overall factor of ~ present on the
right), so that the ambiguity is of order ~2, while the unambiguous part of the commutator
expression is only of order ~. Nonetheless the quantisation recipe is indisputably ambigu-
ous when applied to classical theories with such Poisson structures. Fortunately for our
purposes there will be easy criteria to choose an appropriate order in the cases we have to
consider.
The Poisson structure of the reduced variables in the general York-time reduced-
Hamiltonian theory is given by eqs. 4.28 and 4.29 (and the vanishing of {g˜ab, g˜cd}). The
resulting commutator algebra is then given by
[ˆ˜gab(x), ˆ˜gcd(y)] = 0 (10.3)
[ˆ˜gab(x), ˆ˜pi
cd(y)] = i~
(
δ(ca δ
d)
b − 13 ˆ˜gab ˆ˜gcd
)
δ3(x− y) (10.4)
[ˆ˜piab(x), ˆ˜picd(y)] =
i~
3
(
ˆ˜gcd ˆ˜piab − ˆ˜gab ˆ˜picd
)
δ3(x− y). (10.5)
The operators ˆ˜gab and ˆ˜picd act on wave functionals Ψ.1 The inverse-metric operator g˜ab has
the obvious meaning, satisfying g˜abg˜bc = δca. For reduced notational clutter it is useful to
suppress the position arguments (x, y, etc.).
By inspection one can find a ‘position’ basis for Ψ, that is, a representation of the
operators and the wave functional such that Ψ is expressed as a functional of the reduced-
metric configurations g˜ab(x) and constitutes eigenfunctions of the operator ˆ˜gab with the
eigenvalue being the argument of Ψ,
ˆ˜gabΨ[g˜ij] = g˜abΨ[g˜ij]. (10.6)
1In the presence of matter this functional also depends on the matter field configuration, such as a scalar
field φ(x). Since this is not important for our purposes here, we do not include it here in order to avoid
obscuring the notation. Of course, Ψ is furthermore dependent on York time T , which we also suppress at
this stage.
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The momentum operator acts as
ˆ˜piabΨ[g˜ij] =
[
−i~
(
δ
(ab)
(cd) − 13 g˜abg˜cd
) δ
δg˜cd
]
Ψ[g˜ij]. (10.7)
One can verify that this is indeed a representation of the commutators 10.3 - 10.5.
However, there is no momentum representation. This follows directly from the fact
that momenta do not commute with each other, eq. 10.5. A momentum representation
would require functionals Ψ[p˜iij] such that
ˆ˜piabΨ[p˜iij] = p˜iabΨ[p˜iij], (10.8)
but then
pˆiabpˆicdΨ˜[piij(x)] = piabpicdΨ˜[piij(x)] = picdpiabΨ˜[piij(x)] = pˆicdpˆiabΨ˜[piij(x)], (10.9)
contradicting the commutator relation 10.5. The box below discusses the physical and
formal meaning of this and draws contrasts with loop quantum gravity.
The position representation identically satisfies the quantum constraint demanding the
vanishing of the trace of the momentum for physical states,
ˆ˜gabˆ˜piabΨphys[g˜ij] = 0. (10.10)
The ‘scale-free’ constraint,
ˆ˜gΨ[g˜ij] = 1ˆΨ[g˜ij], (10.11)
on the other restricts Ψ to be non-vanishing on the surface defined by the condition g = 1.
This may be more clearly understood in the context of a finite-dimensional model, such
as the anisotropic cosmological model considered in this chapter.
Momentum observables:
Reduced-Hamiltonian quantisation versus Loop Quantum Gravity
The origin of the non-Hermiticity of the momenta may be understood as follows. In the
usual formal canonical quantisation procedure one constructs a commutative C∗-algebra of
complex functions and the action of complex vector fields on the configuration space (with
its representation respecting an involution) in order to ensure that all phase-space functions
become ‘observables’ in the quantum theory. For example, in Loop Quantum Gravity this is
implemented via the shift to the loop variables, which have the appropriate structure. There
one has a kinematical (i.e. prior to ‘knowledge’ of the constraints) phase space in the form
of a cotangent bundle over the configuration space and can proceed accordingly. Loop quan-
tum gravity is perhaps the most advanced approach to canonical quantum gravity (a phrase
borrowed from ref. [68]), with a rigorously defined quantisation and Hilbert space. However,
the introduction of loop variables comes at the cost of having configuration variables that
(arguably) lack a clear physical interpretation.
The present theory, as constructed via the Hamiltonian reduction, differs qualitatively from
the procedure used for Loop Quantum Gravity. The metric-derived variables gab (or qi in the
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anisotropic minisuperspace model) and associated momenta do not lead to the full structure
of a C∗-algebra. The set of position operators form their own (smaller) C∗-algebra (with
gab = g
∗
ab = gab or q
∗
a = qa, and F (gab)
∗ = F¯ (gab) or F (qa)∗ = F¯ (qa) for the involution)
and this ensures the existence of the position basis (e.g. theorem 29.2.2 in ref. [128]). What is
not present here is the involution of the vector fields on configuration space. This leads to the
momenta not being ‘observables’ and neither is the operator form of a general phase-space
function involving the momenta (although some functions may be, including, fortunately, the
Hamiltonian).
In contrast with conventional canonical quantisation such as employed in the construction
of Loop Quantum Gravity, the reduced momenta do not span the cotangent space of the
kinematical configuration variables gab (or qi) since instead they maintain the constraint g = 1
(or q1q2q3 = 1) by construction, acting only tangentially to the constraint surface. The
Poisson structure also ensures that the other constraint, gabpiab = 0 (or qipi = 0) is maintained
by any generator constructed from the momenta and variables. In the quantum theory this is
in effect the reason the analogous quantum constraint holds identically at the operator level.
Fortunately, the lack of momentum observables does not make the quantum theory unfea-
sible. Physically speaking, as has been pointed out by Feynman and Hibbs [45, ch. 5] and
repeatedly been emphasised by Bell [15, e.g. p. 196] all physical observation is ultimately that
of positions, such as time-of-flight measurements for particle momenta or simply the position
of an apparatus pointer that is appropriately coupled to the system.
Elaborating on this point, note that quantum theories may be viewed as theories of po-
sitions. In general, this requires one to view the position basis as preferreda, although for
our purposes this is already the case in light of the Poisson structure, as argued in the text.
Particular types of position measurements can be interpreted as ‘momentum measurements’.
For example, in the standard quantum mechanics of a single particle with the wavefunction
initially localised in position space, the statistical spread of position-measurement outcomes
after a fixed time interval corresponds to the probability distribution of potential momentum-
measurement outcomes. The initial uncertainty in position becomes negligible at sufficiently
long times of flight (see ref. [45, sec. 5-1] for a detailed analysis). Accepting that the obser-
vation of momentum is only a particular type of position measurement, it becomes clear that
a quantum theory is not strictly required to have this structure. The absence of self-adjoint
momentum operators implies that the theory lacks certain formal properties in contrast with
conventional quantum theories, but it is not physically inconsistent or unviable.
aSome formulations, such as de Broglie-Bohm theory, do this at the fundamental level, whereas in
the Everettian formulation, for example, an (approximate) position basis may be preferred as a result
of decoherence.
10.1.2 Application to the anisotropic homogeneous universe
Applying this quantisation scheme to the anisotropic cosmological model developed in
section 7.2, we promote the (reduced) variables qi and pi to operators that are understood
to act on kinematically allowed quantum states Ψkin. ‘Kinematically allowed’ encom-
passes all states that are expressible as suitable normalisable functions over the Hilbert
space that corresponds to the classical configuration space defined by the three position
variables q1, q2, q3. Much smaller is the space of physically allowed states — states to
which a physical meaning can be given and which are not mere mathematical artifacts.
These states must also satisfy the quantum constraints, obtained by operator-promotion
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of the classical constraint equations. That is, a constraint φ(qi, pj) = 0 acts on states as
φ(qˆi, pˆ
j)Ψphys = 0, selecting physically meaningful states Ψphys.
In the present case the constraint equations were given by eqs. 7.2 and 7.3 with the
resulting quantum constraints
qˆ1qˆ2qˆ3Ψphys = 1Ψphys (10.12)
qˆapˆ
aΨphys = 0. (10.13)
The Poisson algebra is promoted to a commutator algebra of operators:
[qˆa, pˆ
b] = i~
(
δba − 13 qˆaqˆb
)
, (10.14)
[pˆa, pˆb] =
i~
3
[
pˆaqˆb − pˆbqˆa] (10.15)
The momentum operators do not commute, so as in the general case the theory does
not possess a momentum representation. However, there is a ‘position’ representation
(a representation defined by the fact that the operators qˆa act by multiplication of the
argument, qˆaΨ(qi) = qaΨ(qi)), given by
qˆaΨkin(qi) = qaΨkin(qi), (10.16)
pˆbΨkin(qi) =
[
−i~ (δba − 13qbqa) ∂∂qa
]
Ψkin(qi). (10.17)
It is easy to verify that these do indeed satisfy the commutation relations 10.14, 10.15.
We are left to consider the meaning of the constraints. The tracelessness requirement
in operator form 10.13 is satisfied identically in this representation, so that it does not
restrict the space of physical wavefunctions. On the other hand, the absence of absolute
scale, taking the form of the self-adjoint quantum constraint 10.12 implies that physical
wavefunctions must vanish off the two-dimensional surface Σ given by q1q2q3 = 1. On
the full configuration space physical wavefunctions are therefore discontinuous at Σ. One
may be worried that this is problematic given that one encounters expressions of the form
∂/∂qi Ψphys, which are derivatives across the discontinuity. However, derivatives in the
position representation only appear in the form of linear combinations as given by the
momenta, which are directional derivatives tangent to the constraint surface. This is, of
course, the quantum result corresponding to the fact that classically momenta generate
motion within the constraint surface. Specifically, considering a basis for the tangent
space to Σ at an arbitrary point by writing q3 = (q1q2)−1 and calculating the corresponding
tangent vectors,
T1 ≡
(
∂q1
∂q1
,
∂q2
∂q1
,
∂q3
∂q1
)
=
(
1, 0,−1/q21q2
)
, (10.18)
T2 ≡
(
∂q1
∂q2
,
∂q2
∂q2
,
∂q3
∂q2
)
=
(
0, 1,−1/q1q22
)
, (10.19)
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the momenta can be expressed in terms of this basis,2
pˆ1 =
(
2
3
T1 − q2
3q1
T2
)
· ∇ (10.20)
pˆ2 =
(
− q1
3q2
T1 +
2
3
T2
)
· ∇ (10.21)
pˆ3 =
(−1
3
q21q2T1 − 13q1q22T2
) · ∇. (10.22)
The evolution of the value of Ψphys at some point ~q is therefore ‘blind’ to the properties
of Ψphys outside the constraint surface, regardless of the form of the Hamiltonian.
10.1.3 The quantum theory of the anisotropic universe
The dynamics of the quantum theory is determined by the quantised, time-dependent
Hamiltonian,
Hˆ =
√
8
3T 2
√̂
q2i p
i2. (10.23)
Since classically the numerical value of the Hamiltonian is ‘volume’, in the quantum
theory Hˆ defines a ‘volume spectrum’ with volume eigenfunctions and eigenvalues rather
than the more conventionally encountered energy spectrum (section 3.2).
The obvious difficulty with Hˆ is the appearance of a ‘square-root’ operator, whose
meaning is not initially clear. Another question is the factor-ordering ambiguity in the
radicand. Regarding the latter, one can show using the commutation relations that chang-
ing the ordering of (qˆaqˆapˆapˆa) either has no effect or merely corresponds to adding or
subtracting a constant 4
3
~2 or 8
3
~2. A different ordering choice therefore corresponds to
a shift in the Hamiltonian eigenvalues but does not change the eigenfunctions. Where
necessary, we will therefore with minimal loss of generality assume the ordering ‘qqpp’,
also expressible in the form
qˆaqˆapˆ
apˆaΨphys(q) =
(
q2a∂
a2 − 1
3
qaqb∂
a∂b + 2
3
qa∂
a
)
Ψphys(q). (10.24)
The square-root operator could be dealt with formally by assuming the existence of a
series expansion,
Hˆ = (8/3T 2)
1
2
∞∑
n=0
wn,a(q)(∂
a)n, (10.25)
which acts straightforwardly on a state when expressed as a Fourier transform,3
ψ(q) =
∫
d3k ψ˜(k)eik
cqc , (10.27)
2Furthermore, one notes that the momenta are not linearly independent operators.
3Note however that the Fourier expansion does not constitute a integral over momentum eigenstates
since no momentum representation exists. In fact, the relation of the Fourier components kc and the mo-
menta can be seen via the action of the latter on the former,
pˆaψ(q) = ~
∫
d3k ψ˜(k) · (δab − 13qaqb)kb eik
cqc = ~kaψ(q)− ~
3
∫
d3k ψ˜(k) · qaqbkb eikcqc . (10.26)
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giving
Hˆ
(
ψ˜(k)eik
cqc
)
=
∫
d3k
∞∑
n=0
wn,a(q) (ik
a)n · ψ˜(k)eikcqc
=
∫
d3k
√
q2a(ik
a)2 − 1
3
qaqb(ika)(ikb) +
2
3
qa(ika) · ψ˜(k)eikcqc .
(10.28)
This formal result does not seem however very practical or insightful.
A more productive approach is to deal with the square-root explicitly. We intend to
interpret hˆ = (qˆ2apˆ
a2)
1
2 in the manner described in the general discussion in the box at
the end of section 9.1: Since analysis of Hˆ2 is a lot easier than Hˆ itself (as there is no
square root and so the interpretation of the operator expression is clear) interpretation of
the operator via diagonalisation offers the way forward. Hermiticity and positive semi-
definiteness need to be established for this to be viable however.
The operator fˆ ≡ hˆ2 is Hermitian only on Σ, not on the full, unconstrained configura-
tion space. In order to establish its Hermiticity it is useful to perform a change of coordi-
nates (q1, q2, q3) → (u ≡ q1, v ≡ q2, w ≡ q1q2q3), so that w = 1 describes the constraint
surface, facilitating the integration. With ∂u = ∂1 − (w/u2v)∂3, ∂v = ∂2 − (w/uv2)∂3,
∂w = (1/uv)∂
3, the momenta are
pˆ1 = −i~
(
2
3
∂u − v
3u
∂v
)
(10.29)
pˆ2 = −i~
(
2
3
∂v − u
3v
∂u
)
(10.30)
pˆ3 =
i~
3
(
u2v
w
∂u +
uv2
w
∂v
)
, (10.31)
the volume element is dq1dq2dq3 = (uv)−1dudvdw and the operator fˆ is
fˆ ≡ qˆaqˆapˆapˆa = −2~
2
3
[
u2∂2u + v
2∂2v − uv∂u∂v + v∂v + u∂u
]
. (10.32)
In terms of these coordinates the Hermiticity of fˆ on the constraint surface,∫
Σ
ψ†phys(fˆχphys) =
∫
Σ
(fˆψphys)
†χphys, (10.33)
is easily shown. The momenta themselves are not Hermitian and therefore do not consti-
tute ‘observables’ in the conventional sense (see box above for a formal discussion). For
example,∫
Σ
ψ†phys(pˆ
1χphys) =
∫
Σ
(pˆ1ψphys)
†χphys −
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
du dv
1
uv
· i~
u
ψ†physχphys. (10.34)
The reason we chose to examine the simplest model in which the Poisson brackets are
non-trivial is that it allows us to explore their quantisation without having to worry about
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too many cumbersome notational or other details. An added benefit of this model is that
the Hamiltonian eigenequation, that is, the ‘volume eigenspectrum’ can be solved exactly.
This is because fˆ is a homogeneous operator (eq. 10.32) whose eigenfunctions may be
readily found by inspection,
φn,m(u, v) = An,mu
nvm, (10.35)
with eigenvalues
fˆφn,m(u, v) = −2~
2
3
[
n2 +m2 − nm]φn,m(u, v). (10.36)
Naı¨vely m,n ∈ C, although the values will be restricted shortly. With the interpretation
of the square-root operator discussed above, the Hamiltonian eigensolutions are
Hˆφn,m(u, v) = hn,m(T ) φn,m(u, v), hn,m(T ) = i
4~
3|T |
√
n2 +m2 − nm. (10.37)
The eigenfunctions φm,n(u, v) are, however, not normalisable on u, v ∈ (0,∞) for any
values n,m. But they are bounded (and, in fact, of constant magnitude) for purely imag-
inary n,m, and divergent for all other values. That is, let n = iβ, m = iδ, β, δ ∈ R.
Then
hiβ,iδ(T ) = − 4~
3|T |
√
β2 + δ2 − βδ, (10.38)
where β2 + δ2 − βδ ≥ 0 always, so that the eigenvalues are real. Thus the reality of
eigenvalues is equivalent with the non-divergence of the eigenfunctions. This is closely
analogous to the ‘plane wave’ eigenfunctions of a free particle in basic particle quantum
mechanics. There the eigenfunctions are of the form exp(ikx) for real k and therefore
not normalisable either but bounded with constant magnitude. Imaginary values of k are
excluded even though they solve the eigenvalue equation because they entail divergent
eigenfunctions. The analogy can be made more apparent by writing φiβ,iδ = ei(β lnu+δ ln v).
The eigenvalues are sign-definite, that is, either all positive or all negative, depending on
the choice of sign in the Hamiltonian. As we did in the classical theory we can choose
‘volume’ to be positive, so that the Hamiltonian is a positive-semidefinite operator. We
see furthermore that there is a unique minimum-volume state, φ0,0, which has constant
eigenvalue zero, somewhat analogous to a ‘vacuum’ state.
One can also derive uncertainty relations. However, since the momenta are not ob-
servables the relevance of these relation is questionable and their meaning is obscure.4
Nonetheless we include them for completeness. One finds
σqiσpj ≥
~
3
(i = j) (10.39)
but the other non-zero relations are not as well-behaved and state-dependent,
σqiσpj =∞, (i 6= j) for H-eigenstates (10.40)
σpiσpj = 0 or∞ depending on symmetry properties of chosen state. (10.41)
4And not just in the way in which even in canonical systems the meaning of the uncertainty relation
remains full of controversy.
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Including a cosmological constant in the quantum theory is relatively straightforward
since only the time-dependent pre-factor of the Hamiltonian changes, with the resulting
Hamiltonian eigenvalues changing accordingly. The eigenfunctions remain the same.
The model developed in this section is not a good approximation to our universe.
However, the analysis of the Poisson brackets, in particular, how it guarantees motion on
the constraint surface and leads to a position representation that automatically satisfies
one of the quantum constraint while maintaining the other independent of the Hamilto-
nian, will help us understand the analogous structure in the more complicated case of
cosmological perturbations, developed in the next section.
10.2 Canonical quantisation of York-time cosmological
perturbation theory
The primary physical object in a quantum theory is the quantum state, which is repre-
sented as a complex function (or functional) defined on the configuration space of the
variables of the classical theory and on which operators derived from the classical vari-
ables and momenta act. It evolves according to the Schro¨dinger equation defined by the
operator-promoted Hamiltonian. In general the state may also be expressed as a func-
tion of other variables, such as the momenta. This is not the case here, as we discussed
in the box in section 10.1, since the classical momenta do not Poisson commute among
themselves, a feature they retain when ‘promoted’ to commutator brackets between op-
erators. Instead due to the asymmetric nature of the g˜ab and p˜iab only a ‘position’ (that
is, field-value) representation can be constructed. If sufficient evidence were found to
lend credence to York time as a physically fundamental time, then this asymmetry may
be taken to suggest that position is a physically preferred basis.
In the particular case of the perturbation theory, the ‘position’ variables are hab, while
the momenta are νab. The promotion of their Poisson structure (given by eqs. 8.3, 8.4),
yields
[hˆab(x), νˆ
cd(y)] = i~
[
δ(ca δ
d)
b − 13γabγcd + 13γcdhˆab
− 1
3
γabhˆ
cd + h.o.
]
δ3(x− y), (10.42)
[νˆab(x), νˆcd(y)] =
i~
3
[
γcdνˆab − γabνˆcd] δ3(x− y). (10.43)
From this commutator algebra — or alternatively from the general framework discussed
at the beginning of this chapter — one obtains the representation of the operator-promoted
perturbation variables hˆab and νˆab for a wave functional in the position basis,
hˆabΨ(hij) = habΨ(hij) (10.44)
νˆabΨ(hij) = −i~
(
δabcd − 13(γab − γamhmnγnd)(γcd + hcd)
) δ
δhcd
Ψ(hij)
= −i~(δabcd − 13γabγcd − 13γabhcd + 13habγcd + h.o.) δδhcdΨ(hij). (10.45)
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Since the matter variables are canonical and furthermore commute with the geometric
variables, their representation is not restricted to a particular basis. While one could imag-
ine ‘mixed’ bases such that Ψ = Ψ(g˜ab, pφA) (or Ψ = Ψ(hab, δpφA) in the present case),
here we assume the full position basis where Ψ = Ψ(g˜ab, φA) (or Ψ = Ψ(hab, δφA)),
although since our focus in on the geometric degrees of freedom, this is not important for
our discussion.
The quantum dynamics is determined by the operator form of the Hamiltonian given
by 8.21-8.23. However, the Hamiltonian involves explicit functions of time obtained from
solutions of the classical dynamics of the background. For the purposes of the quantum
theory one could choose to adopt the same form, contending with quantised perturba-
tions on a classical background. Here we are interested in a cosmological theory that is
fully quantum and we therefore also quantise the background. Standard quantum me-
chanics does not, however, provide solutions that could be substituted for the classical
ones since there are no trajectories in configuration space, as the object of interest is the
state or wavefunction. We resolve this conundrum by employing the trajectories obtained
in de Broglie-Bohm theory [34, 18, 59], similar to methods employed in conventional
(unreduced, York-time unrelated) cosmological perturbation theory [e.g. 93, 92]. While
non-equilibrium de Broglie-Bohm theory when applied to cosmological applications may
lead to a distinct phenomenology [136, 138, 137, 131] it agrees perfectly in its statistical
predicitons with standard quantum mechanics in its equilibrium form and can therefore
be employed as a mathematical tool even if one is unwilling to make any form of on-
tological commitment. The fact that de Broglie-Bohm theory regards the position basis
as privileged is furthermore consistent with its special status in the present formalism.
Whether or not this consistency adds credence to de Broglie-Bohm theory as the fun-
damentally correct (with respect to ontology) way to formulate quantum mechanics, is
another discussion.
We fully solved the background dynamics for a single scalar field in the last chap-
ter, where we found that the quantum trajectories do, in fact, match the classical ones
(although this is not generally the case and even here certain provisos regarding our quan-
tisation procedure apply). Furthermore, the Hamiltonian expectation values — physically
the volume of the universe up to a constant, analogous to the notion of energy in quantum
mechanics of more conventional systems — also match the evolution of the classical vol-
ume (this is true without the provisos). A similar quantum-classical correspondence was
established using de Broglie-Bohm theory for other appropriate matter content with stan-
dard cosmological time and outside the reduced-Hamiltonian picture in [65]. While such
results are encouraging, the equality of classical and quantum trajectories is not necessary
for the method described here to be applied. However, the fact that the two do match for
certain scenarios may explain why quantising only the perturbations and leaving the back-
ground classical, as is often done, is empirically successful. For the case of a free field
we found φ(T ) ∼ ln |T | and 〈Ψ | HˆBG |Ψ〉 ∼ |T |−1 with the factors of proportionality
depending on the chosen initial state (see section 9.1).
Having solved the background one has explicit functions of time φ¯A(T ) and p¯φA(T ),
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and the quantum analogue ofH(0)T (T ) is given by the expectation value of the background
Hamiltonian. This fully determines the perturbation Hamiltonian in the quantum theory.
The dynamics is further defined by the presence of the constraints implied by the York
gauge, that is, the choice of gauge such that the foliation is parameterised by York time
exactly rather than merely at zeroth order. Classically this condition implied that hab and
νab are traceless, which according to the Dirac quantisation procedure leads to constraints
on the set of physical states Ψphys,
γabhˆabΨphys = 0 (10.46)
γabνˆ
abΨphys = 0. (10.47)
In the position representation the first of these implies that Ψphys must vanish off the clas-
sical constraint surface defined by hij = 0, reducing the dimensionality of the physical
configuration space by one per spatial point.5 From the linearity of the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion it follows that the vanishing of Ψphys off the surface is consistent with its time evolu-
tion. This result is exactly analogous to what we found in our analysis for the anisotropic
minisuperspace model of section 10.1.
The physical wave functional is therefore necessarily discontinuous in the full (un-
constrained) configuration space. This is nonetheless not in conflict with the action of
the momenta νˆab as derivatives since they act tangential to the constraint surface, just as
their classical generator counterparts and analogous to their nature in the minisuperspace
model. Here one could also change variables (separately at each point in space) in order
to express all operators in terms of tangential derivatives only, as we did above, although
we will not do so here since no further insight is gained.
The momentum-trace constraint 10.47 does not restrict the set of possible physical
states any further since it is identically satisfied by the choice of representation of ˆ˜piab
even in the general case (eq. 10.7).
The momentum operator is Hermitian only when considered to zeroth order (meaning
the first two terms in 10.45), where its form is fully determined by the background. At
this order a momentum representation exists, although note that the representation of the
momentum in the position basis is still not the canonical one. The classical analogue
is that the Poisson brackets only contribute to the linear perturbation equations at zeroth
order as discussed above. The Hamiltonian may be made Hermitian by choosing the
symmetric ordering for the mixed term,
F (T )H
(0)
T ·M−2Pl T · 12(hˆij νˆij + νˆijhˆij). (10.48)
The reason Hermiticity cannot be established at all orders is in part that in the deriva-
tion of the Hamiltonian it was assumed that the perturbation variables hab and νab are
sufficiently small for a second-order Hamiltonian to adequately describe the dynamics.
The statement that the momentum or Hamiltonian operators be Hermitian however is, al-
gebraically speaking, a claim involving the functional integral over all allowed functions
5Recall that the true number of physical degrees of freedom is, of course, further reduced by the 3-
conformal-diffeomorphism invariance.
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hij , including those where individual components may be large. Therefore one would
have to apply finite (and adequately small) limits to the functional integral, or use an
appropriate attenuation functional, representing the notion that physical wavefunctionals
must become small for functions hij(x) with large upper bounds. However, even then one
can at best hope to establish Hermiticity approximately. This issue does not depend on
whether or not one restricts the functional integration to the constraint surface, whereas in
the non-perturbative finite-dimensional model developed in section 10.1 Hermiticity can
be established if one does make that restriction.
In practice one might ignore these issues and consider expression 10.45 to leading
order only, so that the Hamiltonian is Hermitian and a well-defined probability current
exists. One consequence of this is however that the geometric momentum operator νˆab is
therefore only a quantum observable at leading order. At this order, however, the quantum
theory is well defined. Even at higher order however there is no issue with the momentum
not being an observable as we discussed in the box in section 10.1. Momentum is only
approximately observable.
The quantum theory developed here is consistent and at this stage not obviously un-
reasonable. However, a full understanding can only be achieved once a number of topics
have been described within this framework, such as detailed solutions (possibly through
numerical work), the notion of a vacuum state, what kind of quantum effects might be
detectable, and so on. This will comprise a significant amount of work that is left for
future inquiry. Here we instead return to a more fundamental issue and question whether
there are alternatives to the canonical quantisation method.
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Part IV
Quantum cosmology without the
wavefunction
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Chapter 11
Trajectory-Weyl quantisation
In this chapter we propose a new quantisation procedure that does not rely on a ‘wave-
function’ and may be specifically suited to the quantisation of cosmological theories. The
approach combines aspects from two different lines of inquiry: the quantisation based on
ensembles of trajectories and quantum mechanics understood as a dynamical Weyl geom-
etry on configuration space. This chapter closely resembles the contents of ref. [102].
11.1 Introduction to trajectory-based quantisation
Formulating a consistent theory of quantum gravity requires a modification of either our
classical theory of gravity or our method to arrive at a quantum theory from a classical
theory, or possibly both. In the past chapters we considered almost exclusively the for-
mer, introducing the notion of a physically preferred time and exploring the consequences
of doing so. In this final part we finally consider the latter, a modification of the quan-
tisation process. We reported the contents of this chapter in ref. [102]. The schematic
developments in chapter 12 have not yet been published in any form.
Among the conceptual troubles of formulating a theory of quantum gravity is, for ex-
ample, the interpretation of the wavefunction of the universe, in particular with regards
to probabilistic notions. The scheme proposed here does not include any form of wave-
function. However, the idea presented here is still in its infancy and this final major part
of the present thesis should therefore be understood as a starting point for a future line of
investigation rather than a fully developed proposal for a theory of quantum gravity. In
fact, in this chapter we present the proposed formalism without any reference to gravity
at all and focus almost entirely on the quantisation of non-relativistic theories with finite-
dimensional configuration spaces. In the next chapter we discuss the application of this
scheme to gravity and cosmology, although results are at this point only schematic. The
proper extension of this approach to field theories involves certain technical complica-
tions, which we will address in future work.
The present proposal is based on two recent but entirely independent developments in
the foundations of quantum theory. The first is a number of ‘trajectory-only’ formulations
of quantum theory [120, 56, 130, 20, 98, 117, 118], though also see ref. [60], intended
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to recover quantum mechanics without reference to a physical wavefunction. Two related
approaches which however lead to an experimentally distinguishable theory are the real-
ensemble formulations of refs. [121, 122]. The other recent development of importance
to us is the insight that the non-classical nature of quantum dynamics may be understood
as a geometrical phenomenon, as has been shown for non-relativistic particle mechanics
[111, 27, 90], relativistic particle mechanics [112, 113] and for the particle Dirac equation
[114, 115, 116]. In this chapter we demonstrate that these two ideas form a natural union,
and that this union may indeed help to overcome a technical problem of the trajectory-
only approach that has remained largely, though not entirely, unaddressed.
We will show how quantum theory may be understood as a natural extension of clas-
sical mechanics by allowing the configuration-space geometry to be dynamical. Here
we focus on the non-relativistic theory. In previous approaches to such trajectory-only
formulations quantum mechanics was recovered by postulating a ‘force’ term that was
Newtonian in the sense that it appeared on the right-hand side of ‘mx¨ =’ (but was not
Newtonian in any other sense of the word). In its simplest formulation [120] this term was
chosen to match the quantum potential of Bohm [18, 59] with the substitution |ψ| → √ρ.
That is, the Born probability amplitude |ψ| was replaced by the square root of the sys-
tem density ρ in configuration space. This eliminates any reference to a wave function
ψ, which is not part of such a trajectory-only theory. However, it does require that ρ is
a physically real quantity. This means it requires the reality of all dynamically allowed
configuration-space trajectories, making it a theory of many worlds.1
We take a different approach and do not postulate such a force. Instead, we begin
by reconsidering aspects of classical mechanics, constructing an action that leads to a
simultaneous determination of all dynamically possible paths. Mathematically this is
almost trivial given the action for a single trajectory. However, it prepares the next step,
the introduction of a geometrical term in the action. This term is nothing but the curvature
of the configuration space. So the action to be associated with quantum mechanics will be
the sum of two terms: The classical matter action plus a curvature. Formally it is similar
to the Einstein-Hilbert action, although this analogy should not be taken too literally since
the latter concerns the curvature of (3 + 1)-spacetime, not configuration space.
The action we obtain is effectively that of Santamato [111], but unlike Santamato’s it
does not rely on the minimisation of expectation values. Nonetheless a substantial part of
our derivation is taken from [111]. Our action differs from that of [90] in its functional
form, although it turns out to be numerically equal on shell.
The trajectories we find turn out to be exactly those of de Broglie-Bohm theory [18,
59, 34] for an ensemble in equilibrium (ρ = |ψ|2).Equilibrium de Broglie-Bohm theory
exactly recovers all experimental predictions of quantum mechanics, and so the theory
presented here does so too. There is, however, a subtlety , which we will address.
1Some authors in their presentation have therefore likened aspects of the many-trajectory approach to
Everettian ‘many-world’ theory. We find this more confusing than helpful since the two have very little in
common with the exception of being described as theories of ‘many worlds’, a phrase with rather distinct
meanings in the two theories.
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The dynamical geometry of the configuration space is a so-called Weyl geometry
[141], of which we will give a brief review in section 11.3. We will find that the ge-
ometry has singularities, namely at points which in conventional quantum mechanics (or
de Broglie-Bohm theory) correspond to nodes in the wavefunction (ψ = 0). This will
lead us to refine our approach: We will move from trajectories in the configuration-space
manifold to a manifold of trajectories. This refinement is crucial to what is to follow, as
well as strongly preferable for philosophical reasons. However, for reasons of presenta-
tional clarity we will only make this change in our perspective once the basic tenets of
our theory are established.
As the final step in our recovery of the phenomenology of quantum mechanics we
address the aforementioned ‘subtlety’, namely the quantised nature of angular momen-
tum, manifest in the fact that loop integrals of the form
∮
~p · ~dl may be non-zero, yet
only take values 2pi~ ·m, m ∈ Z. In standard de Broglie-Bohm theory this result follows
from the multi-valuedness of the phase of the wavefunction and the fact that the phase
is undefined at nodes. In a naı¨ve trajectory-only theory it is entirely unclear why such a
result should hold, or how the integral could be non-zero at all. This was first pointed
out by Wallstrom [140] in connection with hydrodynamical approaches and has remained
largely unaddressed.2
Coming from the perspective of de Broglie-Bohm, the idea of ‘many de Broglie-Bohm
world’ theory may be considered a precursor to the trajectory-only theory. Here an infinite
ensemble of worlds evolves according to the laws of standard de Broglie-Bohm theory,
guided by an ontological wave function. The notion appeared inadvertently as a result
of the ‘many-worlds-in-denial’ objection to de Broglie-Bohm theory [35, 25] and was
discussed and criticised by Valentini [135], whose position was subsequently challenged
by Brown [24]. Since there is a physical wave function in this theory, Wallstrom’s problem
does not arise. The concept is also discussed by Sebens [120], who calls the theory
‘prodigal QM’, although he considers it with only a finite number of trajectories.
Let us now turn to many-trajectory theory proper. It is instructive to outline the ap-
proaches of other authors briefly and review how they have addressed the Wallstrom ob-
jection, before summarising the solution presented in this paper. This short survey is not
intended to be comprehensive or detailed. I am however not aware of any such survey
on the subject in the existing literature (with the exception of ref. [102], of course, which
contains significant overlap with the present chapter).
The idea of formulating quantum mechanics in terms of the flow of an ensemble of
configuration-space particles is sometimes traced back to ideas of Madelung [78]. How-
ever, this is a rather anachronistic reading of Madelung and historically inaccurate [5]:
Madelung imagined the electron as a charged fluid in three-space and he did not make the
leap to configuration space as the arena of the dynamics, nor did he consider individual
trajectories within the fluid to have any ontological significance. His approach is there-
fore more akin to that of Schro¨dinger than having any resemblance to the trajectory-based
2Strictly speaking only the first of these questions is the one asked by Wallstrom in [140]. However, I
will use the phrase ‘Wallstrom’s objection’ more broadly and include also the second where applicable.
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approached with which we are concerned here.
Sebens [120] arrives at the trajectory-only theory by starting from the point of view
of de Broglie-Bohm, introducing an ensemble of ‘worlds’ distributed according to |ψ|2
and then eliminates ψ in favour of the ensemble density. However, he suggests that this is
only a continuum limit of a more fundamental ontology with only a finite (though large)
number of worlds. As such, quantum mechanics is considered to be only approximately
correct, though sufficiently accurate for a difference to be experimentally undetected at
this point. Sebens addresses Wallstrom’s objection by introducing an appropriate quanti-
sation condition, although stating that this is preliminary and that for now the quantised
nature of these loop integrals is an empirically discovered feature of our universe.
The approach of Hall et al. [56] is similar to that of Sebens, except that they discuss in
more detail the nature of the inter-world interaction in the case of a finite number of worlds
and indeed provide a concrete example for a one-dimensional model. They also apply the
theory to a series of quantum phenomena and use it as a tool to numerically approximate
ground state wavefunctions. They do not address Wallstrom’s objection however.
Tipler [130] (but also see his earlier work [129]) begins with classical mechanics with
an infinity of trajectories and then introduces the ‘smoothing potential’ U (equal to the
quantum potential once the function R appearing in the definition of U has been made) as
the unique correction to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation that avoids the crossing of trajec-
tories and thereby ensures the smoothness of Hamilton’s principal function S and, in his
words, prevents ‘god from playing dice’, referring to the ambiguity in evolution where
trajectories would cross in the absence of the smoothing potential. He likens this addition
to Maxwell’s introduction of the displacement current in Ampe`re’s law. The constant ~
must exist based on dimensional grounds. He also discusses the recovery of Born proba-
bilities and the uncertainty principle in terms of his theory. However, despite employing
an example involving angular momentum he does not address Wallstrom’s issue. Indeed,
S is a real valued function by construction —the classical Hamilton principal function—
and therefore any non-zero value of angular momentum remains to be explained.
A critique of Tipler’s proposal can be found in Bostro¨m [20]. Bostro¨m’s approach
shares features with that of Sebens, Hall et al. and Tipler, but he is very careful about dis-
cussing the philosophical and logical foundations required for the construction of his the-
ory. Somewhat peculiarly though the existence of a wave function is one of the postulates
of his theory, although he makes clear that ‘existence’ here is meant in a mathematical
sense (that is, such a function is definable) and not in some ontological sense. This does
help his theory to overcome Wallstrom’s objection, although the theory may be seen as
somewhat unsatisfactory given the reliance on a wave function, ontological or not. Unlike
Sebens and Hall et al., Bostro¨m argues in favour of a continuous infinity of worlds rather
than a large but finite number and he briefly discusses the measure-theoretic foundations
for such a picture, in particular in response to criticism by Vaidman [133].
The approach of Schiff and Poirier [98, 117] is different in that their formulation
does not rely on the introduction of a quantum potential in the usual form. Instead, they
consider higher-order time derivatives of the variables to appear in the expressions for
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the Lagrangian and energy of their theory. Certain constraints on their form then allow
the identification of a term that effectively constitutes (at least numerically) the quantum
potential as the simplest option (although at least in the time-dependent case reference
to a density of trajectories in configuration space cannot be avoided). The authors show
how the function S can be recovered as the action integral along a trajectory, but why this
function should indeed be phase-like in its multivaluedness remains unaddressed.
Schmelzer’s [118, 119] construction is somewhat similar to Tipler, Sebens and Hall
et al., although he discusses a number of foundational points not addressed by them and,
crucially, provides a detailed discussion of Wallstrom’s objection together with a proposal
to overcome it. He shows that a regularity postulate for the Laplacian of the density ∆ρ
suffices to restrict the value of the loop integrals
∮
~p · ~dl to take values equal to ±~. The
postulate is equivalent to demanding that the nodes of the wave function are simple ze-
ros. Since other integer values are however possible in standard quantum theory such
situations must correspond to the presence of multiple zeros within the loop. For this
to be viable one must consider quantum mechanics to be merely an approximation to
some underlying ‘subquantum’ theory, whose exact nature is unknown, but which may
be empirically distinguishable, at least in principle. Therefore, while not proposing an
experimentally distinct theory, Schmelzer’s reasoning may nonetheless be experimentally
assessible, although hard to ever rule out since, if standard quantum mechanics holds
up, one is always able to change the regime (scale) on which differences are expected to
become detectable. Despite this departure from quantum mechanics, Schmelzer does re-
solve the Wallstrom objection in his framework. The regularity postulate itself is justified
by another principle concerning the nature of the elusive subquantum theory, which he
calls the ‘principle of minimal distortion’, together with a recognition of the role of ∆ρ in
the energy-balance equation associated with the trajectories, although he acknowledges
that this specification is ‘speculative in character’ [119] because it concerns the unknown
subquantum theory.
Smolin [121, 122] has made two proposals for real-ensemble formulations, mean-
ing formulations of quantum mechanics in terms of ensembles of identical systems in a
single (our) world. As such they do not belong to the family of many-trajectory theories
discussed so far. However, Smolin’s theories address Wallstrom‘s objection and are there-
fore of interest to our purposes, although we cannot, of course, do his approaches justice
here. His first formulation [121] is based on a stochastic dynamics governing how systems
copy their beables onto those of similar system (in addition to a further deterministic dy-
namical law concerning a ‘phase’ associated with each system). Wallstrom’s objection is
avoided in virtue of the form of the action, in which the phase variables appear as phases,
not their real-valued gradient. There are other issues with this approach however, notably
what the author calls ‘phase alignment’, for which a mechanism is suggested but which,
in the author’s own words, “is ad hoc and can probably be improved on”. His second
formulation [122] does not rely on a stochastic mechanism but the ‘principle of maximal
variety’, which effectively drives systems towards greater distinctiveness (a term which
is given a quantitative definition) with regards to their relation to the rest of the universe.
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Mathematically this is achieved via a potential-energy term that is a function of the ensem-
ble properties, in particular the aforementioned ‘distinctiveness’. In the appropriate limit
quantum mechanics can be recovered, although one can expect experimental deviations
from quantum mechanics for appropriately rare systems, such as macroscopic objects.
Motivation for this idea is found in Leibniz’ Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles.
Smolin addresses Wallstrom’s issue by introducing unimodular complex beables to take
the role of momenta, rather than real-valued phases. This is a relatively straightforward
solution, although it may be criticised on the basis that it was introduced specifically to
solve this problem and without independent motivation.
Our solution to the Wallstrom’s objection consists of a slight generalisation of our ac-
tion, bringing it into the most general form that still retains the same equations of motion.
While this modification is, of course, prompted by the necessity to address Wallstrom’s
objection, we emphasise that the new term is by no means ad hoc. Rather, it is the most
general total derivative that can be consistently added to the Lagrangian and the addi-
tion of the total derivative in the first place is connected to the open-endpoint variation
employed in the construction (see sec. 11.2).
At the end of this chapter we discuss the viability of this quantisation scheme to field
theory and gravity. The detailed implementation thereof is left to future work.
11.2 Relevant aspects of classical mechanics
In this section we discuss two somewhat unconventional aspects of classical mechanics
that will be relevant when we introduce our action for quantum trajectories below. The
first of these is variation of an action without fixing the end point, apparently leading to
the condition that the momenta pi vanish. However, if the Lagrangian is specified only
up to a total derivative of some unknown function S (this does not change the equations
of motion), then the condition obtained is pi = ∂iS. This use of open-endpoint variation
is due to Santamato [111]. Tipler [130] uses open-endpoint variation in a similar though
not identical manner in his derivation of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation. The second point
of discussion is the simultaneous variation of multiple trajectories in configuration space
by summing (or integrating) the actions of each individual system. At first this remark
may appear almost trivial, yet it will present a natural starting point for our derivation of
quantum trajectories later on.
11.2.1 Open-endpoint variation and total derivatives
Let us assume that in our classical theory the trajectories q(t) traced out in a configuration
space C may be obtained by extremisation of an action,
I1 =
∫
dt L(q(t), q˙(t), t) (11.1)
where q = {q1, . . . , qn} are the configuration variables and L is the Lagrangian. A dot
denotes differentiation with respect to the time parameter t. In the usual approach one
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fixes the two end points of the trajectory, that is, the configuration of the system at two
times t0 and t1: q0 = q(t0) and q1 = q(t1), where t1 > t0. Since the value of I1 (and L
and the intermediate points q(t)) depends on the choice of end points, we should strictly
write
I1(q0, t0; q1, t1) =
∫ t1
t0
dt L
(
q(q0; q1; t), q˙(q0; q1; t), t
)
. (11.2)
This is usually not done since it is cumbersome notation and the choice of end points q0
and q1 does not affect the equations of motion. Only the functional form of the Lagrangian
is of significance. Rarely is the numerical value of the action integral of interest.
The variation δq at t0 and t1 is assumed to vanish, and so there is no boundary term
when performing the partial integrations that lead to the equations of motion. But consider
now the case where we only set δq = 0 at t0, but leave it open at t1.3 We therefore write
I1(q0, t0; t1) =
∫ t1
t0
dt L
(
q(q0; t), q˙(q0; t), t
)
. (11.3)
In that case variation yields a non-zero boundary term, proportional to the variation at t1:
δI1(q0, t0; t1) =
∂L
∂q˙i
(
q(t1, q0), q˙(t1, q0), t
) · δqi(t1, q0)
−
t1∫
t0
dt
[
∂
∂t
∂L
∂q˙i
(
q(t, q0), q˙(t, q0), t)
)− ∂L
∂qi
(
q(t, q0), q˙(t, q0), t
)] · δqi(t, q0).
(11.4)
The variation δq(t1, q0) at the end point is independent of the variation δq(t, q0) at inter-
mediate times. The vanishing of the boundary term is not a result of the vanishing of the
integrand along the path. Rather it is the result of the applications of Hamilton’s prin-
ciple, demanding that δI1 = 0 for any choice of path and endpoint. As a result each of
the two terms must vanish separately. Hence an extremisation of I1 implies that the term
multiplying δq(t1, q0) must vanish, as does the expression inside the square brackets. The
latter gives the usual Euler-Lagrange equation, while the former implies that
pi
(
q(t1, q0), q˙(t1, q0), t
) ≡ ∂L
∂q˙i
(
q(t1, q0), q˙(t1, q0), t
)
= 0. (11.5)
The momenta at the end point vanish. In fact, the appearance of such an end-point con-
straint is a general feature of variational problems with open boundary conditions [72,
chap. 2]..
In the context of Lagrangian mechanics this condition appears rather undesirable, as
it seems to suggest that ‘ignorance’ of the final position of our system implies that its
momenta must vanish (and if our action principle is be extremised for any choice of t0
and t1 the implication is that the momenta would have to vanish at all times). Nonetheless
3We could have chosen to leave both open, or only the initial variation. The reasoning that follows
would be similar.
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open-endpoint variation has found to be useful in the elimination of unphysical (gauge)
degrees of freedom via a procedure called ‘best-matching’ [8, Sec. 4], which we briefly
discussed in chapter 2. Here we employ the method for another purpose however.
A slight generalisation of our Lagrangian alleviates any concern we might have re-
garding the boundary equation 11.5. It is well known that the equations of motions are
unchanged if a total time derivative of an arbitrary function S(q, t) of the system variables
and time is added to the Lagrangian:
I¯1(q0, t0; t1) =
∫ t1
t0
dt
[
L
(
q(q0; t), q˙(q0; t), t
)− dS
dt
(
q(q0, t), t
)]
. (11.6)
The relative minus sign is for later convenience. Note that dS
dt
= ∂S
∂t
+ q˙i∂iS. Performing
the variation as before, the boundary equation is now
pi
(
q(t1, q0), q˙(t1, q0), t
)− ∂iS(q(t1, q0), t) = 0, (11.7)
where pi is defined as above (that is, in terms of the original Lagrangian without the
total time derivative). Since this is to hold for any interval [t0, t1], we have in general
that pi = ∂iS. This equation can be seen as determining S up to an arbitrary additive
function of time.4 It only restricts the momenta pi in that these must be the gradient of
some function.
Of course, S turns out to have all the properties of a generator of those canonical
transformations that represent the time evolution of the system. In a more usual approach
we might have introduced it as such. However, here we see that such a function can also
be introduced in the Lagrangian picture as an arbitrary addition to the Lagrangian that
leaves the equations of motion unchanged. For example, using q˙ipi = q˙i∂iS = dSdt − ∂S∂t ,
together with H(q,∇S, t) ≡ q˙i∂iS − L(q, q˙, t) allows one to obtain the usual Hamilton-
Jacobi equation for our function S.
Returning briefly to the use of open-endpoint variations in the context of ’best-matching’,
it is worth noting that Barbour’s and his collaborators’ use [8] and ours is perfectly con-
sistent, provided we demand that the function S depend only on physical and not on non-
physical gauge degrees of freedom. Then the momenta associated with the non-physical
variables vanish, while those associated with physical ones satisfy pi = ∂iS. In fact, we
believe this to be a promising line of investigation for the construction of a fully relational
quantum theory from first principles. This might then be extended to form a natural quan-
tisation scheme of Shape Dynamics (see chapter 2) to produce a promising candidate for
a viable theory of quantum gravity.
11.2.2 Action principles for multiple simultaneous trajectories
The extremisation of I1 (or I¯1) determines dynamically allowed configuration-space tra-
jectories of a single system, starting at q0 at time t0. In the absence of a fixed end point,
4If we really wish to add the most general total derivative to the Lagrangian (which still does not change
the equations of motion, of course), then another subtlety arises regarding the function S. We will not go
into it here though but reserve it for section 11.5, where it will be of relevance.
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a second boundary condition (such as the initial velocity q˙(t0)) must be given in order to
pick out a single trajectory uniquely.
Suppose now that instead of one such system we have N systems of the same type,
located at positions q0(1), q0(2), . . . at start time t0, with q0(J) = {q10(J), . . . , qn0(J)}, J =
1, . . . , N . The usual thing to do would be to extremise I¯1(q0(J), t0; t1) for each q0(J).
Each time we would get the same equations of motion and only the initial conditions
differ. That is, we have a different action for each system (taking different numerical
values), although all the actions are identical in their functional form. This latter fact is
the reason that in practice we would only derive the equations of motion once and then
merely introduce the boundary conditions when solving them.
However, it is also possible to extremise a single action in order to obtain all N tra-
jectories at once (provided sufficiently many boundary conditions are specified). To do so
we use the action
IN(q0(1), . . . , q0(N), t0; t1) =
1
N
N∑
J=1
I1(q0(J)). (11.8)
The factor 1/N is not necessary for finite N but is introduced here for consistency with
what is to follow. The variations δq(t, q0(J)) for each J are independent of one another and
so this action yields N sets of formally identical Euler-Lagrange equations. In addition
we have N sets of boundary equations 11.7, one for each system.
We can generalise this to an infinite number of systems. For a countable infinity we
take the limit,
I∞ = lim
N→∞
IN(q0(J); J ∈ N). (11.9)
Here the factor 1/N is important since otherwise the numerical value of the action would
in general be infinite and thus not extremisable.5 Here we will not consider the countable
case any further.
For a continuous (uncountable) infinity of system we must define a measure µ(q0)
over the configuration space, representing the density of systems at q0 at time t0. Since
µ is defined over the whole configuration space (with µ = 0 in places where there are no
systems), the starting positions q0 take on the role of coordinates. Let us therefore make
the purely notational replacement q0 → x. Instead of the discrete label J = 1, 2, . . . ,
systems are now labelled by the value of their initial position x (or q0). The total action
for this infinite ensemble of systems is now an integral over all starting positions x with
measure µ(x), which we assume to be normalisable. The action is therefore
IEns =
∫
C
dnxµ(x)I1(x, t0; t1)
=
∫
C
dnxµ(x)
∫ t1
t0
dt
[
L
(
q(t, x), q˙(t, x), t
)− dS
dt
(
q(x, t), t
)]
(11.10)
5Alternatively we could have written down an infinite sum explicitly, but then we must use coefficients
αJ , which converge to zero sufficiently quickly as J → ∞, so that the sum
∑∞
J=1 αJI1(q0(J)) is finite.
However, this would give different ‘weights’ to different systems.
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Let us reiterate: x labels the initial position at time t0 and therefore functions as a
coordinate for an ensemble whose distribution in C forms a continuum (or at least may
be approximated by one). The dynamical variable itself is q(t, x), that is, the variables
are labelled by their initial position q(t0, x) = x. The integral of x over the configuration
space C is not an integral of the dynamical variable but of the initial positions. (It would
be nonsensical to integrate over all q and at the same time attempt to arrive at dynamical
laws for q.)
Note that µ(x) is a function over the configuration space describing the ensemble den-
sity at time t0, not over the variables q. This measure turns the integral over configuration
space into an integral over all systems in the ensemble. If the ensemble is allowed to
evolve for some time, and then the systems are ‘relabelled’ at some later time t′0 by their
instantaneous positions q(t′0, y) = y, the new density function µ
′(y) will of course not be
identical with the original µ(x).
One may furthermore show using standard results of classical mechanics that the mea-
sure µ obeys a continuity equation,
∂µ
∂t
+ ∂i
(
q˙iµ
)
= 0. (11.11)
This follows from the fact that the momentum pi is given by the spatial gradient of a func-
tion S, which ensures that trajectories can never cross (or begin or end) and furthermore
are continuous on the configuration space.
We are now in a position to make the step towards the quantum theory.
11.3 Review of Weyl geometry
In this short section we present the main ideas and relevant results of a Weyl geometry.
The primary source (and in our opinion still the best one despite its age) is found in the
mathematical sections of Weyl‘s own work [141].6 Here we will remain brief and only
quote the results relevant to us.
In order to avoid confusion we emphasise that a Weyl geometry is a concept that is
distinct from those of the perhaps more widely known ‘Weyl transformations’, ‘Weyl-
invariant theories’ and so on. The latter concepts are applicable to Riemannian geome-
tries. For example, a Weyl-invariant theory is a theory determined by an action principle
which is invariant under a local rescaling gµν(x)→ Ω2(x)gµν(x) (plus matter-field rescal-
ing depending on their conformal weights) and has found application in some spacetime
theories of gravity and matter.
A Weyl geometry on the other hand is a generalisation of a Riemannian geometry in
the sense that it is concerned with manifolds equipped with a metric gij but also further
geometric degrees of freedom not encoded in the metric. They key difference to a Rie-
mannian geometry is that ‘length’ is not comparable across finite distances. In Weyl’s
6The sections on physical interpretation in Weyl’s paper are also of extraordinary interest, although it
seems that the (rather beautiful) idea to identify the Weyl one-form with the electromagnetic 4-potential
ultimately fails. See the Einstein-Weyl correspondence following Weyl’s other 1918 paper [77].
150
words, it is a ‘pure infinitesimal geometry’. Consider a vector Ak at some point P in the
manifold, and suppose the vector is parallel-transported along some curve C to a point
P ′, where the transported vector is denoted by A′k. In the case of a Riemannian geometry
the direction of the vector is dependent on the connecting curve C. However, its length is
not. The length |A′| = √gijA′iA′j depends only on the local metric gab(P ′). In this sense
length is path-independent and can be compared across finite distances in a Riemannian
manifold.
This is not the case if the geometry is a Weyl geometry. Here the length |A′| of the
transported vector Ak is also path dependent. For reasons described in [141] it is arguably
natural to demand that for an infinitesimal transformation P → P +dP , or in coordinates
xi + dxi, the change in length is linear. That is, for a general length `, we find
`+ d` = `+ `φkdx
k, (11.12)
where φk is an arbitrary one-form and the full geometric properties of the manifold are
given by the pair (gij, φk). The two sets of variables gij and φk are a priori independent
from one another, so that they may be varied independently in the application of an action
principle, for example.
In general, an infinitesimal transport results in a change in the vector given by δAk =
Γkijdx
iAk, where the coefficients Γkij are a priori arbitrary. However, this definition of Γ
k
ij ,
together with δ|A|2 = δ(gijAiAj), implies that
Γkij =
1
2
gkl (∂igjl + ∂jgil − ∂lgij) + 1
2
gkl (gliφj + gljφi − gijφl) , (11.13)
If φk ≡ 0, this expression reduces to the usual Christoffel symbol and the geometry is
Riemannian. That is, the vectors undergo no change in length as they are transported
along a curve.
Curvature is defined exactly as in the Riemannian case as a commutator of covariant-
derivative operators, RijklA
j = ∇l∇kAi − ∇k∇lAi, leading to the usual expression in
terms in the connections Γkij , although their expression 11.13 differ from the Riemannian
case. After some algebra we see that the scalar curvature (the one pertinent to our action)
is given by
R = RRiem + (n− 1)(n− 2)φkφk − 2√
g
(n− 1)∂k(√gφk). (11.14)
Also note that the covariant derivative (defined in the usual way) of the metric does not
vanish:
∇kgij = gijφk. (11.15)
This implies that if one chooses coordinates such that locally the metric is gab = diag(1, 1, . . . )
it is not the case that the connection coefficients Γabc vanish.
7
7Contrast this to General Relativity, where ∇gµν = 0, so that Lorentz frames (where gµν =
diag(−1, 1, . . . ) locally) are inertial frames (where Γαµν = 0) and vice versa (see [86])
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One can in general consider a joint local transformation of the two geometric degrees
of freedom, gij → ωgij , φk → φk − ∂k lnω, under which it is reasonable to demand that
a physical theory be invariant, given that such a transformation does not change the local
notion of length and angles, or how to transport them. These gauge transformation are
clearly similar to the notion of ‘Weyl transformations’ in a Riemannian geometry since
the metric gij transforms in the same manner, but the latter does not have the separate
notion of φk, that is, path-dependent transport properties of length.
Accordingly, one can make a gauge choice by choosing ω(x) with some given initial
values gij and φk. In particular, if the Weyl geometry is integrable, meaning φk is the gra-
dient of a scalar function, then it is possible to choose ω such that after the transformation
φk = 0 and the geometry is Riemannian. If on the other hand the metric can be expressed
gij(x) = λ(x)g¯ij everywhere with g¯ij constant, then one can choose a gauge such that gij
is spatially constant and only φk has spatial dependence, so that the curvature is only a
function of φk. This latter scenario will be the case relevant to us below.
For our considerations below we do not consider the Riemannian part of the geometry,
that is, the part determined by the metric gij , to have any dynamical meaning. Ultimately
the metric geometry of the configuration space may find some application but at this
preliminary stage we contend with illustrating that the Weylian part (determined by φk)
of the configuration-space geometry can be understood to encode the difference between
classical and quantum dynamics. In [111] Santamato chose a similar route. He chose
to include explicit reference to the metric gij “[o]nly for the sake of generality, as well
as in view of further extension to spinning particles” [p. 216]. For the sake of algebraic
simplicity we will not include reference to gij in this work and leave a generalisation and
extension entirely to future inquiry.
11.4 Quantum trajectories from an action principle
In this section we allow the geometry of the configuration space to become dynamical. To
this end, we treat the Weyl one-form φk as a dynamical variable and add to the classical
ensemble action IEns a curvature term with an appropriately chosen constant of a form
closely resembling conformal coupling. Extremising this action we obtain the equation
of motion for q (now with an extra non-classical term stemming from the curvature term),
the continuity equation (from variation of the function S) and the relationship between
the geometry and the measure µ. We show how these equations reproduce quantum be-
haviour, up to a subtlety that we will address in section 11.5.
11.4.1 Preliminary remarks
In our discussion in section 11.2 the density µ(x) did not play any dynamical role since
in the extremisation of the ensemble action IEns the total minimum was found as the
weighted sum of the minima of each trajectory. That is, the minimisation of one trajectory
was independent from the minimisation of any other. We will now introduce a term that
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effectively constitutes an interaction between trajectories. More precisely, we add the
curvature of the configuration space to our Lagrangian (with a suitably chosen coupling
constant that essentially turns out to correspond to ~2 up to a numerical factor resembling
a conformal coupling). This curvature is that of a Weyl geometry (see section 11.3 and
[141]) and its Weyl one-form φk is considered to be a dynamical variable. The role of the
‘Riemannian’ part of the curvature (due to the metric gij) is yet to be investigated. Here it
is of secondary importance and gij is not considered dynamical for our current purposes.
Much of the mathematical structure appearing in this construction is again due to
Santamato [111] and our notation is close to (though not identical with) his. However,
Santamato’s approach is founded on the stochastic approach of Nelson and Madelung,
not a many-trajectories theory. Santamato’s quantum action also involves the minimisa-
tion of an expectation value, which one might find ontologically questionable.8 In our
case, the minimisation principle remains unchanged from the classical minimisation of
IEns. Merely an interaction term is added in the form of the curvature term. This curva-
ture term constitutes an interaction between ‘neighbouring’ trajectories since it contains
configuration-spatial derivatives.
Note that our (and equivalently Santamato’s) action is numerically identical to the ac-
tion used in [90] after use of dS
dt
= ∂S
∂t
+ q˙i ∂S
∂qi
, pi = ∂S∂qi and H = q˙
ipi − L. However, we
consider our action to be a more natural starting point as a natural extension of the clas-
sical action. The approach of [90] also differs in three other regards: Firstly, the authors
are committed to consider a geometry on space rather than configuration space and their
approach therefore only applies to a single particle (although without this commitment
their formalism easily generalises). Secondly, the variation of their curvature term is done
in the style of Palatini, that is, by considering the connection Γabc as independent variables.
Here on the other hand we will vary the curvature R as a function of the Riemannian met-
ric gij and Weyl one-form φk, although this latter difference is primarily aesthetic. The
final difference is that they presuppose the Weyl geometry to be integrable, whereas in
our formalism (just as in Santamato’s) this is a result that follows from the equations of
motion.
11.4.2 The quantum action and its variation
We now append the classical Lagrangian by a curvature term γ(n)λ2R[g, φ], where λ is
a coupling constant that is ultimately fixed by observation. The term γ(n) = 1
8
n−2
n−1 is a
numerical constant dependent on the dimensionality of the configuration space, chosen
8How can we make sense of the concept prior to having a theory of measurement and without the notion
of quantum states, for example?
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for later convenience.9 That is, the action for the Trajectory-Weyl theory (TWT) is
ITWT =
∫
C
dnx
√
gµ(x)
t1∫
t0
dt
(
Lclass(q, q˙, t)− dS
dt
(q, t) + γ(n)λ2R[gij(q, t), φi(q, t)]
)
,
(11.16)
where
R[gij(q, t), φi(q, t)] ≡ RRiem[gij] + (n− 1)
[
(n− 2)φiφi − 2√
g
∂i
(√
gφi
)]
(11.17)
as obtained above. Note that we have included
√
g in the volume element inside the
integral since we allow for a general metric gij . The dependence of the variables on the
initial position x has been suppressed.
In what follows, we assume for simplicity that the configuration-space C is flat in the
Riemannian sense (RRiem = 0) and the
√
g is merely determined by coordinates. For the
purposes of illustration one may choose the coordinates to be Cartesian, so that
√
g = 1.
This fixes the Weyl gauge in the manner described at the end of section 11.3. The only
geometric degree of freedom is φk, which, we emphasise, is a variable independent of gij .
We take note though that in classical mechanics C may have a non-zero RRiem for
systems with certain types of constraints which lead to a reduced configuration space
(a (n − l)-dimensional surface with non-vanishing curvature within the n-dimensional
configuration space, where l is the number of independent constraints). Whether or not the
‘quantisation’ method proposed here could (or should) be applied to a classical reduced
configuration space in the presence of constraints is to be investigated in the future.
The similarity of 11.16 with the Einstein-Hilbert action is obvious and may in part
be the superficial appeal of this approach. However, the analogy is minimal. Our action
is defined in configuration space, not physical space(-time). Furthermore, because we
do not worry about tensorial properties relating to a theory’s general covariance (as one
would in general relativity with matter fields) but use fixed coordinates we do not have to
generalise the derivative operators in the Lagrangian to covariant derivatives. Covariant
generalisations are left to future work.
Let us for the sake of specificality consider the classical starting point to be an N -
particle system in three dimensions (n = 3N ) with particle masses mI , I = 1, . . . N .
The masses can be absorbed in the metric gij on C in the usual way. For example for two
particles of masses m1 and m2, we would take gij = diag(m1,m1,m1,m2,m2,m2) (in
Cartesian coordinates), enabling us to write terms in the form
∑
I
1
2
m1~˙qI · ~˙qI = 12gij q˙iq˙j =
1
2
q˙iq˙i and
∑
i
1
2mI
~pI · ~pI = 12gijpipj = 12pipj , and so on, being careful to keep track of
the natural index position for the dynamical quantities. See [72] or any other book on
analytic mechanics for further details. Hence there is no need to include explicit mass
terms in what follows.
9Note that this expression for γ is introduced with the knowledge of hindsight. Without this hindsight,
we might have absorbed any such constant into λ2.
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Variation of q: The law of motion Since R has only dependence on q and not q˙, the
boundary equation is unchanged, pi = ∂iS, and the Euler-Lagrange equation simply
acquires an extra term γλ2 ∂R
∂qi
:
0 =
d
dt
∂Lclass
∂q˙i
(
q(t, x), q˙(t, x), t
)− ∂Lclass
∂qi
(
q(t, x), q˙(t, x), t
)
− γλ2∂R
∂qi
[
gij(q(t, x), t), φi(q(t, x), t)
]
(11.18)
The new term will ultimately be interpretable as a ‘quantum potential’ Q that matches
Bohm’s, as we will see. The equation then takes the form of the classical equation of
motion with Q appearing in the role of a new potential term, at least formally.
Variation of φ: Relationship between φ and µ We note that only the new term carries
dependence on the Weyl one-form φ. Hence we wish to minimise
IR = (n+ 1)
∫
C
dnx
√
gµ
[
(n− 2)φiφi − 2√
g
∂i(
√
gφi)
]
= (n+ 1)
∫
C
dnx
[
µ
√
g(n− 2)φiφi +√gφi · 2∂iµ
]
. (11.19)
where we have partially integrated in order to arrive at the last line. The boundary term
drops out since µ is normalisable and therefore vanishing at infinity. For better readability
arguments have been suppressed.
Following [111], a little algebra reveals that the term to be extremised can be written
as
IR = −n− 1
n− 2
∫
C
dnq µ
√
ggij∂i(lnµ)∂j(lnµ)
+
n− 1
n− 2
∫
c
µ
√
ggij
(
(n− 2)φi + ∂i(lnµ)
)(
(n− 2)φj + ∂j(lnµ)
)
. (11.20)
This brings IR into a form that is independent of derivatives of φi. Furthermore, the
first term contains no dependence on φi and can therefore be ignored for the purposes of
extremisation.
The extremisation is easy since the integrand is positive definite (with
√
g and µ being
positive definite and the rest being of the square form gijWiWj with Wi = (n − 2)φi +
∂i(lnµ)). Hence the the minimum must be bounded from below by zero and indeed it is
clear that this minimum is obtained by
φi = − 1
n− 2∂i(lnµ). (11.21)
This shows that the Weyl geometry is integrable, that is, there is a scalar function f
on C such that φi = ∂if . Hence a local scale may be defined on C and the final length
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of a vector transported between two points in C is path-independent. As we stated an
integrable Weyl geometry allows a gauge choice such that φi = 0 (that is, f = const.)
everywhere. However, in our case we already fixed the gauge such that the Riemannian
metric gij is constant.
The continuity equation The continuity equation may be obtained in the same manner
as for the classical case, using the fact that the momentum is given by a spatial derivatives
at all times as a result of the boundary equation 11.7. The presence of the curvature term
has no impact. It takes the form
∂µ
∂t
+ ∂i
(
µq˙i
)
= 0. (11.22)
Had we not fixed the coordinates to be Cartesian, then the equation would include
additional factors of
√
g [see 111],
∂
∂t
(
√
gµ) + ∂i
(√
gµq˙i
)
= 0, (11.23)
The appearance of
√
g with µ corresponds to the fact that µ is a scalar density of weight
one.
From the meaning of µ, introduced in the process of taking the continuum limit for
a configuration-space ensemble, we should have expected such a continuity equation to
hold. It confirms that µ may be interpreted as a density. This equation furthermore shows
that µ is conserved along a trajectory.
11.4.3 Equivalence with equilibrium de Broglie-Bohm theory
Substituting the solution 11.21 into the expression 11.17 for the curvature, we find that
(by simple algebra, and using γ = 1
8
n−2
n−1 )
R = RRiem +
n− 1
n− 2
[
∂i(lnµ)g
ij∂j(lnµ) +
2√
g
∂i
(√
ggij∂j(lnµ)
)]
= RRiem +
1
2γ
√
µ
∂i
(√
ggij∂j
√
µ
)
. (11.24)
With this, the Hamilton-Jacobi equation derived from the Lagrangian L− dS
dt
+ γλ2R
becomes
0 =
∂S
∂t
+H(q,∇S, t)
=
∂S
∂t
+Hclass(q,∇S, t)− γλ2RRiem − λ
2
2
∂i(
√
ggij∂j
√
µ)√
µ
, (11.25)
where we used the fact that the momentum conjugate to φi vanishes identically since φ˙i
does not appear in the expression for R.
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The reader familiar with de Broglie-Bohm theory in Bohm’s second-order formulation
will recognise the last term on the right as the quantum potential (at least for a broad
class of particle systems), provided λ2 = ~2 (which ultimately is just the experimental
discovery of the value of a constant, or, viewed differently, the discovery of a property of
the system of units used) and that µ, the configuration-space measure, can be interpreted
as the equilibrium density |Ψ|2. But the measure µ was introduced as describing the local
(in C) density of systems of our ensemble in the continuum limit and so this is indeed the
natural interpretation.
In order to obtain the evolution of the ensemble as a whole, eq. 11.25 must now be
solved simultaneously with the continuity equation (eq. 11.22) for µ and S, which in
practice would be done by combining them into the complex field ψ =
√
µeiS/~ on C.
Solving for a single trajectory alone is not possible, since R contains reference to µ,
which is determined by the collection of all trajectories.
The equations 11.25 and 11.22 match, of course, the usual quantum Hamilton-Jacobi
and continuity equations known from equilibrium de Broglie-Bohm theory, with the dif-
ference that no reference to any wavefunction ψ is made and the ‘quantum potential’
contains
√
µ instead of |ψ|, with the consequence that there is no state of quantum non-
equilibrium.10
Note that de Broglie’s first-order dynamics11 also emerges from this formalism (at
least for certain Lagrangians), namely as the condition pi = ∂iS derived from the bound-
ary equation resulting from the open-endpoint variation.
Thus the equations derived here are equivalent with those of de Broglie-Bohm theory.
It appears that therefore the predictions of quantum mechanics have also been recovered.
However, this conclusion would be incorrect, as we will discuss in the next section.
11.5 Nodes and the phase-like nature of S
In this section we discuss the inequivalence between the present theory as it stands and
de Broglie-Bohm quantum mechanics. The issue is related to the respective single versus
multi-valuedness of S. However, we show how the phase-like behaviour of S can be
recovered in our theory using a further generalisation of our Lagrangian. To do so, we
first discuss the concept and nature of ‘nodes’ in our theory and their relationship to the
geometry. This requires a shift in our perspective: from a configuration-space manifold
with trajectories to a manifold of trajectories.
10The term ’non-equilibrium’ here is meant in the sense of de Broglie-Bohm, that is, a state where
ρ 6= |ψ|2. This is impossible here since ψ is not an ontological entity in its own right but only definable
in terms of ρ and S (up to an unphysical overall phase factor). Contrast this to ‘many-de Broglie-Bohm
worlds’ theory [120, 135], where such ρ and |ψ| are a priori independent of one another.
11The distinction between the theories of de Broglie and Bohm is often overlooked. The equilibrium
state of de Broglie’s dynamics is stable (an ensemble in quantum non-equilibrium, ρ 6= |ψ|2, will approach
equilibrium), while in Bohm’s theory there is a a more general form of non-equilibrium (where de Broglie’s
relation ~p = ∇S is violated), which is unstable [29].
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11.5.1 Wallstrom’s criticism
The problem with the above theory, and indeed any many-trajectories theory with or with-
out a geometric foundation [120, 56, 117] is that the space of solutions of such a theory
is smaller than that of de Broglie-Bohm quantum mechanics.12 While on a small local
patch in configuration space the equations have the same solutions, a difference in the
possible global properties of the solutions arises. To our knowledge this was first noted
by Wallstrom [140] in the context of the Madelung hydrodynamic approach.
The function S, when introduced as the phase of the (physically real) wavefunction
ψ = |ψ|eiS/~, is multi-valued, S ∼ S + m · 2pi~, m ∈ Z. Furthermore, S is undefined
at nodes of the wavefunction (points where ψ = 0). These two facts together imply that
there may be ‘states’ (functions ψ) such that a closed loop L may be found such that∮
L
∂iS dl
i 6= 0, (11.26)
where dl is a line element in the configuration space. Specifically this is possible if and
only if L is non-contractible, in the sense that it is impossible to deform L continuously
into a point without passing through a node. Such loops exist in the presence of (n− 2)-
dimensional nodes (points in two dimension, lines in three dimensions, etc.).
Contrast this to the case where S is introduced as a scalar function on C [such as in
ref. 116]. Here S is defined even where µ = 0 and is a real field on C, so that the integral
11.26 vanishes for any loop.
Solutions to the Schro¨dinger equation that display this non-integrability of ∂iS arise,
for example, in the case of stationary states of hydrogen-like atoms with non-zero angular
momentum. It follows that the present theory and other, similar many-trajectories theo-
ries do not allow for non-zero angular momentum states and therefore do not match the
predictions of quantum mechanics.
Wallstrom’s criticism has remained largely unaddressed by authors proposing many-
trajectory theories, as we discussed in the short survey above. The solution we will con-
struct here is superficially similar to Smolin’s [122], who introduces a unimodular com-
plex variable w (a ‘complex factor beable’) in place of the momentum. However, in our
case the goal will be achieved via a generalisation of the total derivative appearing in the
Lagrangian, not by revising the mathematical representation of momenta.
11.5.2 Nodes
The necessity of having nodes present in cases where this mismatch between our ‘trajec-
tory-Weyl theory’ (TWT) and quantum mechanics arises leads us to investigate the nature
of nodes in the former. The term ‘node’ in TWT is, of course, not a good choice of
12Alternatively a many-trajectories theory may be constructed using the velocities or momenta them-
selves as the variables and not making reference to a function S. In this case the space of solutions is not
smaller than that of de Broglie-Bohm but instead larger since angular momenta can take continuous values.
Hence there are two versions of Wallstrom’s criticism applicable to different sorts of formulations.
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terminology given that no waves are involved. However, it is clear what is meant: A
point P in C is a node if µ(P ) = 0. In de Broglie-Bohm theory this does not necessarily
imply that there is no trajectory that passes through the node. Whether a consistent law
of motion exists for this system depends on whether the phase function S(q) or at least
the velocity field can be analytically extended through the node. This is trivial if the wave
function is real (e.g. the n = 2, ` = 1, m = 0 state of hydrogen), in which case the
particle placed at the node remains at the node. On the other hand, the n = 2, ` = 1,
m = 1 state does not allow for such an analytic extension. There can be no continuous
velocity field that includes the node and no trajectory can exist there within the framework
of the theory. More generally, a trajectory exists (in a mathematical sense) at the node if
and only if the loop integrals
∮
L
∂iS dl
i around the node vanish. Whether or not this extra
‘world’ exists in an ontological sense is however irrelevant for the dynamics of all other
‘worlds’ in the case of ‘many-de Broglie-Bohm-worlds’ theory. Furthermore, adding a
single trajectory does not change the local system density.
Above we obtained the result φi = − 1n−2∂i(lnµ) (eq. 11.21). At a node, where µ = 0,
this becomes undefined. That is, the mathematical notion of vector transport and the idea
of ‘scale’ fails to make sense at nodes. So nodes correspond to a certain kind of geometric
singularity.
Let us examine the behaviour of the Weyl form φi in the immediate vicinity of a node.
Suppose µ ∼ r2m as we approach the node, where r is the distance from the node and m
is some (not necessarily integer) positive power. The factor of two in the exponent is for
later convenience.
Approaching the node radially, that is, moving in the negative-r direction, we see that
φ−r = − 2
n− 2
∂
∂(−r) ln r
2m =
2m
n− 2
1
r
, (11.27)
which shows that the length of a vector being transported radially towards the node by
a small distance δr grows by a factor proportional to r−1. Since the Weyl geometry is
integrable, we can also look at the length of a vector itself, which goes as
` ∼ − ln r, (11.28)
and so `→∞ as r → 0.
11.5.3 From a manifold with trajectories to a manifold of trajectories
It is now time for a shift in our thinking. We began by considering systems moving in
the configuration-space manifold C with time, forming trajectories in the ‘configuration-
space-time’ (C ⊗ time, sometimes called the ‘extended configuration space’ [72]). How-
ever, the dynamics of the theory imply that geometric properties are undefined at certain
points in C, namely those points not occupied by a system. This suggests that instead
of considering systems particles (or ‘corpuscles’, or ‘worlds’) moving in a manifold, we
should consider the manifold of all system particles (or of all trajectories if we think of
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it in a configuration-space-time picture), which we shall call T . The configuration space
merely becomes a way to label systems within our continuously infinite ensemble, namely
by using the physical properties (the value of the variables qi). In the presence of nodes,
T is not simply connected.
The view taken is therefore the following. The physical world in its entirety consists
of an infinite collection of similar systems (described by the same set of variables, that is,
corresponding to points in the same configuration space) whose properties are specified
in the form of n variables qi. These variables determine the continuity properties of the
collection, thereby forming an n-dimensional manifold T . Since the number density of
systems is not uniform across the qi, this manifold, in general, has non-zero curvature.
The manifold T may be embedded in a configuration space C of the same dimension via
a Weyl geometry, on which points are labelled by the qi. Continuous subsets of C with
a dimension smaller than n might not have an inverse image (are not mapped to in the
embedding) and form nodes, illustrating that the original manifold might not be simply
connected. In practice, we work in C, labelling systems by qi and tracking their local
number density via the function µ : C → R≥0.
The function S introduced in the action as an arbitrary function is defined on T , not
C. Following the embedding in C it is therefore natural that S is not defined at nodes,
since these are exactly those points that are not in the image of T . Of course, by itself
this does not answer Wallstrom’s criticism. While the presence of nodes is necessary for
a mismatch between naı¨ve TWT and quantum mechanics to occur, it is not sufficient. In
quantum mechanics S is multi-valued and the presence of nodes merely allows one to
find closed paths changing S continuously from one value at a point to another at the
same point.
Before coming to the second part of our solution to Wallstrom’s problem, return
briefly to the question of the existence of trajectories at nodes. In TWT, unlike in ‘many-
de Broglie-Bohm worlds’ theory, the manifold of system particles is considered funda-
mental. This manifold may or may not have a non-trivial topology, and what functions S
(or ‘U + W ’ as introduced in the next section) are possible is contingent on that topol-
ogy. One result of this is that a scenario in which there is a node in the wave function
(as described by the standard theory) through which S can be analytically extended may
or may not correspond to a simply connected topology for T . But whether or not there
is a system particle at the node matters—unlike in the case of ‘many-de Broglie-Bohm
worlds’—since it changes the topology of the manifold and therefore the global properties
of functions definable on it.
11.5.4 The most general time derivative dS/dt
We now discuss a possible solution to Wallstrom’s problem. We consider the most general
total time-derivative dS/dt that can be added to the Lagrangian. This is, in fact, the sum of
two time derivatives, one of which takes values on R as usual, the other one is a derivative
of a function that takes values from the closed one-dimensional manifold S1, not R.
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In order to see this, let us take a step back and consider how S was introduced. We
added an arbitrary total derivative dS
dt
to the action. The only requirement was that dS
dt
∈ R.
This requirement may seem almost not worth stating since it is generally assumed that
terms in the action take values over R or sometimesC. However, the implication of dS
dt
∈ R
is not that S itself must take values on R. Instead we could define S : T → S1, that is, let
S map from T (or equivalently C \ {nodes}) to the closed one-dimensional manifold, the
‘circle’ S1. The spaces S1 and R share the same tangent space R. Furthermore, they are
the only spaces that do so and our Lagrangian will therefore indeed be the most general.
It turns out that the resultant function ‘S’ has the required properties to resolve Wall-
strom’s problem. A critic might be inclined to say that we ‘cheated’ by giving S the
required phase-like property by fiat. Yet without wishing to discuss the philosophical is-
sues too deeply, this is no different than any other introduction of mathematical objects in
quantitative physics. The choice of what particular type of object should represent some
proposed physical entity is founded on the properties that entity is supposed to have,
inferred from observed phenomena and, arguably, certain theoretical guiding principles
(such as generality, simplicity, symmetries, etc.). For example, in standard quantum me-
chanics we invent a mathematical object called the ‘wavefunction’ that takes values from
C on configuration space (or, more abstractly, some Hilbert space whose physical mean-
ing is more obscure). Similarly, we have chosen the correct mathematical structure to
address Wallstrom’s objection and match the predictions of the theory to empirical facts.
We could justify the step of adding to the action a total time-derivative of a function
S : T → S1 rather than one mapping to R by its ultimate observational success (such as
in measurements of atomic angular momentum). However, since the requirement dS
dt
∈ R
gives two options, S : T → R and S : T → S1, and neither changes the equations
of motion, a priori we should add both terms in order to achieve maximal generality.
The added term is therefore not an ad-hoc addition, but a natural generalisation. Let us
therefore introduce a function U : T → R, while the symbol W will be used for the
function W : T → S1. These take the place of the symbol ’S’. Our action becomes
I?TWT =
∫ t1
t0
dt
∫
C
dnx
√
gµ(x)
(
Lclass(q, q˙, t) + γ(n)λ
2R[gij(q, t), φi(q, t)]
− dU
dt
(q, t)− dW
dt
(q, t)
)
. (11.29)
The equation of motion (11.18) remains unchanged, as does the result for the Weyl ge-
ometry (11.21). The one difference is in the boundary equation, which now reads
pi = ∂iW + ∂iU. (11.30)
All the previous derivations to recover de Broglie-Bohm trajectories hold provided we
replace S by ‘W +U ’. The expression is in quotation marks since addition is not defined
for two functions taking values in different spaces, even if both are one-dimensional, and
is therefore not to be interpreted as literal addition. However, S = ‘U +W ′ never occurs
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itself, only its derivatives do and among them addition is well-defined (since they all take
values in R).
Now since U is a globally defined real field, we have∮
L
∂iU · dli = 0 (11.31)
for any closed loop, so there is no contribution from U to closed-loop integrals of ∇S.
Meanwhile, ∮
L
∂iW · dli = z · h, z ∈ Z, (11.32)
where h is defined to be the value obtained when the image of the loop L under W winds
around the manifold S1 exactly once. The numerical value of h depends on how the
manifold S1 is parametrised (how it is represented in terms of real numbers, ultimately a
choice of units). The value of h is the same for all nodes in the manifold.
The constant h can be thought of as the ‘circumference’ of S1 if we visualise the
manifold as a circle embedded in R2. It functions as a ‘constant of conversion’ between
lengths on S1 and on R. For dimensional reasons it takes units of angular momentum if
dimensionful variables are used. What is left to be addressed is the relationship between
the associated radius, ~ = h/2pi, and the geometric ‘coupling constant’ λ.
The proportionality of the geometric coupling constant γλ2 follows from dimensional
analysis. The functions U and W must have the same dimension as the action, length
squared over time (L2T−1). The only fundamental scale in the theory is the ‘radius’ ~,
which therefore must also have dimensions L2T−1. But the dimensions of the curvature
R are L−2, so γλ2 must have the dimensions of ~2, allowing us to set λ = ~, leaving only
the numerical constant γ.
The constant ~ is the one fundamental scale provided by the theory. It is remarkable
that this one fundamental scale is, in fact, sufficient to compare all terms in the Lagrangian
(that is, to let them have the same dimensionality). It is even possible to go one step further
and demand that the action be dimensionless. This can be achieved by rescaling ITWT by
a factor ~−1. In this case U and W are dimensionless, too, and the closed manifold onto
which W maps is simply parametrised by angular values.
So only the numerical value of γ is left to be discussed. The value 1
8
n−2
n−1 was, of
course, chosen with the hindsight of experimental outcomes (matching those of quantum
mechanics). However, it is itself distinguished: Its n-dependence is the unique choice
such that the resultant equations of motion do not explicitly depend on n. Only the ge-
ometric properties of the manifold do (eq. 11.21). The coupling constant resembles a
‘conformal coupling‘ as familiar from field theory in Riemannian geometries.
11.6 Discussion of trajectory-Weyl quantisation
In this chapter we showed how the phenomenology of non-relativistic quantum mechanics
may be recovered starting with an ‘ensemble’ of systems continuously distributed in con-
figuration space. Thus our theory is one of many worlds, though very much distinct from
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the notion of ‘world’ in (Everettian) ‘Many-Worlds’ Theory. By including a curvature
term in the action the trajectories turned out to match those of equilibrium de Broglie-
Bohm theory. Our construction was closely modelled along that of [111], although our
starting point was different. Nor is the idea of recovering quantum dynamics via an infi-
nite ensemble of systems, covering all possible configurations, completely new, although
it is a relatively recent development.
Our purpose here was to show that the two ideas, a dynamical Weyl geometry together
with a ‘many-trajectory’ theory, form a natural union. In order to emphasise this point we
showed how Wallstrom’s objection, a key problem with ‘quantum’ theories not based on
a wavefunction, can be overcome via a generalisation of the total time derivative in the
Lagrangian.
In our procedure we demoted the configuration space to a purely mathematical con-
cept, with the physical reality corresponding to a manifold of configuration-space parti-
cles (or ‘worlds’), or — in a configuration-space-time picture — of trajectories. Other
than the fact that this manifold, unlike the configuration space, has topological properties
that allow the existence of non-contractible loops and thereby forms the first step in our
solution to Wallstrom’s objection, it may also be philosophically preferable: In standard
quantum mechanics the wavefunction is defined on configuration space and it is unclear
what this space is without appeal to some previous classical theory with a certain set of
dynamical variables. In contrast, the present trajectory-Weyl theory has no such ambigu-
ous ontology. Functions such as S (or U and W ) are defined on the set of all worlds, each
of which is physically concrete. If the manifold allows for non-contractible loops then the
S1-valued function W may yield non-zero quantised values for the integral
∮
∂iW · dli.
The appearance of W in the generalisation of the Lagrangian thus completes the solution
to Wallstrom’s objection.
The development of this wavefunction-free method of arriving at a quantum theory
from a classical theory was motivated by the failure of the canonical quantisation scheme
in gravity, and from conceptual issues with interpreting the wavefunction of the universe,
for example. Our motivation has therefore been entirely negative, namely the failure of
another quantisation scheme. There is another positive, philosophical reason however for
this kind of quantisation. In fact, even in the absence of any empirical evidence for quan-
tum effects a philosopher might propose a scheme similar to ours because of conceptual
trouble with the classical theory.
Consider a philosopher and scientist at the end of the late nineteenth century. Looking
at the known laws of physics, he13 realised that two pieces of information are required for
a physical description of the universe: its laws (in the form of equations) and boundary
conditions (selecting the actually instantiated solution). Leaving aside the possibly deeper
questions of why the laws are what they are, he wonders not only why nature chose some
particular boundary conditions rather than another, but also why one set of boundary
conditions must be selected — that is, somehow ontologically preferred — in the first
place. He finds the demand of classical physics to arbitrarily choose a single solution
13Gender inequality at the time implies that chances are this scholar would likely have been male.
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from the set of all solutions of the laws of nature unacceptable. That is, he dislikes the
categorisation of worlds into impossible worlds (those not satisfying the laws of nature),
possible but non-actual worlds (solutions to the laws of nature that differ from the actual
world), and possible actual worlds (the one world we live in).
Suppose, he says, there is no distinction between actual and non-actual possible worlds.
All initial conditions are equally real.14 We would be unable to observe worlds other than
our own (or they would be part of our world by definition), so there is no empirical reason
either for or against their reality. His intellectual adversaries bring up the principle of
parsimony (‘Ockham’s razor’) but he replies confidently that parsimony was exactly the
reason to abandon the superfluous notion of ‘possible but not actual’ worlds. However,
he soon realises that an implication of classical mechanics understood in this sense is that
individual world trajectories cross and that configuration-space position alone does not
uniquely identify a world (one has to include velocities, or momenta). Dissatisfied by this
underdetermination he formalises this problem mathematically in the Hamilton-Jacobi
description and adds the demand that the Hamilton-Jacobi equation be C2 (doubly differ-
entiable) everywhere as this would fix the problem. Imposing this constraint, he arrives at
trajectory-based quantisation.
The development from Hamilton-Jacobi theory to quantum trajectories in this manner
was, in fact, proposed by Tipler [130], as we discussed. The preceding philosophical
argument has to my knowledge not been made in this exact form, though it is closely tied
to the reasoning of Lewis [76] and others on the reality of all possible worlds (see footnote
14).
While the reasoning is somewhat tentative and may need to be spelled out more rigor-
ously, it does in any case serve as an example of how purely philosophical reasoning —
so often dismissed by physicists — can lead to empirically adequate theories. Of course,
if physicists were to adopt this reasoning, it would undoubtedly no longer be considered
‘philosophical’.15
The scientific test of the theory is, of course, another. Can this quantisation scheme
provide a path toward an adequate theory of quantum gravity?
14 The philosophical position proposed here is somewhat similar to modal realism (most prominently
held by David Lewis [76]), which states that all possible worlds are equally real. There ‘possible’ means
not logically inconsistent (while worlds with laws of physics different from ours are considered ‘possible’).
The view of our fictional polymath here is more restricted in that ‘possible’ is understood as ‘possible given
that the laws of physics are just as they are in our world.’ We will return to this discussion briefly in the
conclusion (chapter 13).
15Coincidentally, the fact that once a particular line of philosophical reasoning has consequences for a
physical theory it becomes adopted by physicists and loses its status of being ‘philosophical’, and that as a
result philosophers are considered by some to never contribute anything useful to physics, has been pointed
out in a popular article by Hossenfelder [61].
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Chapter 12
Quantum cosmology from
trajectory-Weyl quantisation?
In this chapter we sketch the application of the wavefunction-free quantisation scheme
developed in the last chapter to gravity. Detailed technical developments are left for
future work.
12.1 Extension of the trajectory-Weyl approach
The developments of the last chapter have provided us with a fundamentally new method
of arriving at a quantum theory from a classical theory. For a finite-dimensional particle
system with the usual action we have exactly recovered the empirical predictions of equi-
librium de Broglie-Bohm theory and hence standard operational quantum mechanics. It
is however not guaranteed that this equivalence should hold for any type of system, in
particular, for systems with classical equations that have a fundamentally different form,
such as those resulting from Hamiltonian reduction. In the case of quantum gravity and
cosmology it is not even clear what the ‘standard’ approach is (there is none). The phe-
nomenological equivalence with canonical quantisation for conventional actions is, in a
sense, coincidental.1
The geometric approach (without a trajectory ontology) has been extended to relativis-
tic particle quantum mechanics [112, 113] (in the sense of a non-field-theoretic picture,
where the Klein-Gordon equation is considered to hold for a wavefunction, not for a clas-
sical field) and the particle Dirac equation [114, 116], starting from the configuration
space of a classical rigid body (although without attention to Wallstrom’s criticism). The
trajectory ontology could however be incorporated into their method. Extension to field
theory proper is technically more difficult. The primary reason is that the field-theoretic
configuration space (the space of all allowed functions φ(x) in scalar field theory, for
1Of course, without this coincidence we would never have discovered the possibility of trajectory-Weyl
quantisation. More precisely, if the fundamental ontology of the universe is really such an infinite ensem-
ble of systems individually described by classical language and if the dynamics were not equivalent with
canonical quantisation, then canonical quantisation and standard operational quantum theory would never
have been developed, at least not in the present form.
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example, or (conformal) superspace in the case of gravity) is infinite-dimensional. The
standard measure on this space is therefore not defined but only Gaussian measures are
available [31, 32]. This complication is likely manageable. An open question is the proper
definition of a geometry (specifically, the curvature term that enters the action) in the case
of an infinite-dimensional space. A rigorously constructed theory will require consider-
able technical and formal development, an endeavour left for future work. In the next
section (12.2) we sketch some of the expressions that are the metric-field counterparts of
the equations in chapter 11.
Wallstrom’s problem exists in field theory, too. Recall that the presence of non-
contractible loops requires the existence of nodes of co-dimension two. In field theory
this occurs in states corresponding to particular linear combinations of two field modes,
analogous to circular polarisation. For example, if only two such modes k1, k2 in Fourier
space are non-zero, then the infinite-dimensional wave functional can be written in the
form of a two-dimensional wavefunction. For example,
Ψ(k1, k2) = R(|k21 + k22|) [cos k1 + i sin k2], (12.1)
where R(|k21 + k22|) is the ‘radial’ part of Ψ and satisfies R(0) = 0, so that there is a node
on the ‘∞ − 2’ dimensional ‘line’ k1 = 0 = k2. The existence of such states implies
that Wallstrom’s objection also applies to the infinite-dimensional field theory, not just to
simple non-relativistic particle mechanics.
The success of such the trajectory-Weyl approach to quantum field theory is yet to
be determined, although one may be hopeful. Ultimately the goal is, of course, its ap-
plication to gravity. Multiple preliminary investigations need to be undertaken here: the
quantisation of time-reparameterisation invariant systems such as those described in chap-
ter 2, the quantisation of relational theories such as the precursors to Shape Dynamics as
described above, a series of minisuperspace models, which may provide some insight
regarding the scheme’s application to gravity, in particular in the context of cosmology,
the question whether a fully covariant quantisation is possible with this method or if a
particular choice of physical time such as York time has to be made, or if we should disre-
gard general relativity all together in favour of Shape Dynamics, and so on. Undoubtedly
this work would easily take up another thesis, likely more. Here we contend with laying
the foundation for what may ultimately turn out to be a viable contender for a theory of
quantum gravity.
12.2 Application to gravity and cosmology
Applying the above quantisation scheme to gravity — presumably to the spatial metric
field for a chosen slicing such as the York-time (constant-mean-curvature) foliation —
introduces a number of technical issues. In addition, it is notationally cumbersome and
some development in this area will be necessary for the theory to be viably analysed. Let
us sketch some of the steps toward this wavefunction-free theory of quantum gravity.
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The basic dynamical variables (the ‘qi’ above) in the case of gravity are the possible
configuration of the metric field qab(x). We reserve the symbol gab(x) (or (q0)ab(x)) for
the analogue of the initial variable value or ‘coordinate’ that was called x (or initially
qi0) above, while x in this chapter refers to points of space. The configuration space is the
infinite-dimensional function space of all possible functions qab(x) which are suitably well
behaved, the precise meaning of which will have to be determined but will presumably
involve being symmetric in the indices (ab) and smooth almost everywhere, and possibly
satisfying other properties relating to finiteness and continuity. One way to ‘translate’
the finite-dimensional quantities from the last chapter to the functional quantities of the
present one is to treat x itself like an additional index, albeit one that takes values not
from a finite subset of N but from R3 in the case of a flat cosmology and from S3 in a
closed one. Sums over indices become integrals over space, in addition to the finite sums
over the two standard indices of the metric. One plausible proposal for a simplifying
notation would be to write qab(x) rather than qab(x) together with an ‘Einstein integration
convention’, integrating over recurring ‘(x)’. However, we will not use this here but leave
this to be investigated further in future work.
A technical issue that arises in the case of the flat cosmology is that integrals over R3
are, in general, not finite even if the integrand is finite everywhere. One will therefore
require some form of normalisation. This could take the form of a suitably infinitesimal
pre-factor cancelling the infinity or the introduction of a coordinate ‘box’ of space, giving
finite integration limits. The infinite limit of this box could then be taken at the level of
measurable quantities.2
The expression for the classical action analogous to equation 11.1, using York time T ,
would read
I1 =
∫
dT L
[
qab(x)(T ), q
′
ab(x)(T ), T
)
, L =
∫
d3x L
(
qab(x)(T ), q
′
ab(x)(T ), T
)
.
(12.2)
Here we used the convention to use square brackets for dependence on functional ar-
guments and mixed brackets ‘[...)’ if both functional as well as conventional arguments
occur. The expression qab(x)(T ) is to be understood as the variable q with finite indices
ab, continuous ‘index’ (x), as a function of time T . We see how the notation quickly be-
comes difficult to read and proposed convention of placing (x) in the super or subscript,
for example, may help with clarity.
The analogue of the action written with the initial ‘coordinate’ gab(x) ≡ (q0)ab(x)
2Alternatively, the theory might be investigated with a suitably chosen box size, such as the size of the
observable universe (of order 10− 100 gigaparsecs today). The latter idea would correspond to choosing a
coordinate limit such that the line integral across the box would give a physical distance of this order, using
a classically plausible choice of metric configuration. However, since here classical notions of distance are
introduced, this method appears less desirable than taking the infinite limit.
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included (equation 11.3) is
I1
[
(q0)ab(x), T0;T1
)
=∫
T1
T0
dT L
[
qab(x)
[
(q0)ab(x);T
)
, q′ab(x)
[
(q0)ab(x)
[
(q0)ab(x);T
)
, T
)
.
(12.3)
The need for more concise yet clear notation is evident. Application of the open-endpoint
principle leads to vanishing of the momenta just as above. Spelled out (analogous to
eq. 11.5),
piab(x)
[
qab(x)
(
T1, (q0)ab(x)
]
, q′ab(x)
(
T1, (q0)ab(x)
]
, T
)
≡ δL
δqab(x)
[
qab(x)
(
T1, (q0)ab(x)
]
, q′ab(x)
(
T1, (q0)ab(x)
]
, T
)
= 0. (12.4)
The ensemble minimisation principle above involved an integral of the full configura-
tion space together with a suitable measure µ. The corresponding expression (analogous
to eq. 11.10) is, formally,
IEns =
∫
C
Dgab(x) µ
[
gab(x)
]
I1
[
gab(x), T0;T1
)
. (12.5)
In close analogy with the developments in chapter 11 we have now abandoned the notation
(q0)ab(x) in favour of the ‘coordinate’ gab(x). The term Dgab(x) denotes the coordinate
integration measure (itself an issue, to be addressed below), with the physical, dynamical
measure being given by µ as above.
This raises the second major technical problem. Measures on function spaces are
difficult to define. For example, there is no notion of a basic Lebesque measure. Only
Gaussian measures exist [31, 32]. The way forward here would likely be to first repeat
the finite-dimensional trajectory-Weyl quantisation with such Gaussian measures only (in
standard quantum mechanics a Gaussian rather than Lebesque measure over the configu-
ration/Hilbert space changes the position representation of operators, for example, but is
also possible). Then one could construct a field-theoretic analogy of that. The issue is, I
believe, manageable at least in principle, even if complicated.
Another difficulty is the correct notion of the analogue of a Weyl geometry in a func-
tion space. The naı¨ve expression for length transport3 is
`+ d` = `+ `
∫
d3x φab(x)Dgab(x). (12.6)
3The way to define the length of a vector in a function space in the first place is not obviously unique
either.
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This expression alone involves two technical issues: First, the integral is over all space,
which may be infinite. This can be dealt with via a nominal coordinate box. The second is-
sue is that a small shiftDgab (not to be confused with the functional volume elementDgab)
in the function space requires a metric M on this function space in the first place.4 This
problem is exactly that of the coordinate integration measure mentioned earlier. There is
no unique or obvious way to choose this metric. A further complication (though one that
can be dealt with) arises with the need to identify metric configurations that correspond
to the same geometry (that is, are related via three-diffeomorphisms).
One then has to define a notion akin to curvature for the function space. I am not
currently aware of how far such notions have been developed by mathematicians. A
significant degree of function-space theory will be necessary to make trajectory-Weyl
quantisation rigorous for the metric field. What the resulting dynamics look like will be
seen.
A more basic development is necessary first if the system to be quantised in this man-
ner was obtained by Hamiltonian reduction, specifically with York time as the physical
time parameter. The developments of chapter 11 were in a Lagrangian style (a term
was added to the action), while the reduced-Hamiltonian theory is by its very nature a
Hamiltonian formalism. Naı¨vely, on might propose deriving a physical (or ‘reduced’)
Lagrangian from the reduced Hamiltonian via a Legendre transform, schematically (for a
finite-dimensional model):
Lphys = q
′apa −Hphys(q, p, T ). (12.7)
This is however problematic since the dynamics in the reduced-Hamiltonian theory is not
determined only by the physical Hamiltonian but also, crucially, by the Poisson struc-
ture. Equations of motion derived via minimisation from a Lagrangian principle would
be incorrect since the non-canonical Poisson structure would be lost.
Instead this requires the development of the proposed quantisation scheme in the
Hamiltonian picture. Another option however could be to quantise in the trajectory-Weyl
style prior to Hamiltonian reduction. In this case the quantisation scheme needs to be ex-
tended to include time-reparameterisation invariant systems (with general lapse functions
N ) and the procedure of Hamiltonian reduction would need to be extended to include
terms involving the configuration-space curvature. Developments in fundamental analyt-
ical mechanics appear to form the foundation of this approach to quantum gravity, no
matter which line of inquiry is pursued.
A short-term goal may be the quantisation of cosmological minisuperspace models
(such as those of chapter 5 and section 7.2), which only have a finite number of dimen-
sions. In this case the homogeneous gravitational and matter degrees of freedom would
take the role of the variables qi of chapter 11. Even this development however requires
the quantisation scheme to be expressed in a Hamiltonian-compatible form, at least if
4The deWitt supermetric Gabcd together with integration over all space (since the deWitt supermetric is
map from two metric values at a point to a number, while M is to be a map from two metric functions)
comes to mind, although this would require some a priori justification.
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connection with a reduced-Hamiltonian picture is to be made. An open question here
is one we already touched upon, then with regards to canonical quantisation. It equally
arises in the case of geometry-trajectory quantisation: is quantising the cosmology equiv-
alent to ‘cosmologising’ the quantum theory? That is, is the dynamics one obtains by
quantising a minisuperspace model the same as those obtained by imposing the selected
minisuperspace symmetries onto the full quantum theory?
The goal of this chapter was not to present a full theory of quantum gravity. In-
deed, this would be beyond the scope of any single thesis. Instead the goal was to lay
out as clearly as reasonably possible a research programme based on the quantisation
method developed in chapter 11, possibly in conjunction with the physical-time reduced-
Hamiltonian approach that has formed the main part of this work.
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Chapter 13
Conclusion
An ideal candidate for a fundamental theory of quantum gravity would have the following
features:
1. It should have a self-consistent mathematical structure and its axioms or principles
should be independent of any non-quantum-gravitational regime, such as a low-
energy or large-scale limit.
2. It should provide a clear ontological picture of what sorts of entities constitute the
world at the fundamental level.
3. In the appropriate respective limits it should recover an empirically adequate clas-
sical theory of gravity (such as general relativity or Shape Dynamics) and the quan-
tum field theory of the standard model.1
4. It should make clear predictions about in principle empirically accessible quantities
for regimes in which both quantum as well as gravitational effects are important
(such as the very early universe) and that are outside the scope of our current best
fundamental theories.
I would believe that these criteria are for the most part uncontroversial. That the theory
be consistent is obvious and that it avoid reference to other regimes is a requirement for
the theory to be fundamental and not, for example, to suffer from an analogue of the
measurement problem, which in quantum mechanics arises as the result of the reliance of
the theory on external regimes (such as classical observers) to which the theory does not
apply.
The second point (concerning ontology) might not be considered important by work-
ers without realist sympathies. This is ultimately a question of the philosophy of science,
the full extent of which we cannot discuss in the confines of this thesis. However, provid-
ing a clear picture of ontology is arguably necessary for the theory to have explanatory
rather than merely predictive value. At least historically this has been a feature of suc-
cessful theories in physics, including some formulations of quantum mechanics.
1The subject here is a fundamental theory of quantum gravity that includes appropriate matter content,
not a quantum theory of pure gravity (unless is itself purely geometrical, for example, described via a
Kaluza-Klein mechanism).
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The third point is a necessity if the theory is to be empirically adequate. It may be
possible that the limit of the fundamental theory leads to a classical theory of gravity, for
example, that is structurally different from known theories such as general relativity or
Shape Dynamics, but still agrees with observation. In such a case the theory of quantum
gravity would provide a new way ‘for free’ to understand classical gravity. But even then
general relativity and Shape Dynamics would form effective theories in the low-energy
large-scale regime.
The final point is necessary for the theory to be falsifiable independent of the empirical
status of its effective form in the low-energy regimes of classical gravity and quantum field
theory. If the theory has open parameters these should be determinable by experiment but
not in such a way that they can be made to fit any set of observations, lest the theory lose
its scientific value.
A criterion that could be added to the list is that the theory should be derivable from
a small number of well-defined physical principles. Indeed such a property would be
desirable. However, it is not obvious that nature has to behave in a manner that allows for
the reduction of its structure to simple principles or axioms. While many theories in the
past have satisfied this criterion (indeed, a substantial effort is made today to axiomatise
the structure of quantum theory, information-theoretically or otherwise), it is not a given
that there is a fundamental theory of quantum gravity that is reducible in this manner.
How does the quantisation (canonical or otherwise) of reduced-Hamiltonian theories
of gravity, in particular our theory based on York time fare? The mathematical structure of
our theory is effectively that of quantum mechanics applied to a conformal geometry as its
physical degrees of freedom, together with an appropriate matter content. In the canonical
theory one has a wavefunction and (in the de Broglie-Bohm approach) a trajectory in
configuration space (recall that position space is considered physically preferred not only
in de Broglie-Bohm theory, but also by the commutator structure of the quantised reduced-
Hamiltonian theory). The constraints that arise as part of the reduction fit neatly into
this framework (section 10.1 above) and there is no sign of any internal inconsistency.2
Crucially, the theory is also consistent with time evolution, which was not the case in the
unreduced theory of general relativity in the ADM description, whose quantisation led
to a frozen universe. In the trajectory-Weyl approach a number of technical questions
remain to be explored (see chapter 12), and only once these are overcome the consistency
of the theory can be fully assessed. However, at least in the finite-dimensional model this
method of quantisation did not lead to any obvious inconsistencies.
The ontology of our theories is also clear. In the canonical theory the universe is made
up of a complex entity mathematically described by a wavefunctional — a complex func-
tion over spatial geometries — and possibly (in the de Broglie-Bohm picture) a concrete
‘world’ represented by a moving point (or ‘particle’) in the configuration space. Whether
or not this is a satisfactory ontological picture is a different question (mostly independent
2Proving that a theory is actually consistent is in general very difficult. It is a lot easier, usually, to show
that an inconsistent theory is just that, while in the case of a consistent theory one must point to the absence
of obvious inconsistencies.
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of gravity and dependent more generally on quantum theory). But either way, it is a clear
proposal for an ontology. In the trajectory-Weyl picture, the universe instead consists of
an infinite continuity of ‘classical-like’ worlds (each representable by a single point in
configuration space), evolving dynamically in time dependent on one another. There is
no wavefunction. In both theories time has a status analogous to standard classical and
quantum mechanics, although it is physically meaningful (since the dynamics is explicitly
time dependent). While this does not answer the question ‘what is time?’ this issue is no
more pressing than the same question asked in the context of classical mechanics.
The limits of the theories are expected to satisfy the third criterion. A classical limit
may be obtained, for example, via Ehrenfest’s theorem or by analysis of the quantum
trajectories in conditions representing a classical-like regime.3 Quantum field theory is
expected to be recovered in the case where matter fields dominate and the gravitational
field is approximately static flat space. An issue that arises here is that in such a scenario
no York time passes, so quantum field theory can never be obtained exactly but must be
always be understood as a limit (to some extent the situation is analogous to the York-time
description of inflation in section 5.4). In fact, given the intrinsically geometrical nature
of York time, completely new insights into ‘Minkowski’ quantum field theory may be
gained by analysing this limit. A non-trivial amount of work will be necessary to develop
this.
Finally, the description of the early universe in York-time geometrodynamics is qual-
itatively no different from later eras: time passes and geometric and matter quantities
evolve. In fact, the universe is infinitely old and all time but the very last finite interval
belong to the so-called Planck era. Our theory requires further developments in order
to identify what the measurable remnants of this era are. This may be via the quan-
tum perturbation theory developed in this thesis, or take the form of non-linear (that is,
non-perturbative) effects. Relating the theory to actual experimental measurements and
distinguishing it empirically will require more work. The scientific value of the theory
will rest, at least to a substantial part, on these developments.
Suppose then that quantised York-time geometrodynamics (canonical or trajectory-
Weylian) or perhaps some other still unknown approach to quantum gravity turns out to
be an ideal theory in the sense of the criteria above, and further presume that this theory
becomes well corroborated by experiment. That is, the theory of quantum gravity has
been found. What is left for fundamental physics?
The search for quantum gravity is not the only big outstanding question in theoretical
physics: What is the cosmological constant and why is it what it is? Did inflation really
occur and what are the actual mechanisms responsible for it if it did? If it did not, what
explains the CMB homogeneity and scale-invariant power spectrum? What about the
3There is no complete consensus, it seems, on what constitutes a rigorous derivation of the classical
limit of a quantum theory. Frequent approaches include considering the limit of the theory as ~ → 0
(which makes no physical sense since ~ is a constant and showing that the theory leads to certain dynamics
in this limit has no bearing on the physical emergence of the macroscopic classical world) or introducing
‘sufficiently classical states’ (which begs the question how these states arise dynamically in the case of
systems that are expected to behave approximately classical, such as people and planets).
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flatness problem? What are the details of the reheating mechanism? In what ways, if any,
does the standard model have to be modified? What is the fundamental (field?) theory
describing matter physics at high energies and justifies the renormalisation of known field
theories, which are understood to be only effective at sufficiently low energies? The list
goes on.
One would hope that a full theory of quantum gravity might provide answers to a
number of these questions, for example, explain the apparent value of the cosmological
constant and provide a natural mechanism for inflation. However, even then physics is
left with more fundamental questions: Why are there three spatial and one temporal di-
mension (at least at the classical level)? What explains the value of constants in physics,
such as the parameters of the standard model? Why are the symmetries of space and time
— or whatever structure underlies them at the fundamental level — what they are?
One can ask questions that go even deeper: Is there an underlying reason why the
laws of physics are what they are? That is, why do the equations of quantum gravity take
one form rather than another? Even with the laws in place, how did the universe ‘decide’
what the boundary conditions should be? In a very modest sense, the trajectory-geometry
approach to quantisation might be considered to contribute to that last question. No single
trajectory is ontologically preferred and no initial configuration is selected. However, as
the theory stands currently boundary conditions still need to be applied to the density of
trajectories (or the measure on the space).
This line of questioning leads naturally to a desire for a sort of necessitarianism — the
idea that the universe is exactly as it is because it could not possibly have been otherwise,
neither laws nor boundary conditions. That is, there is an underlying reason why this
is the only consistent way for the universe to be. The idea of necessitarianism has its
own history going back at least Anthony Collins in the early eighteenth century [30],
although the subject has been firmly one of philosophy and arguably not physics.4 I do not
doubt though that if mathematical or logical reasons are found that explain the boundary
conditions of the universe, for example, the programme would very quickly be adopted by
physicists. The implication of this, the idea that all of physics would be reducible to pure
reason (although its discovery would in practice be guided by observation) is not new.
However, at this point in time it is extraordinarily remote. Nonetheless, I would argue, it
is worth pursuing these questions. Who knows where they might lead.
4Coincidentally, Collins had an extensive correspondence on a variety of philosophical questions with
the very same Samuel Clarke who famously argued with Leibniz over the nature of space, time and motion
[73].
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